Law Commons^™

Penyelesaian Sengketa Kewenangan Direksi Dengan Pendekatan Formal Sesuai Pencatatan Perubahan Data Perseroan Di Kementerian Hukum Dan Ham, Maleakhi W. Sitompul

"Dharmasisya” Jurnal Program Magister Hukum FHUI

Managing a company as the company's purpose and objectives are carried out by the Board of Directors by taking policies which are considered appropriate and in good faith (business judgment rule), by staying in compliance with the limits determined by Law No. 40 of 2007 concerning limited liability companies and / or the Company's Articles of Association. But in practice related to the composition and number of directors in a company it is often debated which Directors are entitled to act against other parties. Starting with the provisions in Law No. 40 of 2007 Articles 29 and 98, changes in …

The Problem With Predators, June Carbone, William K. Black

Seattle University Law Review

Both corporate theory and sex discrimination law start with presumptions that CEOs seek to advance legitimate ends and design the internal organization of business enterprises to achieve such ends. Yet, a growing literature questions why CEOs and boards of directors nonetheless select for Machiavellianism, narcissism, psychopathy, and toxic masculinity, despite the downsides associated with these traits. Three scholarly literatures—economics, criminology, and gender theory—draw on advances in psychology to shed new light on the construction of seemingly dysfunctional corporate cultures. They start by questioning the assumption that CEOs—even CEOs of seemingly mainstream businesses—necessarily seek to advance “legitimate” ends. Instead, they suggest …

Quasi Governments And Inchoate Law: Berle’S Vision Of Limits On Corporate Power, Elizabeth Pollman

Seattle University Law Review

This Berle X Symposium essay gives prominence to distinguished corporate law scholar Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and his key writings of the 1950s and 1960s. Berle is most famous for his work decades earlier, in the 1930s, with Gardiner Means on the topic of the separation of ownership and control, and for his great debate of corporate social responsibility with E. Merrick Dodd. Yet the world was inching closer to our contemporary one in terms of both business and technology in Berle’s later years and his work from this period deserves attention.

A New Standard For Governance: Reflections On Worker Representation In The United States, Julian Constain

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

The contemporary state of corporate law in the United States is one that is skewed toward the archaic principle of shareholder primacy. This narrow conception of corporate purpose has resulted in governance mechanisms that tend to overlook the many stakeholders that are affected by, and, in turn, affect the bottom line of modern corporations. In the wake of the recently proposed Accountable Capitalism Act, this Note investigates the viability of adopting a system of mandated worker board representation—codetermination—in the United States. The Note employs a comparative analysis of the German and Swedish experiences with codetermination, and then evaluates the policy, …

Volkswagen's Bad Decisions & Harmful Emissions: How Poor Process Corrupted Codetermination In Germany's Dual Board Structure, Nicola Faith Sharpe

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

This Article directly challenges the often argued proposition that Ger-many’s two-tier board of directors is superior to America’s single-tier board structure. It argues that regardless of structure, any decision-making body that lacks effective decision-making processes is at signifcant risk of failure, scandal, and ineffectiveness. Legal scholars and policymakers have largely ignored the connection between decision-making processes and the efficacy of corporate leadership. The Article is the first to examine this underexplored relationship in the context of the German dual-board.

Volkswagen’s 2015 emissions scandal provides a vehcicle to critcally assess the relationship between Germany’s two-tiered board and an effec-tive decision-making process. …

Lobbying, Pandering, And Information In The Firm, Adam B. Badawi

Seattle University Law Review

In their classic and insightful article on team production in corporate law, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout identify the minimization of rent-seeking as one of the chief benefits of vesting ultimate authority over a firm with the board of directors. In their analysis, this problematic rent-seeking arises when parties need to divide the gains from production after the fact. The squabbling that is likely to ensue may threaten to eat away most, or all, of the gains that come from productive activity. If parties know that this sort of rent-seeking will occur, they may not engage in productive activity in …

Anglo-American Directors' Legal Duties And Csr: Prohibited, Permitted Or Prescribed?, Benedict Sheehy, Donald Feaver

Dalhousie Law Journal

The interaction between corporate social responsibility (CSR) obligations and directors' legal duties is underexamined. This article addresses that void by examining directors' duties in case law and legislation across the major commonwealth countries and the U.S.A. It provides an analysis of leading cases and examines how they deal with directors' duties, the doctrine of shareholder primacy, corporate legal theory and CSR. The article reviews fiduciary relations and duties and analyzes the directors'duties toexercise power in the best interests of the company as a whole and for proper purposes. The article concludes that CSR is well within the accepted range of …

