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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Humanities Strike Back: (E)Esg And Justice Strine Challenge Gamer Shareholder Primacy, David H. Webber
The Humanities Strike Back: (E)Esg And Justice Strine Challenge Gamer Shareholder Primacy, David H. Webber
Faculty Scholarship
Leo E. Strine, Jr. is closing in on Blair and Stout for the undisputed title of all-time top-scoring stakeholderist.3 I don't intend to squander this opportunity to roast and toast him by weighing the pros and cons of basketscoring primacy. Instead, my aim is to surface an overlooked argument in the debate over shareholder primacy and stakeholderism, the case for which has been recently reinvigorated by Strine's work. My argument is this: one underappreciated aspect of shareholder primacy's appeal is that it creates a competition with a single endpoint, basically a game, and that the exhilarating tournament that results, …
The Tort Foundation Of Duty Of Care And Business Judgment, Robert J. Rhee
The Tort Foundation Of Duty Of Care And Business Judgment, Robert J. Rhee
Faculty Scholarship
This Article corrects a misconception in corporation law – the belief that principles of tort law do not apply to the liability scheme of fiduciary duty. A board’s duty of care implies exposure to liability, but the business judgment rule precludes it. Tort law finds fault; corporation law excuses it. The conventional wisdom says that the tort analogy fails. This dismissal of tort prinicples is wrong. Although shareholder derivative suits and ordinary tort cases properly yield systemically antipodal outcomes, they are bound by a common analytical framework. The principles of board liability are rooted in tort doctrines governing duty, customs, …
Corporate Governance And Executive Compensation In Financial Firms: The Case For Convertible Equity-Based Pay, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Corporate Governance And Executive Compensation In Financial Firms: The Case For Convertible Equity-Based Pay, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Faculty Scholarship
Unlike the failure of a nonfinancial firm, the failure of a systemically important financial firm will reduce the value of a diversified shareholder portfolio because of economy-wide reductions in expected returns and a consequent increase in systematic risk. Thus, diversified shareholders of a financial firm generally internalize systemic risk, whereas managerial shareholders and blockholders do not. This means that the governance model drawn from nonfinancial firms will not fit financial firms. Regulations that limit risk-taking by financial firms can thus provide a benefit, rather than necessarily impose a cost, for the typical diversified public shareholder. Managerial shareholding also gives rise …
Federalizing Fiduciary Duty: The Altered Scope Of Officer Fiduciary Duty Following Orderly Liquidation Under Dodd-Frank, Dorothy S. Lund
Federalizing Fiduciary Duty: The Altered Scope Of Officer Fiduciary Duty Following Orderly Liquidation Under Dodd-Frank, Dorothy S. Lund
Faculty Scholarship
The financial crisis of 2008 ushered in a new era of regulatory reform in the United States. The failure of several large banks prompted Congressional scrutiny ofthe U.S. bank regulatory system. Many critics highlighted the government's failure to intervene to prevent Lehman Brothers' insolvency, which resulted in economic turmoil not yet resolved. Against this backdrop, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank") in July 2010.
