Law Commons^™

Shareholder Wealth Maximization: A Schelling Point, Martin Edwards

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

Imagine a reality television game show where two contestants begin the game in two different places in New York City. The object of the game is for the two contestants to find each other, but they do not know anything about each other and they have no way of communicating. If they succeed, both contestants win a prize. If they fail, they get nothing. With no ability to explicitly bargain over the meeting, the parties have to make an educated guess about what the other person is most likely to do. Most people, confronted with this sort of tacit …

Business Law–Corporate Purpose And Benefit Corporations–Making Benefit Corporation Legislation Work For Socially Minded Investors, Cody Mckinney

The Arkansas Journal of Social Change and Public Service

No abstract provided.

Can Soft Words Lead To Strong Deeds? A Comparative Analysis Of Corporate Human Rights Commitments’ Enforcement, Adeline Michoud

Seattle Journal for Social Justice

No abstract provided.

Corporate Social Responsibility Versus Shareholder Value Maximization: Through The Lens Of Hard And Soft Law, Min Yan

Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business

Even with a significant increase in the number of firms around the world engaging in corporate social responsibility (“CSR”), many people still perceive CSR as a voluntary commitment and shareholder value maximization (“SVM”) as a mandatory requirement. This paper borrows the concept of hard law and soft law in terms of coerciveness and overturns the stereotype that SVM is a hard-law constraint and CSR a soft-law constraint. The paper first demonstrates that directors of the board are not obliged to maximize shareholder value even in the Anglo-American jurisdictions where shareholder primacy culture is more dominant. Next, the paper critically discusses …

Western Corporate Fiscal Citizenship In The 21st Century, Alex Freund

Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business

For the Western world, the challenges of the 21st Century are numerous, from climate change’s effects on food production and coastal cities to underfunded social safety nets to automation’s impact on the middle class. To handle such costly problems, government intervention will be required. Government intervention, however, always comes at a cost to either individuals or corporations. To determine who should bear these costs, scholars and experts should turn to notions of fiscal citizenship – the social contract between the state and private parties through taxation and the provision of goods and services. By applying principles of individual fiscal citizenship …

Taking Shareholders' Social Preferences Seriously: Confronting A New Agency Problem, Adi Libson

UC Irvine Law Review

Oliver Hart, Nobel Laureate in Economics for 2016, and economist Luigi Zingales recently published an article justifying companies’ pursuit of social objectives at the expense of profits from within the shareholder primacy framework. This Article highlights an important consequence of this approach: a new agency problem between managers and shareholders regarding social preferences. This Article provides two possible solutions to this agency problem: a bottom-up solution focused on shareholders’ ability to submit proposals on such issues and a top-down solution based on an independent board sub- committee intended to identify social objectives and forward them for shareholder approval.

The Shrinking Scope Of Csr In Uk Corporate Law, Andrew Johnston

Washington and Lee Law Review

Through a historical analysis of corporate law reforms in the United Kingdom (UK) during the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, this paper traces the shrinking scope for corporations to take socially responsible decisions. It offers a detailed examination of the rationales and drivers of the reforms, and shows that, by focusing exclusively on the question of accountability of directors to shareholders, wider social concerns were “bracketed” after 1948, leading to a permanent state of “crisis,” which constantly threatens the legitimacy of the corporate law system. Following the Brexit vote, there are signs that the UK Government is willing to reconsider …

Effective Compliance With Antidiscrimination Law: Corporate Personhood, Purpose And Social Responsibility, Cheryl L. Wade

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Using Proactive Legal Strategies For Corporate Environmental Sustainability, Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, Paul Shrivastava, Adam Sulkowski

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

We argue that proactive law can help organizations be more sustainable. Toward that end, this Article first summarizes proactive law literature as it pertains to corporate sustainability. Next, it examines a series of cases on the pivotal nexus between proactive law and corporate sustainability. It then advances novel propositions that connect proactive law to central organizational design elements. The discussion traces further implications and suggests fruitful avenues for research and ways of using proactive law for firms to become more sustainable.

More Burden Than Benefit? Analysis Of The Benefit Corporation Movement In California, Sarah Thornsberry

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

The benefit corporation movement has been associated with the separate camps of social entrepreneurship, nonprofit organizations, and for-profit corporations, while trying to establish itself as a community of businesses that pursue not only profit, but also environmental and social good. This article examines the legal attributes of benefit corporation legislation and articulates why incorporating as a benefit corporation can be an excellent business decision. Lastly, the article looks at how the movement can further expand in California.

Anglo-American Directors' Legal Duties And Csr: Prohibited, Permitted Or Prescribed?, Benedict Sheehy, Donald Feaver

Dalhousie Law Journal

The interaction between corporate social responsibility (CSR) obligations and directors' legal duties is underexamined. This article addresses that void by examining directors' duties in case law and legislation across the major commonwealth countries and the U.S.A. It provides an analysis of leading cases and examines how they deal with directors' duties, the doctrine of shareholder primacy, corporate legal theory and CSR. The article reviews fiduciary relations and duties and analyzes the directors'duties toexercise power in the best interests of the company as a whole and for proper purposes. The article concludes that CSR is well within the accepted range of …

Corporate Energy Responsibility: International And Domestic Perspectives On Supply And Demand In The New Millenium, Steven Ferrey

Fordham Environmental Law Review

No abstract provided.

