Law Commons^™

Taxing The New With The Old: Capturing The Value Of Data With The Corporate Income Tax In Virginia, Coleman H. Cheeley

University of Richmond Law Review

The Commonwealth of Virginia markets itself as “The Largest Data Center Market in the World.”In 2019, the Northern Virginia market alone was the largest in the United States by inventory, with room to grow. In 2021, data centers in Northern Virginia required an estimated 1,686 megawatts of power; that number is expected to increase by 200 megawatts in the near future, reflecting data centers currently under development. For reference, in 2022, it was estimated that more than 100 homes could be powered by one megawatt of solar power in Virginia. Historically, data centers have been located in the Commonwealth due …

Covid-19 And Rule 10b-5, Allan Horwich

University of Richmond Law Review

The COVID-19 pandemic presented wide-ranging challenges for businesses. Not the least of these is compliance with federal securities laws, including the prohibition—most notably under SEC Rule 10b-5—on materially deceptive statements made to the public. Both the SEC, in its role as enforcer of the law, and private parties, seeking to represent classes of aggrieved investors, have filed complaints asserting that corporations and others have engaged in deception of investors regarding matters pertaining to COVID-19. Some of these claims relate to disclosures regarding testing kits for the virus as well as development of vaccines. Other complaints allege faulty disclosure on the …

Mergers, Macs, And Covid-19, Brian Jm Quinn

University of Richmond Law Review

The conventional wisdom is that MAE/MACs in merger agreements provide an opportunity for buyers to renegotiate merger agreements in the event of intervening adverse events. However, the experience following the COVID-19 outbreak suggests that the conventional wisdom is incorrect or at least overstated. In fact, MAE/MACs shift the risk of exogenous adverse events (like COVID-19) to buyers while leaving only the risks of adverse endogenous and semi-endogenous events with the seller. The consequence of this risk-shifting is to strictly limit the circumstances under which a buyer can credibly lean on a MAE/MAC to threaten to terminate a merger agreement and …

The Corporate Chameleon, Megan Wischmeier Shaner

University of Richmond Law Review

This Article seeks to address what is currently missing from corporate law—a clear way of determining “officer” status as that distinct legal role is contemplated in corporate jurisprudence. Part I discusses the three primary actors involved in the internal governance of the corporation—directors, stockholders, and officers—and how the law defines each one. While corporate law clearly contemplates officers as a distinct role, a quick comparison of the three reveals a failure to identify with any precision the bounds of “officer” status. Part II looks to other areas of the law for guidance in defining and identifying the officers of the …

Corporate And Business Law, Laurence V. Parker Jr.

University of Richmond Law Review

This year there were a number of significant legislative changes to the Virginia Stock Corporation Act (“VSCA”) and the Virginia Limited Liability Company Act. Part I discusses certain statutory changes related to Virginia Corporations. Part II summarizes the changes to VSCA, including changes related to ratification of defective corporate acts, appraisal rights in asset sale transactions, multiple changes related to interspecies transactions, improving and making the effect of merger, domestication, and conversion language more uniform, refining the process for abandoning fundamental transactions, regulating the second step merger following a tender offer, modifying the corporate opportunity doctrine, allowing for a court …

Beyond Beholden, Da Lin

Law Faculty Publications

Corporate law has long been concerned with director independence. In controlled companies, the conventional wisdom focuses on "beholdenness" as the main threat to independence. The prevailing theory argues that directors might feel pressured to reciprocate a past kindness from the controlling shareholder or fear retaliation. This Article argues that this conventional narrative is troublingly incomplete. I show that directors are also influenced by the prospect of rewards, or patronage, from the controller.

