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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Millennial Corporation, Michal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis, David H. Webber
The Millennial Corporation, Michal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis, David H. Webber
Faculty Scholarship
In a prior paper, Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund ESG Activism and The New Millennial Corporate Governance, we argued that the index funds’ sudden shift towards socially-responsible investment, after decades of ignoring or opposing it, was driven by the competition to manage growing Millennial wealth. In our view, the main contribution of that paper was identifying sharp differences between Millennials and prior generations over investment, consumption, and employment. It has now become clear that this contribution has implications far beyond index-fund environmental, social and governance (“ESG”) activism and is in fact completely transforming the corporate world, marking a fundamental shift in …
Regulating Offshore Finance, William J. Moon
Regulating Offshore Finance, William J. Moon
Faculty Scholarship
From the Panama Papers to the Paradise Papers, massive document leaks in recent years have exposed trillions of dollars hidden in small offshore jurisdictions. Attracting foreign capital with low tax rates and environments of secrecy, a growing number of offshore jurisdictions have emerged as major financial havens hosting thousands of hedge funds, trusts, banks, and insurance companies.
While the prevailing account has examined offshore financial havens as “tax havens” that facilitate the evasion or avoidance of domestic tax, this Article uncovers how offshore jurisdictions enable corporations to evade domestic regulatory law. Specifically, recent U.S. Supreme Court cases restricting the geographic …
Too-Big-To-Fail Shareholders, Yesha Yadav
Too-Big-To-Fail Shareholders, Yesha Yadav
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
To build resilience within the financial system, post-Crisis regulation relies heavily on banks to fund themselves more fully by issuing equity. This reserve of value should buttress failing banks by providing a mechanism to pay off creditors and depositors and preserve the health of financial markets. In the process, shareholders are wiped out. Scholars and policymakers, however, have neglected to examine which equity investors, in fact, are purchasing bank equity and taking on the default risk of U.S. banks. This Article addresses this question. First, it shows that five asset managers - BlackRock, Vanguard, State Street Global Advisors, Fidelity and …
Preserving The Corporate Superego In A Time Of Activism: An Essay On Ethics And Economics, John C. Coffee Jr.
Preserving The Corporate Superego In A Time Of Activism: An Essay On Ethics And Economics, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
This essay focuses on the impact of recent changes in corporate governance on ethical behavior within the public corporation. It argues that a style of corporate behavior – one characterized by a risk tolerant, even reckless, pursuit of short-term profits and a disregard for the interests of non-shareholder constituencies – is attributable in significant part to recent changes in corporate governance, including the rise of hedge fund activism, greater use of incentive compensation, and the appearance of blockholder directors. It then surveys feasible responses intended to strengthen the role of the boards as the corporation’s conscience and superego. Given the …
Trending @ Rwulaw: Susan Schwab Heyman's Post: Defining The Boundaries Of Insider Trading, Susan Schwab Heyman
Trending @ Rwulaw: Susan Schwab Heyman's Post: Defining The Boundaries Of Insider Trading, Susan Schwab Heyman
Law School Blogs
No abstract provided.