Improving The Benefit Corporation: How Traditional Governance Mechanisms Can Enhance The Innovative New Business Form, Steven Munch

Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy

In recent years, a number of states have offered innovative new business forms to accommodate social enterprises, organizations that pursue both profit and social purpose. These hybrid forms are designed to free socially conscious entrepreneurs from the strict pursuit of shareholder value maximization that often controls in business practice and law, allowing them instead to serve the interests of other company stakeholders or even society. One form, the benefit corporation, has been adopted by seven states and is now under consideration in several more. This Note details the development, provisions, and advantages of the benefit corporation. It also identifies and …

Corporate Social Responsibility In The Oil And Gas Industry: The Importance Of Reputational Risk, David B. Spence

Chicago-Kent Law Review

Modern oil and gas production takes place in environments that are increasingly challenging, environments that pose very high levels of technical risk, as well as political, social, environmental, heal and safety risks. The people of the oil-rich nations of the world are growing more assertive politically and more sensitive to the environmental, health, and safety risks posed by oil and gas development. Governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and local people seek the means to control oil and gas development so as to minimize the risk of harm and provide redress in the event harm is done. Oil and gas companies have …

Foreword: In Berle’S Footsteps, Charles R.T. O'Kelley

Seattle University Law Review

On the weekend of November 6–8, 2009, scholars from around the world gathered in Seattle for a symposium—In Berle’s Footsteps—celebrating the launch of the Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Center on Corporations, Law and Society. As founding director of the Berle Center, I described our undertaking: “It is with a profound sense of obligation to the legacy that has been entrusted to my care, that I announce the launching of the Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Center on Corporations, Law and Society. It is a privilege to follow in Berle’s footsteps.”

Carpe Crisis: Capitalizing On The Breakdown Of Capitalism To Consider The Creation Of Social Businesses, Celia R. Tayloe

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Opening Remarks, Chancellor William B. Chandler Iii

Seattle University Law Review

Law is, in many ways, a backwards-looking field. We litigate over facts that have already occurred, challenge deals that have already been signed, and apply rules of decision based on previously-established precedent or statutes already enacted. To the extent that this Center and the symposium reflect on Berle’s work, they too are an exercise in looking back. Indeed, some might say the establishment of a Center named in Berle’s honor is a monument to the past.

Securities Intermediaries And The Separation Of Ownership From Control, Jill E. Fisch

Seattle University Law Review

The Modern Corporation & Private Property is a paradigm-shifting analysis of the modern corporation. The book is perhaps best known for the insights of Berle and Means about the separation of ownership from control and the consequences of that separation for the allocation of power within the corporation. The Berle and Means story focuses on the shareholder as the owner of the corporation. Berle and Means saw the mechanism of centralized management—in which the shareholder retains the economic interest but not the control rights associated with ownership—as threatening the conception of shareholder interests in terms of property rights. In particular, …

Rethinking The Separation Of Ownership From Management In American History, Kenneth Lipartito, Yumiko Morii

Seattle University Law Review

In <em>The Modern Corporation and Private Property</em>, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means would use AT&T as a prime example of what they saw as a dangerous new trend, the replacement of ownership-based capitalism with giant corporations controlled by a small group of propertyless managers. Indeed, AT&T became Berle and Means’ favorite example. . . . As we shall see, however, the claim that AT&T was a leading example of the separation of ownership from management is incomplete. More importantly, the common interpretation of Berle and Means’ work is mistaken, placing the emphasis incorrectly on the number of shareholders and reading …

The Modern Corporation As Social Construction, Mark S. Mizruchi, Daniel Hirschman

Seattle University Law Review

Classic works, Mark Mizruchi and Lisa Fein argued, share a particular fate. Authors often cite classic works without reading them—or without reading them carefully. . . . Yet perhaps no single work fits the above description better than one of the most important books on the large corporation ever published: Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means’s The Modern Corporation and Private Property. One can speculate that few works in the social sciences have been as often cited and as little read. As a consequence, we would expect The Modern Corporation to be a good candidate for either selective interpretation or …

Berle And The Entrepreneur, Charles R.T. O'Kelley

Seattle University Law Review

In the first and last four chapters (“the Five Chapters”) of The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Adolf Berle, Jr. describes in sweeping terms a fundamental transformation of the American economy. . . . Writing more than ten years before Berle, another seminal scholar, Frank Knight . . . developed a theory of the entrepreneur as part of his larger effort to more carefully explain the theoretical underpinnings of a free-market economy. . . . Given Knight’s prominence and the fact that Knight apparently reached dramatically different conclusions than did Berle concerning the consequences flowing from separation of ownership …

