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Full-Text Articles in Law
Are There Too Many Cooks In The Corporate Kitchen?, Jill Fisch
Are There Too Many Cooks In The Corporate Kitchen?, Jill Fisch
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
No abstract provided.
Institutional Investors: Agents Of Change, James E. Heard
Institutional Investors: Agents Of Change, James E. Heard
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
No abstract provided.
Organized Labor As Shareholder Activist: Building Coalitions To Promote Worker Capitalism, Marleen A. O'Connor
Organized Labor As Shareholder Activist: Building Coalitions To Promote Worker Capitalism, Marleen A. O'Connor
University of Richmond Law Review
In the past, the traditional question posed by unions was: "which side are you on?"--presenting a clear choice between labor and capital. As membership and bargaining power fall, however, unions are asserting their rights as shareholders to influence corporate decision making outside the conventional labor law framework. Because the National Labor Relations Act does not adequately protect workers' rights, unions have devised innovative methods as shareholders to exercise unprecedented power over managers. In only a few years, labor-shareholders have become highly visible players in the institutional shareholder movement. As a group, labor-shareholders submit one of the largest numbers of shareholder …
Esop's Fables: Leveraged Esops And Their Effect On Managerial Slack, Employer Risk And Motivation In The Public Corporation, Hunter C. Blum
Esop's Fables: Leveraged Esops And Their Effect On Managerial Slack, Employer Risk And Motivation In The Public Corporation, Hunter C. Blum
University of Richmond Law Review
Shareholder rights and their influence on corporate governance have become an increasingly important topic in corporate law. The recent wave of corporate downsizing in the early 1990's has disturbed our collective equilibrium. Many now challenge the basic corporate law tenet that the directors hold a fiduciary duty to the shareholders only and the traditional idea that the proper corporate goal is shareholder wealth maximiza- tion.