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Re-Examining The Law And Economics Of The Business Judgment Rule: Notes For Its Implementation In Non-Us Jurisdictions, Aurelio Gurrea-Martinez
Re-Examining The Law And Economics Of The Business Judgment Rule: Notes For Its Implementation In Non-Us Jurisdictions, Aurelio Gurrea-Martinez
Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law
The business judgment rule, as it has been traditionally understood, seems to be based on three underlying assumptions that make this rule economically desirable. First, directors are subject to a credible threat of being sued for a breach of the duty of care. Second, the primary role of the corporation is to maximise shareholder value. Third, shareholders want the directors to pursue those investment projects with the highest net present value regardless of their volatility. This article challenges these assumptions and argues that the business judgment rule might not be desirable in some jurisdictions outside the United States and even …
Securities Law's Dirty Little Secret, Usha Rodrigues
Securities Law's Dirty Little Secret, Usha Rodrigues
Scholarly Works
Securities law’s dirty little secret is that rich investors have access to special kinds of investments—hedge funds, private equity, private companies—that everyone else does not. This disparity stems from the fact that, from its inception, federal securities law has jealously guarded the manner in which firms can sell shares to the general public. Perhaps paternalistically, the law assumes that the average investor needs the protection of the full panoply of securities regulation and thus should be limited to buying public securities. In contrast, accredited—i.e., wealthy— investors, who it is presumed can fend for themselves, have the luxury of choosing between …
The Equity Trustee, Kelli A. Alces
The Equity Trustee, Kelli A. Alces
Scholarly Publications
As we reel from the effects of a recent financial disaster, it is apparent that there is a significant gap in corporate governance and accountability for management. One reason we have experienced this financial cataclysm is the inability of shareholders to do the "shareholderj ob. " Shareholders, as the putative owners of corporations, hold a venerated place in corporate governance. They are responsible for electing directors and monitoring management as well as valuing companies through trades in a vigorous market. The shareholder collective action problem and resulting rational apathy have kept shareholders from effectively fulfilling their role in corporate governance. …