Revisiting Berle And Rethinking The Corporate Structure, Kelli A. Alces

Seattle University Law Review

Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means painted what remains a defining portrait of corporate law. The separation of ownership and control they described and the agency costs it causes are still a central concern of the law of corporate governance. For that reason, Berle’s work is relevant nearly eighty years after its publication. Seemingly forgotten, however, is that Berle’s enduring description of the corporate structure was published before most of today’s corporate law was in place. His work preceded the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and even preceded the dominance of Delaware common law in …

Monitoring To Reduce Agency Costs: Examining The Behavior Of Independent And Non-Independent Boards, Anita Anand, Frank Milne, Lynnette Purda

Seattle University Law Review

Berle and Means’s analysis of the corporation—in particular, their view that those in control are not the owners of the corporation—raises questions about actions that corporations take to counter concerns regarding management’s influence. What mechanisms, if any, do corporations implement to balance the distribution of power in the corporation? To address this question, we analyze boards of directors’ propensity to voluntarily adopt recommended corporate governance practices. Because board independence is one way to enhance shareholders’ ability to monitor management, we probe whether firms with independent boards of directors (which we define as boards with either an independent chair or a …

Power Without Property, Still: Unger, Berle, And The Derivatives Revolution, Cristie Ford, Carol Liao

Seattle University Law Review

We are in a time when the notion of property is in flux. The derivatives revolution has shattered the “atom of property” well beyond what was originally imagined in 1932 by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means. This disaggregation has had fascinating, and often adverse, effects on corporate law and securities regulation. Moreover, the phenomenon has had the unexpected effect of permitting some parties that already possess considerable social, economic, and political power to accumulate even more.

The New Financial Assets: Separating Ownership From Control, Tamar Frankel

Seattle University Law Review

In The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner Means wrote about the separation of ownership from control in corporations. They noted that the interests of the controlling directors and managers can diverge from those of the shareholder owners of the firm. . . . There are those who consider such a decoupling beneficial. Others express the same concern that Berle and Means have expressed. And depending on what one focuses on in viewing the pluses and minuses of these separations, one could reach different conclusions. I reach a number of conclusions. First, the separation of …

Neo-Brandeisianism And The New Deal: Adolf A. Berle, Jr., William O. Douglas, And The Problem Of Corporate Finance In The 1930s, Jessica Wang

Seattle University Law Review

This essay revisits Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and The Modern Corporation and Private Property by focusing on the triangle of Berle, Louis D. Brandeis, and William O. Douglas in order to examine some of the underlying assumptions about law, economics, and the nature of modern society behind securities regulation and corporate finance in the 1930s. I explore Douglas and Berle’s academic and political relationship, the conceptual underpinnings of Brandeis, Berle, and Douglas’s critiques of modern finance, and the ways in which the two younger men—Berle and Douglas—ultimately departed from their role model, Brandeis.

Enumerating Old Themes? Berle’S Concept Of Ownership And The Historical Development Of English Company Law In Context, Lorraine E. Talbot

Seattle University Law Review

This paper offers some tentative suggestions as to why Berle’s work has been read and interpreted so selectively in the United Kingdom. I suggest that this must be partly attributable to the historical developments in English company law that entrenched the notion of shareholder ownership claims. Specifically, unincorporated associations’ normative values—that members are owners and there is no distinction between small organizations with no share dispersal and large organizations with wide share dispersal—have a continuing influence on this entrenched notion of shareholder ownership claims. First, I provide an overview of the origins of English company law. Next, I address how …

Berle’S Vision Beyond Shareholder Interests: Why Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Liability, Claire Hill, Richard Painter

Seattle University Law Review

This essay, published in a symposium on the work of Adolf Berle, approaches the Berle-Dodd debate from the perspective that corporate managers have responsibilities beyond pursuing the interests of shareholders. Stock based executive compensation, designed to align managers’ interests with those of shareholders, has, in the investment banking industry in particular, failed to avert, and may have caused, managers (in this case, bankers) to take excessive risks that in the present financial crisis inflicted great damage on creditors and on society as a whole. We describe here the broad outlines of a proposal that we will discuss in future publications …

The Birth Of Corporate Governance, Harwell Wells

Seattle University Law Review

Part I of this Article briefly examines the concept of “corporate governance” and argues for dating the concept’s origins to the debates of the 1920s. Part II then moves on to examine early scholarly and popular discussions of the separation of ownership and control. After surveying the historical developments that produced the recognizably modern corporate economy around the turn of the century, it examines early scholarly and popular discussions of the separation of ownership and control, focusing on three major thinkers, Louis D. Brandeis, Walter Lippmann, and Thorstein Veblen. It argues that, while each of these authors examined the separation …

Tracking Berle’S Footsteps: The Trail Of The Modern Corporation’S Last Chapter, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter

Seattle University Law Review

Readers game enough to work through all three hundred pages of The Modern Corporation and Private Property looking for insights on corporate law today encounter two, apparently contradictory, lines of thought. One line, set out in Books II and III, resonates comfortably with today’s shareholder-centered corporate legal theory. Here the book teaches that even as ownership and control have separated, managers should function as trustees for the shareholders and so should exercise their wide-ranging powers for the shareholders’ benefit. The other line of thought emerges in Books I and IV, where The Modern Corporation encases this shareholder trust model in …