Is The Independent Director Model Broken?, Roberta S. Karmel

Seattle University Law Review

At common law, an interested director was barred from participating in corporate decisions in which he had an interest, and therefore “dis-interested” directors became desirable. This concept of the disinterested director developed into the model of an “independent director” and was advocated by the Securities and Exchange Commission and court decisions as a general ideal in a variety of situations. This Article explores doubts regarding the model of an “independent director” and suggests that director expertise may be more important that director independence. The Article then discusses shareholder primacy and sets forth alternatives to the shareholder primacy theory of the …

Employee Stock Ownership Plans And Corporate Takeovers: Restraints On The Use Of Esops By Corporate Officers And Directors To Avert Hostile Takeovers, Margaret E. Mclean

Pepperdine Law Review

In 1974, Congress enacted the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA), which was designed to promote employee benefit plans and provide safeguards for the assets of the plans. An employee stock ownership plan is a device used by corporations which holds corporate stock as the primary asset of the employee benefit plan. Recently, corporate executives have seized the opportunity to use ESOPs as a defensive tactic for averting takeovers considered to be adverse to the corporation. However, provisions of ERISA, particularly relating to fiduciary duty, exclusive benefit, and prudence, seriously impede the use of an ESOP by incumbent management …

The Limited Liability Company As A Security, Mark I. Steinberg, Karen L. Conway

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Are Limited Liability Company Interests Securities?, Mark A. Sargent

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Uncorporation And The Unraveling Of 'Nexus Of Contracts' Theory, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie

Michigan Law Review

A corporation is not a contract. It is a state-created entity. It has legal personhood with the right to form contracts, suffer liability for torts, and (as the Supreme Court recently decided) make campaign contributions. However, many corporate law scholars have remained wedded to the conception-metaphor, model, paradigm, what have you-of the corporation as a contract or "nexus" of contracts. The nexus of contracts theory is meant to point up the voluntary, market-oriented nature of the firm and to dismiss the notion that the corporation owes anything to the state. It is also used as a justification for preserving the …

The Short, But Interesting Life Of Good Faith As An Independent Liability Rule, Robert B. Thompson

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Good Faith In Revlon-Land, Christopher M. Bruner

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Risks And Hedges Of Providing Liquidity In Complex Securities: The Impact Of Insider Trading On Options Market Makers, Stanislav Dolgopolov

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Rewarding Outside Directors, Assaf Hamdani, Reinier Kraakman

Michigan Law Review

While they often rely on the threat of penalties to produce deterrence, legal systems rarely use the promise of rewards. In this Article, we consider the use of rewards to motivate director vigilance. Measures to enhance director liability are commonly perceived to be too costly. We, however demonstrate that properly designed reward regimes could match the behavioral incentives offered by negligence-based liability regimes but with significantly lower costs. We further argue that the market itself cannot implement such a regime in the form of equity compensation for directors. We conclude by providing preliminary sketches of two alternative reward regimes. While …

Director Compliance With Elusive Fiduciary Duties In A Climate Of Corporate Governance Reform, Nadelle Grossman

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

On The Liability Of Corporate Directors To Holders Of Securities For Illegal Corporate Acts: Can The Tension Between The "Net-Loss" And "No-Duty-To-Disclose" Rules Be Resolved, Geoffrey Rapp

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Institutional Investors: Agents Of Change, James E. Heard

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Directorial Fiduciary Duties In A Tracking Stock Equity Structure: The Need For A Duty Of Fairness, Jeffrey J. Hass

Michigan Law Review

Part I of this article briefly describes the key distinctions between a tracking stock corporation and a conventional corporation. It then touches on the reasons why corporations have adopted tracking stock equity structures. Part II articulates the unique legal challenges presented by a tracking stock equity structure. Part III discusses the disclosure that tracking stock corporations have made with respect to these challenges. Part IV briefly summarizes the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty and explores why these duties are ill-equipped to address these challenges. Part V presents the duty of fairness and discusses the duty's elements in detail. In …

M&A: Survival Of The Fittest In The 21st Century, Strategic Positioning In The Banking And Communications Industries - Corporate Restructuring & Spin-Offs, Michael Kliegman

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Two Models Of Corporate Governance: Beyond Berle And Means, Lynne L. Dallas

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Article introduces a new model of corporate governance, which challenges, as did Berle and Means, the conclusions drawn from the traditional ownership model. Rather than focusing upon the inefficiencies of the large complex firm resulting from the separation of share ownership and control, however, this new model, which I call the power model, focuses upon the political nature of decision making in the large corporation, which exists regardless of the identity of the entrepreneur.