Dodd-Frank mandates institutional changes to minimize economic instability and establishes regulatory processes to guide the government's response to future bank failures. At the heart of the regulation is the Orderly …
Donahue's Fils Aîné: Reflections On Wilkes And The Legitimate Rights Of Selfish Ownership, Daniel S. Kleinberger
Donahue's Fils Aîné: Reflections On Wilkes And The Legitimate Rights Of Selfish Ownership, Daniel S. Kleinberger
Faculty Scholarship
This Article asserts that Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc. should be at least as memorable as Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., and is, in a practical sense, substantially more important. The assertion rests on two propositions: first, that Donahue announces admirable sentiments but provides little practical guidance; second, that Wilkes provides the best practical rule for adjudicating “oppression” claims when the alleged victim is also a miscreant or for some other reason the dispute is grey rather than black and white. In particular, this Article asserts that Wilkes’s multistep, burden-shifting rule is a nuanced and effective method for accommodating …
Corporate Control And The Need For Meaningful Board Accountability, Michelle M. Harner
Corporate Control And The Need For Meaningful Board Accountability, Michelle M. Harner
Faculty Scholarship
Corporations are vulnerable to the greed, self-dealing and conflicts of those in control of the corporation. Courts historically have regulated this potential abuse by designating the board of directors and senior management as fiduciaries. In some instances, however, shareholders, creditors or others outside of corporate management may influence corporate decisions and, in the process, extract corporate value. Courts generally address this type of corporate damage in one of two ways: they designate controlling shareholders as corporate fiduciaries and they characterize creditors, customers and others as contract parties with no fiduciary duties. The traditional roles of corporate shareholders and creditors may …
Finessing Well-Plead Derivative Lawsuits: The Implications Of The Minnesota Supreme Court's Selection Of Auerbach Over Zapata, James F. Hogg
Finessing Well-Plead Derivative Lawsuits: The Implications Of The Minnesota Supreme Court's Selection Of Auerbach Over Zapata, James F. Hogg
Faculty Scholarship
This article begins with the factual background and subsequent procedural history of the UnitedHealth Group Inc. shareholder derivitve litigation, as an instance where Minnesota courts effectively disposed of the factual allegations in a well-pleaded derivative action, directed at the behavior and actions of members of a board of directors, without reviewing finding of facts or reasoning behind the SLC's report or conclusions. The purpose of this article is to understand how a board-appointed committee can convince a court to dismiss and settle a derivative suit without showing detailed justification, and this is achieved by reviewing the statutes, case law, and …
Twilight In The Zone Of Insolvency: Fiduciary Duty And Creditors In Troubled Companies, Royce De R. Barondes, Lisa M. Fairfax, Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Robert Lawless, Jonathan C. Lipson, Russell C. Silberglied
Twilight In The Zone Of Insolvency: Fiduciary Duty And Creditors In Troubled Companies, Royce De R. Barondes, Lisa M. Fairfax, Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Robert Lawless, Jonathan C. Lipson, Russell C. Silberglied
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Duty To Creditors Reconsidered - Filling A Much Needed Gap In Corporation Law, Richard A. Booth
The Duty To Creditors Reconsidered - Filling A Much Needed Gap In Corporation Law, Richard A. Booth
Faculty Scholarship
The most fundamental question of corporation law is to whom does the board of directors of a corporation owe its fiduciary duty. Recently, the question has tended to be whether and under what circumstances the board of directors has the duty to maximize stockholder wealth. But if a corporation is insolvent (or close to it), business decisions designed to maximize stockholder wealth may result in a reduction of creditor wealth. Although the conventional wisdom is that creditors must protect themselves by contractual means, there is a substantial body of case law that says that creditors can assert claims sounding in …
Agents Of The Good, Servants Of Evil: Harry Potter And The Law Of Agency, Daniel S. Kleinberger
Agents Of The Good, Servants Of Evil: Harry Potter And The Law Of Agency, Daniel S. Kleinberger
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Clark's Treatise On Corporate Law: Filling Manning's Empty Towers, Ronald J. Gilson, Reinier Kraakman
Clark's Treatise On Corporate Law: Filling Manning's Empty Towers, Ronald J. Gilson, Reinier Kraakman
Faculty Scholarship
Almost 45 years ago, in an elegantly depressive account of the then current state of corporate law scholarship, Bayless Manning announced the death of corporation law "as a field of intellectual effort." Manning left us with an affecting image of a once grand field long past its prime, rigid with formalism and empty of content:
