Law Commons^™

Contract Production In M&A Markets, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, Matthew Jennejohn, Robert E. Scott

Faculty Scholarship

Contract scholarship has devoted considerable attention to how contract terms are designed to incentivize parties to fulfill their obligations. Less attention has been paid to the production of contracts and the tradeoffs between using boilerplate terms and designing bespoke provisions. In thick markets everyone uses the standard form despite the known drawbacks of boilerplate. But in thinner markets, such as the private deal M&A world, parties trade off costs and benefits of using standard provisions and customizing clauses. This Article reports on a case study of contract production in the M&A markets. We find evidence of an informal information network …

Quebec's Sales Recording Module (Srm): Fighting The Zapper, Phantomware, And Tax Fraud With Technology, Richard Thompson Ainsworth

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Mtic (Carousel) Fraud: Twelve Ways Forward; Two Ways 'Preferred' - Has The Technology-Based Administrative Solution Been Rejected?, Richard Thompson Ainsworth

Faculty Scholarship

In a May 31, 2006 Communication to the Council, the European Parliament, and the European Economic and Social Committee, the European Commission indicated a need to develop a co-ordinated strategy to improve the fight against fiscal fraud [COM(2006) 254 final]. Although the Communication considers fiscal fraud broadly (VAT, excise duties and direct taxes) the most pressing need seems to be for a VAT strategy that will effectively deal with MTIC (Missing Trader Intra-Community) or carousel fraud. To this end the Commission hosted a conference: Fiscal Fraud - Tackling VAT Fraud: Possible Ways Forward. The March 29, 2007 conference was constructed …

Thinking To Be Paid Versus Being Paid To Think, Merritt B. Fox

Faculty Scholarship

In the first chapter of The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel make an arresting statement:

... [P]eople who are backing their beliefs with cash are correct; they have every reason to avoid mistakes, while critics (be they academics or regulators) are rewarded for novel rather than accurate beliefs. Market professionals who estimate these things wrongly suffer directly; academics and regulators who estimate wrongly do not pay a similar penalty. Persons who wager with their own money may be wrong, but they are less likely to be wrong than are academics and regulators, who are wagering …