Law Commons^™

Caremark's Hidden Promise, Ezra Wasserman Mitchell

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

In re Caremark, decided in 1996, established for the first time a director’s duty to monitor under Delaware law. A significant amount of jurisprudence and commentary has developed. Almost all of this literature parses the language of the case and those following, and disregards the underlying claims for damages. As a result of this linguistic focus, many have concluded that the duty to monitor largely is toothless and, importantly, deals only with claims of failure to monitor legal risk. A duty to monitor business risk has been disavowed.

Following the money reveals a different story. Classifying the cases according to …

Balance And Team Production, Kelli A. Alces

Seattle University Law Review

For decades, those holding the shareholder primacy view that the purpose of a corporation is to earn a profit for its shareholders have been debating with those who believe that corporations exist to serve broader societal interests. Adolph Berle and Merrick Dodd began the conversation over eighty years ago, and it continues today, with voices at various places along a spectrum of possible corporate purposes participating. Unfortunately, over time, the various sides of the debate have begun to talk past each other rather than engage with each other and have lost sight of whatever common ground they may be able …

Boards Of Directors As Mediating Hierarchs, Margaret M. Blair

Seattle University Law Review

In June of 2014, the board of directors of Demoulas Supermarkets, Inc.—better known as Market Basket, a mid-sized chain of grocery stores in New England—decided to oust the man who had been CEO for the previous six years, Arthur T. Demoulas. Most likely, the board of directors did not anticipate what happened next: Thousands of employees, customers, and fans of Market Basket boycotted the stores and staged noisy public protests asking the board to reinstate “Arthur T.” The reaction by employees and customers made what had been a simmering, nasty, intrafamily feud within the closely held Market Basket chain into …

Breaching The Accountability Firewall: Market Norms And The Reasonable Director, Joan Loughrey

Seattle University Law Review

This Article examines and evaluates the role of market norms in determining whether directors have acted reasonably and the appropriateness of setting a standard of reasonableness that reflects market norms. It argues that although there are situations in which a standard that reflects market norms may not be appropriate for determining the reasonableness of a director’s conduct, it is the best standard more often than not. While this Article focuses on the U.K. director’s duty of care, the question of whether compliance with market norms should be exculpatory arises every time legal or regulatory enforcement depends upon establishing that a …

The Third Way, Kent Greenfield

Seattle University Law Review

Shareholder supremacists argue that corporate management should be constrained by additional shareholder power to nominate directors, approve executive pay, or receive financial disclosures. Meanwhile, managerial and directorial apologists suggest that the way forward is to protect managerial prerogative. But, there is a third way: Managerial obligation could be increased without the obligation running solely to the holders of equity. This Article situates the current moment of intellectual churning in corporate law in a larger historical narrative and explains why we find ourselves in this moment. This Article then suggests what a third way might require in terms of conceptualization, process, …

The Proposed Restatement Of Corporate Governance: Is Reform Really Necessary?, Ira S. Levine

Pepperdine Law Review

The role of the director in a modern corporation has recently come under new scrutiny. The American Law Institute has proposed a "Restatement of Corporate Governance" which offers explicit guidelines for the conduct of corporate directors. The Institute proposes to increase the board of directors' responsibility for corporate affairs by raising the board's standard of care. The Proposed Restatement has, however, been criticized by the business community for failing to take into account the realities of corporate governance and for imposing a suffocatingly narrow set of guidelines. Corporate management is not in need of reform. But even if it were, …

Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, Stephen M. Bainbridge

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Corporate Governance: Some Unasked Questions A Personal Commentary, Henry Lesser

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Striking The Wrong Balance: Constituency Statutes And Corporate Governance , Edward D. Rogers

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Role Of Good Faith In Delaware: How Open-Ended Standards Help Delaware Preserve Its Edge, Renee M. Jones

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Meaningful Good Faith: Managerial Motives And The Duty To Obey The Law, Peter C. Kostant

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Sarbanes-Oxley: The Delaware Perspective, Chief Justice Myron T. Steele