Securities Law's Dirty Little Secret, Usha Rodrigues
Securities Law's Dirty Little Secret, Usha Rodrigues
Scholarly Works
Securities law’s dirty little secret is that rich investors have access to special kinds of investments—hedge funds, private equity, private companies—that everyone else does not. This disparity stems from the fact that, from its inception, federal securities law has jealously guarded the manner in which firms can sell shares to the general public. Perhaps paternalistically, the law assumes that the average investor needs the protection of the full panoply of securities regulation and thus should be limited to buying public securities. In contrast, accredited—i.e., wealthy— investors, who it is presumed can fend for themselves, have the luxury of choosing between …
The Agency Costs Of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors And The Revaluation Of Governance Rights, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon
The Agency Costs Of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors And The Revaluation Of Governance Rights, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Faculty Scholarship
Equity ownership in the United States no longer reflects the dispersed share ownership of the canonical Berle-Means firm. Instead, we observe the reconcentration of ownership in the hands of institutional investment intermediaries, which gives rise to "the agency costs of agency capitalism." This ownership change has occurred because of (i) political decisions to privatize the provision of retirement savings and to require funding of such provision and (ii) capital market developments that favor investment intermediaries offering low-cost diversified investment vehicles. A new set of agency costs arises because in addition to divergence between the interests of record owners and the …
Agency Capitalism: Further Implications Of Equity Intermediation, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Agency Capitalism: Further Implications Of Equity Intermediation, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Faculty Scholarship
This chapter continues our examination of the corporate law and governance implications of the fundamental shift in ownership structure of U.S. public corporations from the Berle-Means pattern of widely distributed shareholders to one of Agency Capitalism – the reconcentration of ownership in intermediary institutional investors as record holders for their beneficial owners. A Berle-Means ownership distribution provided the foundation for the agency cost orientation of modern corporate law and governance – the goal was to bridge the gap between the interests of managers and shareholders that dispersed shareholders could not do for themselves. The equity intermediation of the last 30 …
The Fatal Design Defects Of L3cs, Daniel S. Kleinberger
The Fatal Design Defects Of L3cs, Daniel S. Kleinberger
Faculty Scholarship
This article argues that the L3C is an unnecessary and unwise contrivance, and it's very existence is inherently misleading. The notion that an L3C should have privileged status under the Internal Revenue Code (known as the Code) for access to tax-exempt foundation resources is inescapably at odds with the key policies that underpin the relevant Code sections, and L3Cs are not on track-let alone on a fast track-to receive special status under the Code. An ordinary limited liability company (LLC) can perform precisely the same functions proclaimed of L3Cs. In addition, because of technical flaws, the L3C legislation adopted to …
Hedge Fund Activism In The Enforcement Of Bondholder Rights, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
Hedge Fund Activism In The Enforcement Of Bondholder Rights, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
All Faculty Scholarship
Activist hedge funds have transformed how bondholders respond to violations of their contractual rights. Insurance companies and mutual funds, the traditional investors in bonds, often slept on their rights and turned active only little and late. Hedge funds, by contrast, seek out opportunities for activism in order to make profits. In the wake of their activism, hedge funds have not only benefitted themselves, but their fellow bondholders as well. Alas, the remedy scheme for violations of bondholders rights – in particular, the centrality of the acceleration remedy – introduces its own set of imperfections. When treasury interest rates have increased …
Private Investment Funds: Hedge Funds' Regulation By Size, Tamar Frankel
Private Investment Funds: Hedge Funds' Regulation By Size, Tamar Frankel
Faculty Scholarship
This Article focuses on hedge funds-a species of private investment funds. These funds appeared in the 1950s and remained active but small. Then, in a fairly short period, they grew enormously to over $1.5 trillion, although the estimates vary.1 Hedge fund managers engage in more than twenty-five different categories of investment strategies.2 Since 2002, the number of hedge funds has more than doubled to an estimated 9,000 funds,3 and their assets have grown by 400% to an estimated $1.4 trillion since 1999.4 Other estimates are higher, suggesting current hedge fund assets at $2 trillion and their …
Fiduciary Duties For Activist Shareholders, Iman Anabtawi, Lynn A. Stout
Fiduciary Duties For Activist Shareholders, Iman Anabtawi, Lynn A. Stout
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
Corporate law and scholarship generally assume that professional managers control public corporations, while shareholders play only a weak and passive role. As a result, corporate officers and directors are understood to be subject to extensive fiduciary duties, while shareholders traditionally have been thought to have far more limited obligations. Outside the contexts of controlling shareholders and closely held firms, many experts argue shareholders have no duties at all.
The most important trend in corporate governance today, however, is the move toward "shareholder democracy." Changes in financial markets, in business practice, and in corporate law have given minority shareholders in public …
Hedge Funds In Corporate Governance And Corporate Control, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
Hedge Funds In Corporate Governance And Corporate Control, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
All Faculty Scholarship
Hedge funds have become critical players in both corporate governance and corporate control. In this article, we document and examine the nature of hedge fund activism, how and why it differs from activism by traditional institutional investors, and its implications for corporate governance and regulatory reform. We argue that hedge fund activism differs from activism by traditional institutions in several ways: it is directed at significant changes in individual companies (rather than small, systemic changes), it entails higher costs, and it is strategic and ex ante (rather than intermittent and ex post). The reasons for these differences may lie in …