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Full-Text Articles in Law
Brain Perspectives On Investor Behavior And Decision-Making Errors, Owen D. Jones
Brain Perspectives On Investor Behavior And Decision-Making Errors, Owen D. Jones
Seattle University Law Review
I want to start off with what I consider to be the statement of the problem. As I understand it, you’re concerned that the time horizons for maximizing the value of an investment vary among individuals in surprisingly wide, imperfectly predictable, and often seemingly irrational ways. And, if I understand your target here, the idea is that a deeper understanding of the causes of this variation might aid in the planning and design of legal and corporate policies. To jump into this, I’m going to give a little bit of an introduction about behavioral biases, and something that I’ve called …
Long-Term Executive Compensation As A Remedy For Corporate Short-Termism, Caroline Flammer
Long-Term Executive Compensation As A Remedy For Corporate Short-Termism, Caroline Flammer
Seattle University Law Review
It is often argued that corporations are too focused on the short term (i.e., they are “short-termist”). For example, during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, candidate Hillary Clinton urged companies to escape the tyranny of short-termism. Similarly, in the recent policy debate in the United Kingdom on the need to reform corporate governance and executive compensation, Bank of England’s Chief Economist Andy Haldane stated that “[e]xecutive pay is a matter of profound and legitimate public interest. Pay practices can encourage short-term behaviour in ways which harm both firms and the economy.” In this context, a recent article by Flammer and …
Specificity And Time Horizons, Frank Partnoy
Specificity And Time Horizons, Frank Partnoy
Seattle University Law Review
This Essay argues that the short-termism debate would benefit from greater clarity and specificity regarding time horizons. I make four points. First, optimal time horizons vary in discernible ways. Second, the potential mismatch between actual and optimal time horizons should generate a range of responses. Third, investors and managers can discern and disclose estimates of actual and optimal time horizons (e.g., using categories such as preconscious, fast conscious, slow conscious, and discounting). Fourth, market participants, policy makers, and scholars should use such estimates to be more precise about time horizons. For example, critics of hedge fund activism could recognize that …
An Identity Theory Of The Short- And Long-Term Investor Debate, Claire A. Hill
An Identity Theory Of The Short- And Long-Term Investor Debate, Claire A. Hill
Seattle University Law Review
Economics famously treats market actors as homogeneous. People are homo economicus, rational self-interested maximizers of their own utility. So far, so good, notwithstanding supposed behavioral “deviations” from rationality (more on those later). That people can view their own utility very differently from one another is recognized in theory, but not so much in practice. Also not sufficiently recognized is the extent to which people’s views of their own utility reflect their theories of who they are and how the world works, and that they hold such views and theories not just atomistically, but also collectively—that is, socially.
Federalism Of Personal Finance: State & Federal Retirement Plans, William A. Birdthistle
Federalism Of Personal Finance: State & Federal Retirement Plans, William A. Birdthistle
Seattle University Law Review
In this Article, I consider possible approaches that attempt to improve the plans through which millions of Americans tend to their life savings. I begin by considering the inadequacies of our current system of defined contribution accounts and then address two possible alternatives: the first being a federal account universally available to Americans based largely on the model of the Thrift Savings Plan; the second being a system of statebased retirement accounts like those that have already been developed in a handful of states. Though I conclude that a single, federal plan would be superior, either alternative approach would be …
Wrong-Termism, Right-Termism, And The Liability Structure Of Investor Time Horizons, Andrew Verstein
Wrong-Termism, Right-Termism, And The Liability Structure Of Investor Time Horizons, Andrew Verstein
Seattle University Law Review
Do investor time horizons lead to inefficient business conduct in the real economy? An extensive finance literature analyzes whether particular practices (e.g., high frequency trading and stock buybacks) lead firms to operate with inefficiently myopic investment horizons, and an extensive legal literature considers the appropriateness of policy interventions. This Article joins those debates by charting the space of possibilities: what might be the causes of problematic time horizons? What solutions are available? One implication of this analysis is that there may be unexplored market-based solutions located on the liability side of investors’ balance sheets. This Article also argues that we …
Corporate Governance As Privately-Ordered Public Policy: A Proposal, Lynn Stout, Sergio Gramitto
Corporate Governance As Privately-Ordered Public Policy: A Proposal, Lynn Stout, Sergio Gramitto
Seattle University Law Review
In this Article, we show how our society can use corporate governance shifts to address, if not entirely resolve, a number of currently pressing social and economic problems. These problems include: rising income inequality; demographic disparities in wealth and equity ownership; increasing poverty and income insecurity; a need for greater innovation and investment in solving problems like disease and climate change; the “externalization” of many costs of corporate activity onto third parties such as customers, employees, creditors, and the broader society; the corrosive influence of corporate money in politics; and discontent and loss of trust in the capitalist system among …
20/20 Vision In The Long & Short-Termism Debate, Anne Tucker
20/20 Vision In The Long & Short-Termism Debate, Anne Tucker
Seattle University Law Review
What is an optimal investment time horizon—for institutions, individual shareholders and corporations? This question can evoke emotional, ideological, and theoretical responses. The answers usually deeply entrenched debates over the fundamental roles of markets versus regulation and between the appropriate loci of corporate power: the board of directors versus the shareholders. Too long-term and it is myopia; too near-term and is it short-termism. Neither label is inconsequential, so the debates are not tepid, academic, or marginal.