This Article is the first to identify controlling shareholder patronage as a systemic phenomenon and to explore how anticipation of future patronage can affect director behavior. It presents …

Partnership Lost, Christine Hurt

University of Richmond Law Review

A century ago, two distinct business entities existed that could best be defined by describing either one of them as simply not the other. The corporation and the general partnership were mirror images of one another and opposites on a spectrum of corporate governance, limited liability, and taxation. Partnerships, seen as small, livelihood enterprises between active-owner partners, had personal liability but pass-through taxation. Corporations, seen as larger, capital-intensive enterprises with passive-owner shareholders, had limited liability but double taxation. The tax distinctions survive today, but the stereotypical partnership does not; in fact, the modern partnership is more corporation-like than partnership-like.

Today, …

Private Ordering And Improving Information Flow To The Board Of Directors: The Duty To Inform Bylaw, Jennifer O'Hare

University of Richmond Law Review

It seems that almost every day there is another report of a corporate scandal at a public company. Whether the scandal involves sexual harassment by senior management or widespread illegal conduct by employees, the first question asked by investors and the media is usually, “Where was the board?” And the board’s response is almost always, “We didn’t know.” Directors of public companies rely on officers to provide the information the board needs to manage the corporation, but, strangely enough, officers may not even be legally required to provide information to the board. The Delaware General Corporation Law is silent on …

Investing In Corporate Procedure, Jessica M. Erickson

Law Faculty Publications

Corporate litigation is in crisis. At the state level, shareholder lawsuits challenging mergers and other corporate decisions are ubiquitous but rarely end with meaningful relief for shareholders. At the federal level, securities class actions are rife with ethical challenges and low-value settlements. Over the last several decades, multiple groups — including judges, legislatures, and corporate boards — have tried to solve this problem, but all have come up short. This Article argues that the solution lies in rewriting the procedural rules that govern corporate lawsuits. New standing requirements would lead to better screening of these claims. Discovery limits and heightened …

Corporate And Business Law, Christopher L. Mclean

University of Richmond Law Review

The past two years have produced a number of pieces of legislation from the Virginia General Assembly that serve to bring the set of Virginia business entity statutes up to date with its peers around the country. Part I highlights changes to the Virginia Stock Corporation Act (“VSCA”) and the Virginia Nonstock Corporation Act (“VNSCA”). Part II highlights changes to the Virginia Securities Act (“VSA”) and other statutes affecting Virginia business entities. Part III reviews two significant cases that the Supreme Court of Virginia decided over the past two years with respect to Virginia corporate law. Those decisions provided guidance …

Private Ordering In The Old Dominion: A Solution To Frivolous Litigation Or The Elimination Of A Fundamental Shareholder Right?, Rebekah Biggs

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Bespoke Discovery, Jessica Erickson

Law Faculty Publications

The U.S. legal system gives contracting parties significant freedom to customize the procedures that will govern their future disputes. With forum selection clauses, parties can decide where they will litigate future disputes. With fee-shifting provisions, they can choose who will pay for these suits. And with arbitration clauses, they can make upfront decisions to opt out of the traditional legal system altogether. Parties can also waive their right to appeal, their right to a jury trial, and their right to file a class action. Bespoke procedure, in other words, is commonplace in the United States.

Far less common, however, are …

The Gatekeepers Of Shareholder Litigation, Jessica Erickson

Law Faculty Publications

Concerns over agency costs dominate corporate law. The central challenge is ensuring that directors act in the corporation's best interests, rather than their own best interests. Shareholder litigation is a key tool in controlling these agency costs. If directors cross the line, the law provides an array of litigation options that shareholders can use to hold directors accountable. Shareholders can file securities class actions if directors lie to them. They can file shareholder derivative suits if directors engage in egregious misconduct. And they can file lawsuits under both state and federal law if directors try to sell the company at …

When Is It Necessary For Corporations To Be Essentially At Home: An Exploration Of Exceptional Cases, Pricilla Heinz

Law Student Publications

This comment examines the current state of the law surrounding the exercise of general jurisdiction and forecasts the circumstances under which the Supreme Court is likely to clarify its recent decisions. Its purpose is to explore the principles announced in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown and Daimler AG v. Bauman and consider whether the due process rationales offered in the past coincide with the new essentially at home standard imposed for general jurisdiction. Moreover, this comment analyzes the reactions of the lower courts in the wake of these decisions and predicts where the Supreme Court is headed in …

