Law Commons^™

Wireless Investors & Apathy Obsolescence, Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci, Christina M. Sautter

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

This Article discusses how a subgenre of retail investors makes investors’ apathy obsolete. In prior work, we dub this genre of retail investors “wireless investors” for their reliance on technology and online communications. By applying game theory, this Article discusses how wireless investors’ global-scale online communications allow them to circulate information and coordinate, obliterating collective action problems.

Autonomous Business Reality, Carla L. Reyes

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

Society tends to expect technology to do more than it can actually achieve, at a faster pace than it can actually move. The resulting hype cycle infects all forms of discourse around technology. Unfortunately, the discourse on law and technology is no exception to this rule. The resulting discussion is often characterized by two or more positions at opposite ends of the spectrum, such that participants in the discussion speak past each other, rather than to each other. The rich context that sits in the middle ground goes disregarded altogether. This dynamic most recently surfaced in the legal literature regarding …

Codeterminination In Theory And Practice, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

Codetermination—a system of shared corporate governance between shareholders and workers—has been mostly ignored within the U.S. corporate governance literature. When it has made an appearance, it has largely served as a foil for shareholder primacy and as an example of corporate deviance. However, over the last fifteen years—and especially in the last five—empirical research on codetermination has shown surprising results as to the system’s efficiency, resilience, and benefits to stakeholders.

This Article reviews the extant American legal scholarship on codetermination and provides a fresh look at the current state of codetermination theory and practice. Rather than experiencing the failures predicted …

If Rockefeller Were A Coder, Carla L. Reyes

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

he Ethereum Decentralized Autonomous Organization (“The DAO”), a decentralized, smart contract-based, investment fund with assets of $168 million, spectacularly crashed when one of its members exploited a flaw in the computer code and stole $55 million. In the wake of the exploit, many argued that participants in the DAO could be jointly and severally liable for the loss as partners in a general partnership. Others claimed that the DAO evidenced an entirely new form of business entity, one that current laws do not contemplate. Ultimately, the technologists cleaned up the exploit via technological means, and without engaging in any further …

Shareholder Voting And The Symbolic Politics Of Corporation As Contract, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

American corporations are structured in such a way that shareholders, and shareholders alone, have the right to vote in all significant corporate decisions. Over the years, this exclusive shareholder franchise has been supported by an ongoing procession of justifications. But as those arguments have fallen by the wayside, shareholder primacists have circled back and latched upon a final argument for the special voting status of shareholders, arguing that this fundamental feature of corporate governance is the product of the set of freely-bargained-for agreements among all corporate constituents. Because this set of agreements reflects the preferences of all parties to the …

Distributed Governance, Carla L. Reyes, Nizan Geslevich Packin, Bejamin Edwards

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

Distributed ledger technology enables disruption of traditional business organizations by introducing new business entities without the directors and officers of traditional corporate entities. Although these emerging entities offer intriguing possibilities, distributed entities may suffer significant collective action problems and expose investors to catastrophic regulatory and governance risks. Our essay examines key considerations for stakeholders and argues that distributed entities must be carefully structured to function effectively.

This essay breaks new ground by critically examining distributed entities. We argue that a distributed model is most appropriate when DLT solves a unique corporate governance problem. We caution against ignoring the lessons painstakingly …

Protecting American Innovators By Combating The Decline Of Patents Granted To Small Entities, W. Keith Robinson

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

The new patent laws and recent economic trends indicate that there is a difficult time ahead for small entities. American entrepreneurs and small businesses have created several of the major technological innovations in the past forty years. However, statistics indicate that patents granted to small entities have declined. In the wake of this trend, the U.S. Patent system has undergone significant changes. Currently, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) is in the process of implementing the policies and procedures outlined in its five-year strategic plan. Further, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), the largest patent reform law since …

The Bizarre Law & Economics Of 'Business Roundtable V. Sec', Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

Corporations are legal entities designed to foster certain kinds of collective economic activity. The decisionmaking power within a corporation ultimately rests with a board of directors elected by shareholders. Shareholders, however, do not use anything like a conventional ballot in these elections; instead, they fill out a “proxy ballot,” delivered to them by the incumbent board. This proxy ballot lists only the incumbent board’s chosen nominees, very often the board members themselves. If a shareholder wants to run for director or propose another nominee for the board, she needs to provide all other shareholders with a separate proxy ballot — …

Shareholder Democracy And The Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

Corporate law is consumed with a debate over shareholder democracy. The conventional wisdom counsels that shareholders should have more voice in corporate governance, in order to reduce agency costs and provide democratic legitimacy. A second set of theorists, described as “board primacists,” advocates against greater shareholder democracy and in favor of increased board discretion. These theorists argue that shareholders need to delegate their authority in order to provide the board with the proper authority to manage the enterprise and avoid short-term decision making.

