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Corporate Darwinism: Disciplining Managers In A World With Weak Shareholder Litigation, Randall S. Thomas, James D. Cox
Corporate Darwinism: Disciplining Managers In A World With Weak Shareholder Litigation, Randall S. Thomas, James D. Cox
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Because representative shareholder litigation has been constrained by numerous legal developments, the corporate governance system has developed new mechanisms as alternative means to address managerial agency costs. We posit that recent significant governance developments in the corporate world are the natural consequence of the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of shareholder suits to address certain genre of managerial agency costs. We thus argue that corporate governance responses evolve to fill voids caused by the inability of shareholder suits to monitor and discipline corporate managers.
We further claim that these new governance responses are themselves becoming stronger due in part to the rising …
Common Challenges Facing Shareholder Suits In Europe And The United States, Randall Thomas, James D. Cox
Common Challenges Facing Shareholder Suits In Europe And The United States, Randall Thomas, James D. Cox
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Episodic and even sometimes systematic misbehavior by businessmen and corporate entities is ubiquitous. While Enron and WorldCom were the battle cries for corporate reform in the U.S. so it was with Ahold and Parmalat across Europe. No country is free of concern that company officers will misbehave thereby injuring investors, consumers and destroying shareholder value. Thus, this symposium issue collects the recent experiences across Europe in strengthening shareholder suits. Most recent legislative efforts in Europe, and hence the comments in the symposium, are focused on the derivative suit. Just as the American experience with class actions, reviewed separately in this …