Are Investor Time Horizons Shortening?, Rachelle Sampson, Yuan Shi
Are Investor Time Horizons Shortening?, Rachelle Sampson, Yuan Shi
Seattle University Law Review
The rise in quarterly capitalism in corporate America—increased pressure to meet quarterly earnings predictions and cater to shareholder preferences for short-term returns—has gained significant coverage in the business world and popular press in recent years. Increasingly, popular opinion suggests that firms bow to shareholder pressures, taking steps to smooth earnings and boost share prices in the short-term; firms do so by cutting Research and Development (R&D) investment, engaging in extensive cost-cutting, or increasing dividends and share buybacks. Recent estimates at the industry level show that investor discount rates have increased in recent years, supporting the notion that shorttermism is on …
Flash Traders (Milliseconds) To Indexed Institutions (Centuries): The Challenges Of An Agency Theory Approach To Governance In The Era Of Diverse Investor Time Horizons, Harold Weston, Conrad Ciccotello
Flash Traders (Milliseconds) To Indexed Institutions (Centuries): The Challenges Of An Agency Theory Approach To Governance In The Era Of Diverse Investor Time Horizons, Harold Weston, Conrad Ciccotello
Seattle University Law Review
One aspect of the problem in trying to align a corporate investment horizon (the time period for return on investment) to that of its shareholders is the enormous range of investor time horizons, which can range from milliseconds to centuries. A second aspect of the problem is whether ownership of shares equates to ownership of the corporation. A third aspect of the problem is that, despite the theories and advocacy of shareholders being owners, based on the agency model of corporate finance first developed in the 1970s, the theory is contrary to corporate law. These three aspects will be developed …
Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance, And Firm Value, K.J. Martijn Cremers, Simone M. Sepe
Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance, And Firm Value, K.J. Martijn Cremers, Simone M. Sepe
Seattle University Law Review
In the corporate governance debate, the short-term versus longterm contention has grown into perhaps today’s most controversial topic. In this debate, descriptions of institutional investors tend to present a dichotomic nature. These investors are alternatively portrayed as homogenously short-termist or as consistent “forces for good,” focused on targeting underperforming companies. This Article moves beyond this dichotomy. It shows empirically that aggregate institutional investor behavior presents nuances that depend on a variety of factors, including individual firm characteristics, institutional ownership levels, and institutional propensity toward activism.
The Myth Of The Ideal Investor, Elisabeth De Fontenay
The Myth Of The Ideal Investor, Elisabeth De Fontenay
Seattle University Law Review
Critiques of specific investor behavior often assume an ideal investor against which all others should be compared. This ideal investor figures prominently in the heated debates over the impact of investor time horizons on firm value. In much of the commentary, the ideal is a longterm investor that actively monitors management, but the specifics are typically left vague. That is no coincidence. The various characteristics that we might wish for in such an investor cannot peacefully coexist in practice. If the ideal investor remains illusory, which of the real-world investor types should we champion instead? The answer, I argue, is …
The Long And Short Of It: Are We Asking The Right Questions? Modern Portfolio Theory And Time Horizons, Jim Hawley, Jon Lukomnik
The Long And Short Of It: Are We Asking The Right Questions? Modern Portfolio Theory And Time Horizons, Jim Hawley, Jon Lukomnik
Seattle University Law Review
The heavy shadow of modern portfolio theory (MPT) has had a massive impact on everything from market structure, investment philosophy, and investor behavior, to the research that examines those disciplines. Researchers believe that they are casting light onto investment issues (including, for this purpose, specifically investor time horizons), but generalized acceptance of MPT allows it to continue to darken what should be enlightened.
