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Business Organizations Law

Faculty Scholarship

2005

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Corporate Responsibility: Ensuring Independent Judgment Of The General Counsel - A Look At Stock Options, Z. Jill Barclift Jan 2005

Corporate Responsibility: Ensuring Independent Judgment Of The General Counsel - A Look At Stock Options, Z. Jill Barclift

Faculty Scholarship

Recent corporate scandals and allegations of corporate fraud in public companies have most people asking how things went so wrong. When looking to assess blame for corporate malfeasance, many ask, “Where were the lawyers?” In several high-profile corporate fraud investigations, outside and in-house lawyers were criticized for not doing more to prevent corporate executives from violating the law, and several general counsels were charged with criminal misconduct by state and federal authorities. Why would the general counsel of a public corporation risk his or her career, reputation, and criminal prosecution to assist executives in perpetuating corporate fraud? The answer may …


Executive Compensation: If There's A Problem, What's The Remedy? The Case For "Compensation Discussion And Analysis", Jeffrey N. Gordon Jan 2005

Executive Compensation: If There's A Problem, What's The Remedy? The Case For "Compensation Discussion And Analysis", Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

High levels of executive compensation have triggered an intense debate over whether compensation results primarily from competitive pressures in the market for managerial services or from managerial overreaching. Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried have advanced the debate with their recent book, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, which forcefully argues that current compensation levels are best explained by managerial rent-seeking, not by arm's-length bargaining designed to create the optimum pay and performance nexus. This paper expresses three sorts of reservations with their analysis and advances its own proposals. First, enhancing shareholder welfare is not, as a …