Law Commons^™

Behavioral Finance And Investor Governance, Lawrence A. Cunningham

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Doing Well While Doing Good: Reassessing The Scope Of Directors' Fiduciary Obligations In For-Profit Corporations With Non-Shareholder Beneficiaries, Lisa M. Fairfax

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Enduring Illegitimacy Of The Poison Pill, Julian Velasco

Journal Articles

The poison pill is the ultimate defense against a hostile takeover. From management's perspective, it is almost too good to be true. Originally, the poison pill was seen as a way to guard against the worst of hostile takeover tactics. It has been successful; the poison pill has virtually eliminated these tactics from the repertoires of hostile bidders. However, the poison pill is extremely potent, capable of preventing all hostile takeovers, regardless of their underlying merit. Thus, the poison pill eventually became the means to employ a just say no defense of resisting hostile takeovers, regardless of the interests of …

Why A Board? Group Decisionmaking In Corporate Governance, Stephen M. Bainbridge

Vanderbilt Law Review

This Article begins by briefly describing the role of the board both in law and in practice. Part II explores the distinction be- tween consensus and authority as modes of institutional decision- making. As hierarchical institutions, corporations rely far more heavily on authority than on consensus. Yet, at the apex of the hierarchy is a collegial body that functions mainly by consensus.

Part III is the core of the Article. In order to evaluate corporate law's preference for collective decisionmaking, we need to know whether group decisionmaking is superior to that of individuals. A wealth of experimental data suggests that …

Never Trust A Corporation, William W. Bratton

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

I would like to start by noting multitudinous objections to assertions made in Larry Mitchell's Corporate Irresponsibility: America's Newest Export. But I waive these points for purposes of this Symposium. I would prefer to take the occasion to celebrate the book. So I will make two points on the subject of corporate social responsibility on which the book and I stand in complete accord.

Enron And The Dark Side Of Shareholder Value, William W. Bratton

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This Article addresses the implications that the Enron collapse holds out for the self-regulatory system of corporate governance. The case shows that the incentive structure that motivates actors in the system generates much less powerful checks against abuse than many observers have believed. Even as academics have proclaimed rising governance standards, some standards have declined, particularly those addressed to the numerology of shareholder value. The Article's inquiry begins with Enron's business plan. The Article asserts that there may be more to Enron's "virtual firm" strategy than meets the eye beholding a firm in collapse. The Article restates the strategy as …

Lipton And Rowe's Apologia For Delaware: A Short Reply, Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

Three themes animate Martin Lipton and Paul Rowe's thoughtful response to my critical evaluation of Unocal's fifteen-year history. First, they maintain that affording shareholders a primary role in the governance of takeovers depends on a commitment to the stock market's informational efficiency. Second, they claim that allowing shareholders to amend or repeal a poison pill ignores empirical evidence that the existence of a poison pill is associated with higher takeover premiums. Third, they assert that the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) reflects an implicit mega-principle that assigns control over takeovers to managers. This short reply corrects Lipton and Rowe's …

Understanding Enron: "It's About Gatekeepers, Stupid", John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

What do we know after Enron's implosion that we did not know before it? The conventional wisdom is that the Enron debacle reveals basic weaknesses in our contemporary system of corporate governance. Perhaps, this is so, but where is the weakness located? Under what circumstances will critical systems fail? Major debacles of historical dimensions – and Enron is surely that – tend to produce an excess of explanations. In Enron's case, the firm's strange failure is becoming a virtual Rorschach test in which each commentator can see evidence confirming what he or she already believed.

Corporate Norms And Contemporary Law Firm Practice, Milton C. Regan

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Larry Mitchell's book describes the movement toward share price maximization by corporate managers. More intensive market competition both domestically and abroad has led managers to believe that their corporations have little choice but to focus on short-term profits. This practice leads to greater instability for corporate workers and efforts to externalize other costs on third parties. It also intensifies the erosion of "local" cultural practices that are seen as impediments to profit maximization, whether they are associated with countries abroad, communities in the United States, or within the corporation itself. In this process, the norms of the market gain increasing …

The Organizational Psychology Of Hyper-Competition: Corporate Irresponsibility And The Lessons Of Enron, Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

What I want to do here is first explain my fears and then explore the Enron story from the standpoint of both social psychology and organizational behavior. My sense going in, at least, is that the social forces and selfish norms that emerge fairly naturally in highly competitive settings such as these dominate as behavioral influences over anything but high-powered legal controls. The kind of firm that I want to concentrate on is the "new economy" sort that requires a high rate of creative productivity from a large number of key managers and employees. Thus, I will put to the …

What Enron Means For The Management And Control Of The Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

The Enron case plays on many different dimensions, but its prominence is not merely part of popular culture's obsession with scandal du jour. Rather, the Enron situation challenges some of the core beliefs and practices that have underpinned the academic analysis of corporate law and governance, including mergers and acquisitions, since the 1980s. These amount to an interlocking set of institutions that constitute "shareholder capitalism," American-style, 2001, that we have been aggressively promoting throughout the world. We have come to rely on a particular set of assumptions about the connection between stock market prices and underlying economic realities; the reliability …

The Evolution Of Corporate Law: A Cross- Country Comparison, Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan Kleinheisterkamp, Mark D. West

Faculty Scholarship

The importance of law and legal institutions for economic development is widely acknowledged today. The invention of credit mechanisms to support long-distance trade has been hailed as one of the preconditions for the development of capitalism in Europe. The corporate form is regarded as another milestone for industrialization, the creation of viable market economies, and ultimately economic prosperity. Many former socialist countries quickly enacted new corporate codes or revived their pre-World War Two ("WWII") legislation. The failure of major privatization efforts to enhance enterprise efficiency is attributed to weaknesses in corporate governance, of which the corporate law is a crucial …

Lawyer Responsibilities In The New Disclosure & Corporate Governance Regime, Lawrence Hamermesh

Lawrence A. Hamermesh

No abstract provided.