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Full-Text Articles in Law

How Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case Of The Golden Leash, Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven Davidoff Solomon Oct 2017

How Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case Of The Golden Leash, Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven Davidoff Solomon

Steven Davidoff Solomon

This Article presents a case study of a corporate governance innovation—the incentive compensation arrangement for activist-nominated director candidates colloquially known as the “golden leash.” Golden leash compensation arrangements are a potentially valuable tool for activist shareholders in election contests. In response to their use, several issuers adopted bylaw provisions banning incentive compensation arrangements. Investors, in turn, viewed director adoption of golden leash bylaws as problematic and successfully pressured issuers to repeal them. The study demonstrates how corporate governance provisions are developed and deployed, the sequential response of issuers and investors, and the central role played by governance intermediaries—activist investors, institutional …


The Institutional Appetite For Quack Corporate Governance, Alicia J. Davis Jan 2015

The Institutional Appetite For Quack Corporate Governance, Alicia J. Davis

Alicia Davis

This Article offers evidence that higher quality internal corporate governance is associated with higher levels of ownership by institutional investors. This finding is consistent with the idea that institutions have greater reason than individual investors to prefer well-governed firms, but surprising given the substantial empirical evidence that casts doubt on the efficacy of internal governance mechanisms. The study described in this Article also finds that higher quality external governance is associated with lower proportions of ownership by certain types of institutional investors, also a somewhat surprising result given available empirical evidence on the positive relationship between external governance and firm …


Why Does Executive Greed Prevail In The United States And Canada But Not In Japan? The Pattern Of Low Ceo Pay And High Worker Welfare In Japanese Corporations, Alberto R. Salazar V. Sep 2013

Why Does Executive Greed Prevail In The United States And Canada But Not In Japan? The Pattern Of Low Ceo Pay And High Worker Welfare In Japanese Corporations, Alberto R. Salazar V.

Alberto R. Salazar V.

According to a list of the 200 most highly-paid chief executives at the largest U.S. public companies in 2013, Oracle’s Lawrence J. Ellison remained the best paid CEO and earned $96.2 million as total annual compensation last year. He has received $1.8 billion over the past 20 years. The lowest paid on the same list is General Motors’ D. F. Akerson who earned $11.1 million. The average national pay for a non-supervisory US worker was $51,200 last year and a CEO made 354 times more than an average worker in 2012. Hunter Harrison, Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd., was the best …