Corporate Family Law, Allison Anna Tait

Law Faculty Publications

There is no such thing as corporate family law. But there are corporate families, and corporate families fight. What happens when corporate family members fight and the conflict is so severe that one or more of the parties wants out of the corporate relationship? Corporate law provides some solutions, but they are shaped by the assumption that all parties will bargain effectively for protections when seeking to exit a corporate relationship. Under this theory, family business is, after all, just business. The problem with this assumption is that corporate family members do not bargain the way that corporate law expects. …

To Thine Own Ceo Be True: Tailoring Ceo Compensation To Individual Personality And Circumstances, William O. Fisher

Law Faculty Publications

Eight-figure compensation. Cash. Restricted stock. Options. Performance shares. And more. Companies shower their CEOs with pay in large amounts, delivered in multiple ways, and dependent on complex and intricate formulae. It is all intended to motivate the top officers to make decisions that will best benefit their companies. Common sense tells us that the value of a complicated, multifaceted pay package- and hence its ability to motivate- will depend on the psychological characteristics and financial circumstances of the particular executive being paid. Economic theory and empirical studies confirm this intuition. Yet, companies generally ignore these vital factors. Substantive and disclosure …

Piling On? An Empirical Study Of Parallel Derivative Suits, Jessica Erickson

Law Faculty Publications

Using a sample of all companies named as defendants in securities class actions between July 1, 2005 and December 31, 2008, we study parallel suits relying on state corporate law arising out of the same allegations as the securities class actions. We test several ways that parallel suits may add value to a securities class action. Most parallel suits target cases involving obvious indicia of wrongdoing. Moreover, we find that although a modest percentage of parallel suits are filed first, over 80 percent are filed after a securities class action (termed “follow-on” parallel suits). We find that parallel suits and, …

Restoring Pre-Existing Compliance Through The Fcpa Pilot Program, Andrew B. Spalding

Law Faculty Publications

For a quarter-century, incentives to invest in corporate compliance programs have been a cornerstone of federal white-collar enforcement. But the U.S. Department of Justice's most recent announcement of anti-bribery enforcement policy-the FCPA Pilot Program-takes a peculiar and possibly inadvertent turn. In providing newly transparent and explicit penalty reductions, and rolling out the Department's declination policy, the program neglects to incentivize investments in pre-existing compliance. Though remedial, or postviolation, compliance receives a newly heightened importance, pre-existing compliance receives virtually no attention. This is strange, but should not be understood as a new policy change on the benefits of pre-existing compliance; no …

Corporate And Business Law, Laurence V. Parker Jr.

University of Richmond Law Review

Over the past three years, there have been a number of legislative changes to Virginia's business entity statutes. In Part I,this article highlights the changes to the Virginia Stock Corporation Act ("VSCA") and the Virginia Nonstock Corporation Act ('"VNSCA"). Part II highlights changes to the Limited Liability Company Act ("LLC Act"). Part III summarizes Virginia's new intrastate crowdfunding law. The Supreme Court of Virginia has also addressed several significant issues over the last three years, including the applicability of appraisal rights in a stepped transaction. Part IV reviews several of the significant cases during this period.

On Maximizing Deterrence Per Dollar: Thoughts Inspired By Peter Reilly, Andrew B. Spalding

Law Faculty Publications

Professor Peter Reilly addresses concerns that practitioners in this space have privately and publicly debated for years. What exactly is cooperation credit? Can we quantify it? The government promises that self-reporting is in our self-interest, but the government’s interest in saying so is obvious enough. What evidence can the government provide?