Good Activist/Bad Activist: The Rise Of International Stewardship Codes, Jennifer G. Hill
Good Activist/Bad Activist: The Rise Of International Stewardship Codes, Jennifer G. Hill
Seattle University Law Review
Shareholder participation in corporate governance and investor activism are topics du jour in the United States and around the world. In the early part of the 20th century, Professors Berle and Means considered that shareholder participation was impossible in the transformed commercial world that they described in The Modern Corporation and Private Property. This was a world characterized by dispersed and vulnerable shareholders, in which owners do not manage, and managers do not own, the corporation. In such an environment, the goal of corporate law became one of protecting shareholder interests rather than providing shareholders with participation rights. The structure …
In Pursuit Of Good & Gold: Data Observations Of Employee Ownership & Impact Investment, Christopher Geczy, Jessica S. Jeffers, David K. Musto, Anne M. Tucker
In Pursuit Of Good & Gold: Data Observations Of Employee Ownership & Impact Investment, Christopher Geczy, Jessica S. Jeffers, David K. Musto, Anne M. Tucker
Seattle University Law Review
A startup’s path to self-sustaining profitability is risky and hard, and most do not make it. Venture capital (VC) investors try to improve these odds with contractual terms that focus and sharpen employees’ incentives to pursue gold. If the employees and investors expect the startup to balance the goal of profitability with another goal—the goal of good—the risks are likely to both grow and multiply. They grow to the extent that profits are threatened, and they multiply to the extent that balancing competing goals adds a dimension to the incentive problem. In this Article, we explore contracting terms specific to …
Social Enterprise And Investment Professionals: Sacrificing Financial Interests?, J. Haskell Murray
Social Enterprise And Investment Professionals: Sacrificing Financial Interests?, J. Haskell Murray
Seattle University Law Review
Over the past decade, more than three dozen jurisdictions in the United States passed some form of social enterprise legislation. Social enterprise statutes allow for the formation of for-profit entities that expressly require directors to consider the interests of corporate constituents beyond merely shareholders. Proponents of these social enterprise statutes argue that such statutes are needed because traditional corporate law prevents sacrificing the financial interests of shareholders in the interest of a broader social good, or in the interest of other stakeholders. Recently, social enterprises have started exploring public markets and showing up on the radar of investment professionals, including …
Who Wants To Watch? A Comment On The New International Paradigm Of Financial Consumer Market Regulation, Toni Williams
Who Wants To Watch? A Comment On The New International Paradigm Of Financial Consumer Market Regulation, Toni Williams
Seattle University Law Review
This Article explores the capacity of the G20’s model of financial consumer protection to reconfigure relationships between financial firms and consumers, focusing in particular on the market conduct of financial firms. Although this Article does not focus directly on Adolf A. Berle’s work, it does engage with some of his enduring concerns about economic relations between corporations, regulators, and individuals; the socialcontext of those economic relations; and the role of law and legal regulation in shaping market relations. More specifically, this Article considers new international regulatory principles related to corporate social responsibility— a recurring theme of Berle’s work11—in the somewhat …
Dinner Parties During “Lost Decades”: On The Difficulties Of Rethinking Financial Markets, Fostering Elite Consensus, And Renewing Political Economy, David A. Westbrook
Dinner Parties During “Lost Decades”: On The Difficulties Of Rethinking Financial Markets, Fostering Elite Consensus, And Renewing Political Economy, David A. Westbrook
Seattle University Law Review
This Article addresses two groups of problems that ought to be understood in relation to one another. This Article has three movements. In Part II, I discuss conceptual obstacles to forming the new elite consensus that rethinking the role of financial markets requires. To produce policy reform, it is not enough to have new ideas; the ideas must be understood, adopted, and acted upon by people. Policy reform is thus always a function of conversations. In Part III, I discuss some possible ways the elite consensus might be formed. In Part V, the conclusion, I offer a preliminary assessment of …
On The Rise Of Shareholder Primacy, Signs Of Its Fall, And The Return Of Managerialism (In The Closet), Lynn A. Stout
On The Rise Of Shareholder Primacy, Signs Of Its Fall, And The Return Of Managerialism (In The Closet), Lynn A. Stout
Seattle University Law Review
In their 1932 opus "The Modern Corporation and Public Property," Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means famously documented the evolution of a new economic entity—the public corporation. What made the public corporation “public,” of course, was that it had thousands or even hundreds of thousands of shareholders, none of whom owned more than a small fraction of outstanding shares. As a result, the public firm’s shareholders had little individual incentive to pay close attention to what was going on inside the firm, or even to vote. Dispersed shareholders were rationally apathetic. If they voted at all, they usually voted to approve …
Rebalancing Private Placement Regulation, William K. Sjostrom, Jr.
