Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Business Organizations Law

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

Investors

Articles 1 - 7 of 7

Full-Text Articles in Law

The Elephant In The Room: Helping Delaware Courts Develop Law To End Systemic Short-Term Bias In Corporate Decision-Making, Kenneth Mcneil, Keith Johnson Oct 2018

The Elephant In The Room: Helping Delaware Courts Develop Law To End Systemic Short-Term Bias In Corporate Decision-Making, Kenneth Mcneil, Keith Johnson

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

Short-termism in corporate decision-making is as problematic for long-term investors as relying on a three-mile radar on a supertanker. It is totally inadequate for handling the long-term risks and opportunities faced by the modern corporation. Yet recent empirical research shows that up to 85% of the S&P 1500 have no long-term planning. This is costing pension funds and other long-term investors dearly. For instance, the small minority of companies that do long-term planning and risk management had a long-term profitability that was 81% higher than their peers during the 2001–2014 period—with less stock volatility that costs investors dearly as well. …


Dual-Class Capital Structures: A Legal, Theoretical & Empirical Buy-Side Analysis, Christopher C. Mckinnon Feb 2016

Dual-Class Capital Structures: A Legal, Theoretical & Empirical Buy-Side Analysis, Christopher C. Mckinnon

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

“The advantage of a dual-class share structure is that it protects entrepreneurial management from the demands of ordinary shareholders. The disadvantage of a dual-class share structure is that it protects entrepreneurial management from the demands of shareholders.” Issuing dual classes of stock has become hotly debated since two major events transpired in 2014: (1) Facebook acquired WhatsApp for $19 billion and (2) Alibaba chose to list its shares on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) instead of the Hong Kong Exchange. Because dual-class managers, like those at Facebook and Alibaba, retain a controlling voting block, their decisions are immune from …


Enforceability Of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses For Shareholder-Corporation Disputes, Garry D. Hartlieb Dec 2014

Enforceability Of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses For Shareholder-Corporation Disputes, Garry D. Hartlieb

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

Investor litigation is an increasingly vexatious field of law. Nearly every time a significant change of control or corporate ownership occurs, plaintiffs’ attorneys file standardized complaints to set in motion class action suits. Ultimately, the settlements shareholders receive fail to achieve the practical effects that parties on both sides desire. Shareholders may receive pennies on the dollar of what they allege was lost by corporate wrongdoing, and, in some cases, shareholders may not receive monetary recovery as the settlement requires only that the corporation to make changes to its governing documents. These suits distract directors and management from the core …


Legally "Strong" Shareholders Of Japan, Gen Goto Jan 2014

Legally "Strong" Shareholders Of Japan, Gen Goto

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

Foreign investors often criticize Japanese corporations for not paying enough attention to the interests of their shareholders. It might surprise these critics, then, to learn that shareholders’ legal rights under the Japanese Companies Act are actually quite strong. Indeed, many of the rights that shareholders’ rights advocates often support, including shareholders’ power to alter a corporate charter without board consent, shareholders’ power to control dividend payments, majority voting for board elections, shareholders’ power to replace the board of directors, and shareholder access to a corporate ballot—all of which are strongly debated elsewhere— are already effective in Japan. Moreover, derivative suits …


Insider Trading And Other Securities Frauds In The United States: Lessons For Chile, Dante Figueroa Jan 2014

Insider Trading And Other Securities Frauds In The United States: Lessons For Chile, Dante Figueroa

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

This Article is a comparative analysis of insider trading law in the United States and Chile. The study summarily reviews the historical, political, and legal foundations of insider trading regulation in both jurisdictions, identifying areas of convergence, as well as areas in which the Chilean securities market could benefit vis- ` a-vis the more advanced experience of the considerably larger American securities market. The Article also highlights the axiological closeness between both jurisdictions concerning the protection of inside corporate information and the fiduciary role of those who intervene in securities markets in their various capacities (as investors, shareholders, corporate officers, …


Private Equity & Private Suits: Using 10b-5 Antifraud Suits To Discipline A Transforming Industry, Kenneth J. Black Jan 2013

Private Equity & Private Suits: Using 10b-5 Antifraud Suits To Discipline A Transforming Industry, Kenneth J. Black

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

This note demonstrates why private equity will no longer be able to avoid private investor suits as it has (mostly) done in the past and explores the industry’s response to a growing number of investor suits. Notably, the industry has already begun to shift its strategy from regulatory avoidance to regulatory capture, at least in part to avoid investor suits. Given these changes, this note proposes that the best way to maintain discipline in the transforming private equity market is to protect the ability of investors to bring private suits.


A Very Quiet Revolution: A Primer On Securities Crowdfunding And Title Iii Of The Jobs Act, Thaya Brook Knight, Huiwen Leo, Adrian A. Ohmer Jan 2012

A Very Quiet Revolution: A Primer On Securities Crowdfunding And Title Iii Of The Jobs Act, Thaya Brook Knight, Huiwen Leo, Adrian A. Ohmer

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

This essay introduces the complex regulatory regime that governs the public sale of all securities, no matter how small the offeror. It is intended as a rudimentary roadmap for the start-up or its counsel and will, hopefully, help to illuminate the traps for the unwary while providing an overview of the regulatory universe in which securities crowdfunding will operate.