When American law ceased to take the "corporation" seriously, the entire body of law that had been built upon that intellectual construct slowly perforated and rotted away. We have nothing left but our great empty corporate statutes towering skyscrapers of rusted girders, internally welded together …
Seven Points To Explain Why The Law Ought Not Allow The Elimination Of Fiduciary Duty Within Closely Held Businesses: Cardozo Is Dead; We Have Killed Him., Daniel S. Kleinberger
Seven Points To Explain Why The Law Ought Not Allow The Elimination Of Fiduciary Duty Within Closely Held Businesses: Cardozo Is Dead; We Have Killed Him., Daniel S. Kleinberger
Faculty Scholarship
Prepared as part of the author's work as co-reporter for the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, this essay argues against legislation that empowers private agreements to eliminate fiduciary duty within a business organization. The essay considers: (i) the venerable role of fiduciary duty within business organizations and the limited predictive powers of those urging radical reform; (ii) the absence of prescience in contract drafters; (iii) the strict construction function of fiduciary law; (iv) the inevitable and inappropriate pressure that elimination would put on the obligation of good faith and fair dealing; (v) the differences in remedy available for fiduciary …
Employee Stock Ownership After Enron: Proceedings Of The 2003 Annual Meeting, Association Of American Law Schools Section On Employee Benefits, Norman P. Stein, Colleen E. Medill, Susan J. Stabile, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Louis H. Diamond, Damon Silvers, Patricia E. Dilley
Employee Stock Ownership After Enron: Proceedings Of The 2003 Annual Meeting, Association Of American Law Schools Section On Employee Benefits, Norman P. Stein, Colleen E. Medill, Susan J. Stabile, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Louis H. Diamond, Damon Silvers, Patricia E. Dilley
Faculty Scholarship
This session is entitled "Employee Stock Ownership After Enron," and I assume that title has drawn into this room people who know something about either Enron or employee stock, or both. For our purposes, the Enron story has as its focus the Enron 401(k) plan, which was the principal retirement plan for most Enron employees. Employees could make elective contributions to the 401(k) plan, which offered nineteen investment options, one of which was Enron stock. The 401(k) plan also provided that Enron would match employee contributions up to 3 percent of compensation. Enron's match, however, was made in Enron stock. …
Fiduciary Duty, Contract, And Waiver In Partnerships And Limited Liability Companies, Richard A. Booth Marbury Research Professor Of Law
Fiduciary Duty, Contract, And Waiver In Partnerships And Limited Liability Companies, Richard A. Booth Marbury Research Professor Of Law
Faculty Scholarship
Among the controversies swirling around the promulgations of new uniform statutes governing partnerships and LLCs is the question whether and to what extend fiduciary duties should be made mandatory or waivable. Although courts and commentators have not traditionally focused on the costs of fiduciary duties, the costs are significant in that such duties may preclude agents from engaging in other legitimate ventures. Indeed, fiduciary duty may be used by those to whom it is owed to prevent competition or extort side benefits form participants. Mandatory duties effectively require participants who may identify multiple business opportunities to overinvest their human capital …
Resolving The Subsidiary Director's Dilemma, Eric J. Gouvin
Resolving The Subsidiary Director's Dilemma, Eric J. Gouvin
Faculty Scholarship
Although subsidiaries play a significant role in our economy, surprisingly little has been written about the duties of their directors. Despite widespread acceptance of holding companies as commonplace business entities, several legal problems inherent in the holding company form of ownership remain unresolved. Holding companies raise legal dilemmas for subsidiary directors that are easier to ignore than to resolve. This Article examines the subsidiary director's dilemma and demonstrates that traditional models of corporate structure are not adequate for the subsidiary-parent situation. The Author argues that the law should recognize the special relationship between a parent and its subsidiary and adopt …
Why Not Good Faith?-The Foibles Of Fairness In Closely Held Corporations, Daniel S. Kleinberger
Why Not Good Faith?-The Foibles Of Fairness In Closely Held Corporations, Daniel S. Kleinberger
Faculty Scholarship
This essay describes the contours of the shareholder’s duty to be fair and explores some of the problems caused by the law’s imprecision in defining the duty of fairness. Because this duty is best understood as a rejection of old norms, part one of this essay describes the traditional doctrines of intra-corporate responsibility. Part two describes the special characteristics of a close corporation and outlines how those characteristics pushed close corporation law to new concepts of fairness and shareholder duties. Part three attempts to delineate those duties of fairness and also to highlight some of the dangers that arise when …