Rebalancing Private Placement Regulation, William K. Sjostrom, Jr.
Seattle University Law Review
Regulating securities offerings entails balancing investor protection and capital formation. Inevitably, this balance gets upset. As financial markets evolve, Congress passes new legislation, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopts new rules, and the courts issue unanticipated opinions. These events upset the balance because they happen in an uncoordinated and haphazard manner and oftentimes produce unintended consequences.The Article proceeds as follows. To set the stage, Part II provides background on the Securities Act and describes the differences between public offerings and private placements. Part III explains why rebalancing private placement regulation may be warranted. Part IV offers proposed statutory language …
Equity Derivatives And The Challenge For Berle’S Conception Of Corporate Accountability, Janis Sarra
Equity Derivatives And The Challenge For Berle’S Conception Of Corporate Accountability, Janis Sarra
Seattle University Law Review
With the proliferation of equity derivatives and related structured financial products, the North American conception of corporate governance faces a new and distinct challenge to its underlying premises.This Article analyzes these developments with a focus on the implications for director and officer accountability and corporate sustainability, using the occasion of the third symposium of the Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Center on Corporations, Law & Society to consider whether Berle’s analysis of corporate accountability offers any insights into how to address the uncoupling of economic interest and legal rights in corporate governance. Part II of this Article sets the context for …
Hedge Funds And Risk Decoupling: The Empty Voting Problem In The European Union, Wolf-Georg Ringe
Hedge Funds And Risk Decoupling: The Empty Voting Problem In The European Union, Wolf-Georg Ringe
Seattle University Law Review
The law must remain adaptive and responsive to the constantly changing challenges of our society and our business life. One of the most pressing challenges of the past years is the emergence of alternative investment funds, in particular hedge funds, which masterfully exploit the traditional categories of corporate law, financial derivatives, and risk management. This Article is only concerned with the first of these two forms— negative decoupling.9 It looks at the various forms of negative riskdecoupling strategies and tries to shed light on their overall desirability. Three distinct theoretical perspectives are used as an analytical framework to examine the …
Revisiting “Truth In Securities” Revisited: Abolishing Ipos And Harnessing Private Markets In The Public Good, A. C. Pritchard
Revisiting “Truth In Securities” Revisited: Abolishing Ipos And Harnessing Private Markets In The Public Good, A. C. Pritchard
Seattle University Law Review
This article's focus is the idea that the transition between private- and public company status could be less bumpy if we unify the public–private dividing line under the Securities Act and Exchange Act. Part II of this article outlines the current public–private dividing lines under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. This part also explores Facebook’s recent transition from private to public status under that framework, as well as Congress’s recent intervention in the field with the JOBS Act. Part III explores the problems of making the transition from private to public, focusing on IPOs and their role in …
Corporate Governance As A School Of Social Reform, Ciarán O’Kelly
Corporate Governance As A School Of Social Reform, Ciarán O’Kelly
Seattle University Law Review
In this paper, I present a vision of the corporation as a moral person. I point to “the separation of ownership and control” as a moment when the corporation broke away from the moral lives of ownermanagers. I then draw out the manner in which we can speak of the company as a moral person. Finally, through a discussion of social reporting in two British banks, I point to a shift in how this moral personhood is articulated, with the rise of corporate governance—or doing business well—as its own foundation of corporate responsibility. I propose a view of corporate responsibility …
The Common Link In Failures And Scandals At The World’S Leading Banks, Justin O’Brien, Olivia Dixon
The Common Link In Failures And Scandals At The World’S Leading Banks, Justin O’Brien, Olivia Dixon
Seattle University Law Review