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

A Tangled Web: Compliance Director Liability Under The Securities Laws, Anthony Pirraglia

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Disbursement Of Insurance Money Covering An Insured's Legal Expenses As Incurred, Arthur P. Xanthos

Fordham Urban Law Journal

In the Southern District of New York, Pepsico, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co. held that the D & O insurance carrier was obligated to pay the insured's costs as they accrue, subject to reimbursement should adjudication show that there were no grounds for coverage. This Note proposes that the Pepsico rule favoring the insured is the more judicious view regarding interim payments. This Note discusses the differing interpretations of D & O policy defense cost clauses, and then analyzes the Pepsico rule from the standpoints of reasonable expectations, contract interpretation and unconscionability. After comparing D & O insurance with standard …

Arkansas Corporate Fiduciary Standards—Interested Directors' Contracts And The Doctrine Of Corporate Opportunity, Susan Webber

University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review

No abstract provided.

Corporations - Directors - Validity Of By-Law Permitting Removal Of Directors Without Cause, Timothy F. Scanlon

Michigan Law Review

A by-law of defendant, a Delaware corporation, permitted removal of a director with or without cause by a majority vote of the stockholders. The certificate of incorporation provided for a staggered board system which divided the board of directors into three groups, the term of one group expiring at each annual meeting. At a special stockholders' meeting three directors were removed without cause. Plaintiff, majority stockholder of the corporation, instituted an action to determine the validity of the removal. Held, the three directors were improperly removed since the by-law which allowed removal without cause was inconsistent with the certificate …

Corporations - Officers And Directors - Indemnification Of Expenses Incurred In Defense Of Contract Of Employment, John P. Williams

Michigan Law Review

Plaintiff, Sorenson, contracted with defendant, Overland Corporation, to become one of its directors, and the contract was approved by Overland's stockholders. After he began to serve as a director, Sorenson was made a party defendant to a stockholder's derivative suit attacking the propriety of his contract of employment with Overland. The derivative suit terminated in favor of Sorenson and he then brought an action for reimbursement of the counsel fees incurred by him in defending the stockholder's action. Plaintiff's action was under a corporate by-law providing that the corporation shall indemnify directors and officers against expenses incurred by them in …

Corporations - Officers And Directors - Liability For Realizing Less Than Full Value From Sale Of Corporate Assets On Dissolution, Howard N. Thiele, Jr.

Michigan Law Review

The defendants were directors, officers, and sole stockholders of a corporation engaged in the business of wholesaling electrical supplies. The business gradually declined until the corporation was no longer able to meet maturing obligations, even though expenses had been cut to a minimum. After trying unsuccessfully to borrow more money the defendants decided to wind up the business. Faced with several possible methods of liquidation, they chose to sell the assets at an open auction sale. The net proceeds of the sale were about $20,000, while the cost of the inventory had been at least $60,000. The creditors, through the …

Corporations--Shareholders-Effect On Voting Trust Agreement Of Inability To Transfer Shares To The Voting Trustees, Peter Van Domelen

Michigan Law Review

Plaintiff filed a petition in equity attacking his removal as a director and president of the defendant corporation on the grounds that such removal was brought about through the exercise of an alleged invalid voting trust agreement The plaintiff and another shareholder, each owning fifty per cent of the stock in the defendant corporation, had entered into a voting trust agreement by which they appointed themselves and a third party as voting trustees. At the time the trust agreement was executed, all of the stock was on deposit with an escrow agent subject to an existing escrow contract. Plaintiff challenged …

Corporations-Insolvency-Corporate Officers As Preferred Wage Claimants, E. C.V. Greenwood

Michigan Law Review

A closed corporation, soon after its formation, executed an assignment for the benefit of creditors. One of the large creditors objected to a preferred wage claim allowed by the assignee to a vice-president and director of the assignor, the officer who had in fact been instrumental in executing the assignment. The claim was for wages amounting to two hundred fifty dollars for alleged manual work for the assignor prior to the assignment and was granted by the assignee on the theory that preferential treatment was authorized by the New York debtor and creditor statutes. The applicable statute reads as follows: …