The difficulty of measuring this credit is somewhat ironic, given the government’s dependence on cooperation. As this essay will show, our modern enforcement regime, which has four components—the internal or independent investigation, voluntary disclosure, cooperation credit, and a negotiated settlement—is the government’s method of maximizing general deterrence with finite …

Caselaw Developments 2015, William O. Fisher

Law Faculty Publications

This report was prepared for the ABA Business Law Section’s Federal Regulation of Securities Committee, Subcommittee on Annual Review. The paper contains sections on relevant Supreme Court decisions, SEC rulemaking, SEC enforcement actions, proxy solicitation, forward-looking statements, insider trading, materiality, duty to disclose, Scienter and scienter pleading, and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act ("SLUSA").

Merger And Acquisition Due Diligence Part Ii- The Devil In The Details, James A. Sherer, Taylor M. Hoffman, Kevin M. Wallace, Eugenio E. Ortiz, Trevor J. Satnick

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Our prior scholarship examined the legal and technical challenges involved in modern Merger & Acquisition ("M&A") due diligence practices associated with transactions ("Deals"), given recent but steady advances in technology and related increases in sophistication seen in Deal participants-primarily the organizations or assets targeted (the "Targets") as part of the Deal, and the organizations that pursued and/or resulted from the Deal (the "Acquirers"). We then proposed a framework addressing five particular verticals of interest and concern: data privacy ("DP"), information security ("IS"), e-Discovery, information governance ("IG"), and the due diligence and record keeping associated with the Deal itself ("Deal Information") …

Too Many Cooks In The Kitchen: Battling Corporate Corruption In Brazil And The Problems With A Decentralized Enforcement Model, Michelle A. Winters

Richmond Journal of Global Law & Business

No abstract provided.

Corporate Governance In Search Of The Shareholder-Manager Balance Of Power, Razeen Sappideen

Richmond Journal of Global Law & Business

No abstract provided.

The Market For Leadership In Corporate Litigation, Jessica M. Erickson

Law Faculty Publications

Conventional wisdom has long held that leadership decisions in corporate litigation are best left to the lawyers. Even as the world of corporate litigation has changed dramatically, courts have consistently relied on the lawyers themselves to decide who among them will control litigation decisions. As a result, leadership decisions in corporate litigation are almost always made in private negotiations and back room deals. This Article pulls back the curtain on these decisions, using empirical data to conduct the first in-depth examination into the market for leadership in corporate litigation. This examination reveals a market that bears little resemblance to the …

Assessing Effectiveness Of International Private Regulations In The Csr Arena, Martijn W. Scheltema

Richmond Journal of Global Law & Business

No abstract provided.

The Power Of Paradox: The Need For Alternative Remedies In Virginia Minority Shareholder Oppression Cases, Stephanie Martinez

Law Student Publications

This comment addresses where Virginia's current scheme falls short and why equitable remedies are needed in Virginia minority shareholder oppression cases. Part I looks at how the MBCA attempted to solve the problem of minority shareholder oppression. Part II explores how other jurisdictions have interpreted or added to the MBCA so as to provide additional remedies in minority shareholder oppression cases. Finally, Part III advocates for adoption of a new dissolution statute in Virginia that includes equitable remedies for such cases.

Managing Conflicts Of Interest In China's Public Sector: Fighting Corruption At The Early Stage, Hao (Victor) Wu, Xiaoqi (Claudia) Sun

Richmond Journal of Global Law & Business

No abstract provided.

Corruption, Corporations, And The New Human Right, Andrew B. Spalding

Law Faculty Publications

We should no longer expect the Alien Tort Statute to be the principal federal statute that deters overseas corporate rights violations. That distinction rightly belongs to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, an antibribery statute that rests on undisputed principles of corporate liability, contains a clear congressional statement of extraterritorial application, and routinely collects penalties from multinational corporate defendants. Scholars have not associated the FCPA with human rights, owing principally to a thin understanding of rights theory. But freedom from corruption can and should be understood as a human right, one that is as old as social contract theory but new …

Corporate And Business Law, Laurence V. Parker Jr.

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.