Corporations - The Business Judgment Rule Shields The Good Faith Decision Of Disinterested Directors To Terminate A Derivative Suit Against The Corporation's Directors, Jeff J. Friedman

Villanova Law Review

No abstract provided.

Restructuring The Corporate Board Of Directors: Fond Hope--Faint Promise?, Lewis D. Solomon

Michigan Law Review

Reforms, then, have been instituted, and an extensive literature on corporate reform has developed. It is time that we seriously examine the reforms and the literature to assess the accomplishments and possibilities of the corporate board of directors. This Article is a first step in that direction.

The Article begins by investigating the reasons for the impotence of corporate boards. It then examines two models of reformed boards and finds both models badly flawed. The Article proceeds to case studies of three corporations-Mattel, Inc., Northrop Corp., and Lockheed Corp.-which under court· order have attempted to reform their boards by increasing …

Derivative Suits: Director Demand Under Rule 23.1 And Section 36(B) Of The Investment Company Act, Archie E. Williams, Jr.

Fordham Urban Law Journal

In 1882, the Supreme Court first established the conditions precedent to an ordinary derivative action by the shareholders of a corporation. Now after over nine decades of common law development, the present conditions are embodied in Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Of relatively recent interest, however, is the relationship between that Rule and section 36(b) of the Investment Act of 1940 (Act), which authorizes a derivative action by the shareholders of a registered investment company. This Note will focus on one aspect of that relationship--the requirement that a plaintiff make a demand upon the corporation's directors …

Corporation Executive Committees, Nancy F. Halliday

Cleveland State Law Review

Soon after it had been determined by the courts that management functions could be delegated by corporation boards of directors, it became a frequent practice in business and nonprofit corporations to delegate these functions to a small, active group of directors, known as the executive committee. Boards of directors cannot be expected to be in session continually, and certainly the affairs of a corporation require constant supervision by some directing body. This paper is particularly concerned with consideration of the extent to which the managerial function of the board of directors can be properly delegated to an executive committee.

Stock Options For Directors In Small Corporations, Robert H. Moore Jr.

Cleveland State Law Review

The treatment stock options have received since the enactment of Section 421 of the 1954 Code has come under much criticism. Section 421 of the Code authorizes the so-called "restricted"stock options. It is not the purpose of this paper, however, to enter the controversy about restricted stock options but to consider the so-called "non-restricted" and to suggest revisions in the law that appear merited with respect to them.

Corporations - Legal Aspects Of Corporation Bonuses, H. Marshall Peter

Michigan Law Review

It would clearly be inaccurate to say that the percentage method of compensation represents a modern idea. Its rationale is so simple that there must have been instances of its utilization in early history. Be that as it may, it is a device which attained little prominence in this country before the beginning of the present century and which has grown since then with amazing rapidity. Along with the growth of bonus plans in some form or another, perplexing problems have arisen economic, social and perhaps even moral as well as legal. The emphasis of this comment will be upon …

Corporations - Conditions Under Which Settlement Of Corporate Claims Will Not Prevent A Stockholder's Derivative Suit On Such Claims, John M. Ulman

Michigan Law Review

In the recent case of United States Lines, Inc. v. United States Lines Co. the plaintiff was a minority stockholder in United States Lines, Inc., whose only asset was a minority stock interest in the United States Lines Company. A majority of the stock in both companies was owned by the International Mercantile Marine Company. An action originally brought by the United States Lines, Inc., but settled out of court, was sought to be continued by the plaintiff, who alleged: (1) that the Marine Company and its subsidiaries had entered into fraudulent contracts with the United States Lines Company and …

Corporations-Qualifications Of Officers-Effect On Existing By-Laws Of Change In Statute

Michigan Law Review

Corporate by-laws adopted under and following Act No. 84, Michigan Public Acts of 1921, required that directors be chosen from stockholders, the positions to become vacant should the directors dispose of their stock. In 1931 the statute was changed, now reading that "directors . . . need not be shareholders unless the articles so provide." The by-laws were not altered. Qualified directors subsequently disposed of their stock and petitioned the chancery court under the statute for dissolution of the corporation and appointment of a receiver. Appealing from an order granting that petition, creditors and stockholders of the corporation contended that …