This Article argues that both the root cause of the crisis and the route to restoring trust and confidence is to be found in ascertaining how to regulate culture across mandates, processes, and use of discretion. Part II identifies the internal and external failings of four of the most recent global banking scandals within the CEDAR matrix. Part III discusses the regulatory challenges faced when compliance serves no practical function and the consequent material risk to market integrity. This Article concludes by suggesting that it is unsustainable for regulation to be decided, implemented, and monitored at a national level. Global …
Shareholder Social Responsibility, David Millon
Shareholder Social Responsibility, David Millon
Seattle University Law Review
Amidst concerns about the negative effects on long-run value and competitiveness, one overlooked consequence of short-termism is its impediment to corporate social responsibility (CSR).In this Article, Part II examines the short-termism phenomenon, first from the point of view of investors and then from that of corporate managers, and summarizes widely held views about the social costs of short-termism. Part III then shifts the focus to the impact of shorttermism on CSR, a problem that has been largely overlooked, and develops two theories or models of CSR: the “ethical” and the “strategic.” Part III also explains how short-termism presents a significant …
The Financialization Of The U.S. Corporation: What Has Been Lost, And How It Can Be Regained, William Lazonick
The Financialization Of The U.S. Corporation: What Has Been Lost, And How It Can Be Regained, William Lazonick
Seattle University Law Review
As the U.S. economy struggles to recover from the Great Recession, the erosion of middle-class jobs and the explosion of income inequality have endured long enough to raise serious questions about whether the U.S. economy is beset by deep structural problems. My argument is that the employment problem that the United States now faces is largely structural. But the structural problem is not a labormarket mismatch between the skills that prospective employers want and the skills that potential workers have, as many economists have argued. Nor is the problem automation. Rather, the employment problem stems from changes in the ways …
The Modern Corporation Magnified: Managerial Accountability In Financial-Services Holding Companies, Anita K. Krug
The Modern Corporation Magnified: Managerial Accountability In Financial-Services Holding Companies, Anita K. Krug
Seattle University Law Review
This Article first recalls the primary contours of Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means’s acclaimed observations regarding the separation of ownership and control in the “modern corporation,” as well as their conclusions about the implications of those observations for the doctrine of shareholder primacy. Second, the Article describes how the activities of FSHCs generally differ from what we think corporations do and, certainly, from what Berle and Means conceived of as the purpose of corporations or, indeed, any business enterprise. Third, this Article articulates how those business activities render more acute the problem of the separation of ownership and control that …
Toward A More Resilient Financial System?, Joanna Gray
Toward A More Resilient Financial System?, Joanna Gray
Seattle University Law Review
The concept of “resilience” in the context of financial systems calls for closer analysis, as most of the current efforts to reshape financial systems seek to render them more resilient. Resilience has become a necessary complement to the paradigm shift taking place in global financial regulation toward “macroprudential” regulation—a term used to describe a new viewing platform and decisionmaking plane for financial regulation. From this new perspective, regulators can address the state of the financial system as a whole, as well as its component parts. This Article seeks to illustrate how legal and regulatory measures that foster resilience have become …
Financial Hospitals: Defending The Fed’S Role As A Market Maker Of Last Resort, José Gabilondo
Financial Hospitals: Defending The Fed’S Role As A Market Maker Of Last Resort, José Gabilondo
Seattle University Law Review
During the last financial crisis, what should the Federal Reserve (the Fed) have done when lenders stopped making loans, even to borrowers with sterling credit and strong collateral? Because the central bank is the last resort for funding, the conventional answer had been to lend freely at a penalty rate against good collateral, as Walter Bagehot suggested in 1873 about the Bank of England. Acting thus as a lender of last resort, the central bank will keep solvent banks liquid but let insolvent banks go out of business, as they should. The Fed tried this, but when the conventional wisdom …