In the last few years, the classical economic underpinnings of corporate law have been destabilized by a …

The Cult Of Efficiency In Corporate Law, Stephen E. Ellis, Grant M. Hayden

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

This paper challenges a fundamental assumption of corporate law scholarship. Corporate law is heavily influenced by economics, and by normative economics in particular. Economic efficiency, for example, is seen as the primary goal of good corporate governance. But this dependence on standard notions of economic efficiency is unfortunate, as those notions are highly problematic. In economic theory, efficiency is spelled out in terms of individual preference satisfaction, which is an inadequate foundation for any sort of normative analysis. We argue that on any account of the good, people will sometimes prefer things that aren’t good for them on that account. …

Arrow's Theorem And The Exclusive Shareholder Franchise, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

In this essay, we contest one of the main arguments for restricting corporate board voting to shareholders. In justifying the limitation of the franchise to shareholders, scholars have repeatedly turned to social choice theory—specifically, Arrow’s theorem—to justify the exclusive shareholder franchise. Citing to the theorem, corporate law commentators have argued that lumping different groups of stakeholders together into the electorate would result in a lack of consensus and, ultimately, the lack of coherence that attends intransitive social choices, perhaps even leading the corporation to self-destruct. We contend that this argument is misguided. First, we argue that scholars have greatly overestimated …

Corporate Tax Reform: Listening To Corporate America, Christopher H. Hanna

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

In the last few years, academics, practitioners and government officials have engaged in serious discussions in reforming the U.S. corporate income tax system. Some, if not much of the discussion, has focused on maintaining the competitiveness of U.S. corporations in a global economy. As a result, some have argued that the U.S. needs to reduce its top corporate tax rate from 35 percent, which is currently among the highest of the 30 OECD countries, to a rate around 30 percent or even lower. Others have maintained that the U.S. needs to enact specific or targeted tax incentives, such as expensing …

One Share, One Vote And The False Promise Of Shareholder Homogeneity, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

Shareholder democracy has blossomed. The once moribund shareholder franchise is now critical in takeover contests, merger decisions, and board oversight. However, the mechanisms of this vote remain largely undertheorized. In this Article, we use voting rights and social choice theory to develop a new approach to the corporate franchise. Political democracies typically tie the right to vote to the level of a person's interest in the outcome of the election. Corporate democracies, on the other hand, tend to define the requisite institutional interest quite narrowly, and thus restrict the right to vote to shareholders alone. This restriction has found its …

Maximizing The Wealth Of Fictional Shareholders: Which Fiction Should Directors Embrace?, Gregory S. Crespi

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

Corporate directors are generally committed to the social norm of maximizing the wealth of their corporation's common shareholders. Their current practice is to simplify their investment decisions by positing a generic fictional shareholder who is undiversified in his investments as the person to whom they hold themselves accountable. In this Article I discuss this fictional undiversified shareholder concept and compare it with three alternative fictional characterizations that differ from it and among themselves only in the extent of assumed investor diversification, and which could each serve this same analytical function. These three alternatives are the fictional diversified shareholder, the fictional …

Standards Of Conduct And Standards Of Review In Corporate Law: The Need For Closer Alignment, Gregory S. Crespi

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

This article examines the arguments in support of maintaining a divergence in duty of care law between the articulated negligence standard of conduct and the gross negligence standard of review, with particular emphasis on their application to the corporate fiduciary duty of care context. The author provides a detailed discussion of the arguments presented by Meir Dan-Cohen, while also focusing on articles by Richard Singer, David Phillips, and Melvin Eisenberg. After assessing the existing scholarship justifying divergent standards in the context of corporate law, the author concludes that a single, clearly articulated standard which both defines the scope of permissible …

Redefining The Fiduciary Duties Of Corporate Directors In Accordance With The Team Production Model Of Corporate Governance, Gregory S. Crespi

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

This article considers the "team production model" (TPM) of corporate governance set forth and elaborated upon by Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout. The author initially addresses how the locus of fiduciary duties should be respecified to be consistent with the TPM framework of corporate governance, should that paradigm be determined to be a descriptively more accurate model of public corporations than is the conventional agency mode, and then reviews the relatively complex calculations that would have to be carried out to determine how the performance of a TPM-style corporate board of directors measures up against these respecified fiduciary duties. Finally, …

Sanctifying Secrecy: The Mythology Of The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, Elizabeth G. Thornburg

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

This article surveys the traditional justifications for giving corporations the benefit of attorney-client privilege. It rejects both moral and utilitarian explanations and argues that, far from being beneficial or benign, the privilege actually does great harm to the truth-seeking function of litigation and imposes tremendous transaction costs on the litigants and on the judicial system as a whole.

The Acquisition Process And The Closely-Held Corporation: Selected Legal Aspects, Joseph J. Norton

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

No abstract provided.

Perspectives On Corporate Mergers And The Antitrust Laws, C. Paul Rogers Iii.

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

No abstract provided.

Co-Operative Societies, In The Law Of Business Organizations In East And Central Africa, Peter Winship

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

No abstract provided.