Law Commons^™

Lessons From Institutional Shareholder Services: Governing Benefit Corporations' Third-Party Standard, Tammi S. Etheridge

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

Almost one hundred years ago, Henry Ford, as CEO of the Ford Motor Company, announced a plan to cease payment of special dividends to shareholders. Instead, the company would reinvest its profits to employ more workers and build more factories. Investing in new workers and factories would cut the cost of cars and make them affordable to more people. Ford publicly declared that his “ambition [was] to employ still more men, to spread the benefits of this industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help them build up their lives and their homes. To do this we are putting …

Shareholders Do Not Have Standing To Bring An Individual Action Against Third Parties Who Have Damaged The Corporation: Adair V. Wozniak, Frank Carrino

Akron Law Review

Apart from the context of a derivative action, can a shareholder in a corporation sue individually for wrongful acts committed against the corporation by third parties?

The general rule of corporate law states that a shareholder cannot attain standing for such a suit. This rule is grounded on the theory that all shareholders should incur loss from third party wrongdoing in proportion to the amount of shares he or she holds, and likewise should proportionately benefit when the corporate entity wins an action. In addition, courts are fearful that if this rule were not in force, then there would be …

Does Corporate Law Matter? Legal Capital Restrictions On Stock Distributions, Craig A. Peterson, Norman W. Hawker

Akron Law Review

This paper consists of five sections, including this introduction. The background section of this article consists of several parts. First, we provide an historical overview of the legal capital doctrines restricting dividends. Second, we briefly summarize and illustrate six basic types of state statutory restrictions on dividends and other distributions to shareholders. Third, we examine the criticisms of legal capital that has led many states to abandon the use of concepts like stated capital and surplus to restrict financial distributions to shareholders. Fourth, a discussion of the generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") and mechanics of legal capital and stock distributions …

Competing With Delaware: Recent Amendments To Ohio's Corporate Statutes, David Porter

Akron Law Review

House Bill 301 is evolutionary, not revolutionary, in its content, but its changes are nonetheless significant for Ohio corporations and their lawyers. To place these changes in context, this article summarizes corporate statutory developments since 1997 that highlight Ohio’s previous initiatives to keep up with Delaware, America’s dominant state of incorporation, and then discusses at greater length the recent amendments contained in House Bill 301, concluding with a look ahead at some additional changes that may occur as early as this year.

The Myth Of The Unbiased Director, Regina F. Burch

Akron Law Review

This Article seeks to use social science research to better understand why these and other corporate governance problems persist. One reason may be that boards are biased as to how they respond to these issues. Social science research on risk perception informs us that individuals’ “preferences among different types of risk taking (or avoiding), correspond to cultural biases—that is, to worldviews or ideologies entailing deeply held values and beliefs defending different patterns of social relations.” Cultural theorists have identified four competing worldviews: communitarian, individualistic, hierarchical, and egalitarian. The communitarian and individualistic worldviews are at opposite ends of a spectrum measuring …

Executive Compensation In Controlled Companies, Kobi Kastiel

Indiana Law Journal

Conventional wisdom among corporate law theorists holds that the presence of a controlling shareholder should alleviate the problem of managerial opportunism because such a controller has both the power and incentives to curb excessive executive pay. This Article challenges that common understanding by proposing a different view based on an agency problem paradigm. Controlling shareholders, this Article suggests, may in fact overpay managers in order to maximize controllers’ consumption of private benefits, due to their close social and business ties with professional managers or for other reasons, such as being captured by professional managers. This tendency to overpay managers is …

Is The Quest For Corporate Responsibility A Wild Goose Chase? The Story Of Lovenheim V. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., D.A. Jeremy Telman

Akron Law Review

This Article is a Law Story. Law Stories have many purposes, but their main goal is to supplement and demystify the case method of legal pedagogy. The case method has been criticized for presenting students with the law more or less as a fait accompli. The case method assumes a pre-existing body of law that students passively learn rather than learning to think of the law as something that they will have a hand in shaping...In Part II, this Article explores the law of shareholder proposals and the reasons why the SEC and the courts permit proposals relating to social …

Voter Primacy, Sarah C. Haan

Fordham Law Review

This Article argues that Citizens United v. FEC expanded the audience for campaign finance disclosure to include a group that had never before been held relevant to campaign finance disclosure—corporate shareholders—and explores the constitutional, policy, and political consequences of this change. In part IV of Citizens United, the U.S. Supreme Court departed from more than thirty years of campaign finance disclosure analysis to treat corporate shareholders as a target audience for corporate electoral spending disclosure, holding that the governmental interest advanced by campaign finance disclosure laws includes an interest in helping corporate shareholders “determine whether their corporation’s political speech advances …

Of Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy Software, And The Zero-Member Llc, Shawn Bayern

Northwestern University Law Review

No abstract provided.

A Failure Of Substance And A Failure Of Process: The Circular Odyssey Of Oklahoma's Corporate Law Amendments In 2010, 2012, And 2013, Steven J. Cleveland

Oklahoma Law Review

No abstract provided.