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Articles 1 - 12 of 12
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Corporate Form As A Solution To A Discursive Dilemma, Edward B. Rock
The Corporate Form As A Solution To A Discursive Dilemma, Edward B. Rock
All Faculty Scholarship
I examine the connection between the discursive dilemma and corporate law. The discursive dilemma (or doctrinal paradox) is a distinctive social choice problem that was first identified by Kornhauser and Sager and later used as the basis for a theory of organizational personality by Pettit. I examine the ways in which the corporate form prevents the emergence of the discursive dilemma in the firm context and the extent to which the presence of the discursive dilemma can provide the foundation for a theory of corporate personality.
The Fair Value Of Cornfields In Delaware Appraisal Law, Lawrence Hamermesh, Michael L. Wachter
The Fair Value Of Cornfields In Delaware Appraisal Law, Lawrence Hamermesh, Michael L. Wachter
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The Delaware Supreme Court’s opinions in Weinberger and Technicolor have left a troublesome uncertainty in defining the proper approach to the valuation of corporate shares. That uncertainty – increasingly important as going private mergers become more frequent – can be resolved by a blend of financial and doctrinal analysis. The primary problem—the potential opportunism by controlling shareholders in timing going private mergers—can be addressed by a more complete understanding of corporate finance. The definition of fair value must include not only the present value of the firm’s existing assets, but also the future opportunities to reinvest free cash flow, including …
Why Defer To Managers? A Strong-Form Efficiency Model, Richard E. Kihlstrom, Michael L. Wachter
Why Defer To Managers? A Strong-Form Efficiency Model, Richard E. Kihlstrom, Michael L. Wachter
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We compare the efficiency with which management discretion and shareholder choice regulate hostile tender offers. This is the first paper in a long running debate that rigorously compares these legal rules to analyze both the critical informational assumptions and the interplay of those assumptions with principles of financial market efficiency. A critical innovation of our model is its focus on an informed management’s choice among alternative corporate policies under the protection of the business judgment rule, but where agency costs exist. We assume that corporate assets and reinvestment opportunities are efficiently priced by financial markets, but that markets never learn …
Unleashing A Gatekeeper: Why The Sec Should Mandate Disclosure Of Details Concerning Directors' And Officers' Liability Insurance Policies, Sean J. Griffith
Unleashing A Gatekeeper: Why The Sec Should Mandate Disclosure Of Details Concerning Directors' And Officers' Liability Insurance Policies, Sean J. Griffith
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This Essay explores the connection between corporate governance and D&O insurance. It argues that D&O insurers act as gatekeepers and guarantors of corporate governance, screening and pricing corporate governance risks to maintain the profitability of their risk pools. As a result, D&O insurance premiums provide the insurer’s assessment of a firm’s governance quality. Most basically, firms with relatively worse corporate governance pay higher D&O premiums. This simple relationship could signal important information to investors and other capital market participants. Unfortunately, the signal is not being sent. Corporations lack the incentive to produce this disclosure themselves, and U.S. securities regulators do …
How Do Corporations Play Politics? The Fedex Story, Jill E. Fisch
How Do Corporations Play Politics? The Fedex Story, Jill E. Fisch
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Corporate political activity has been the subject of federal regulation since 1907, and the restrictions on corporate campaign contributions and other political expenditures continue to increase. Most recently, Congress banned soft money donations in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ("BCRA"), a ban upheld by the Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC. Significantly, although the omnibus BCRA clearly was not directed exclusively at corporations, the Supreme Court began its lengthy opinion in McConnell by referencing and endorsing the efforts of Elihu Root, more than a century ago, to prohibit corporate political contributions. Repeatedly, within the broad context of campaign …
Institutional Competition To Regulate Corporations: A Comment On Macey, Jill E. Fisch
Institutional Competition To Regulate Corporations: A Comment On Macey, Jill E. Fisch
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No abstract provided.
Corporate Shaming Revisited: An Essay For Bill Klein, David A. Skeel Jr.
Corporate Shaming Revisited: An Essay For Bill Klein, David A. Skeel Jr.
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No abstract provided.
Symbiotic Federalism And The Structure Of Corporate Law, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
Symbiotic Federalism And The Structure Of Corporate Law, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
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No abstract provided.
The Academic Tournament Over Executive Compensation, William W. Bratton
The Academic Tournament Over Executive Compensation, William W. Bratton
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Welfare, Dialectic, And Mediation In Corporate Law, William W. Bratton
Welfare, Dialectic, And Mediation In Corporate Law, William W. Bratton
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Do Institutions Matter? The Impact Of The Lead Plaintiff Provision Of The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch, A. C. Pritchard
Do Institutions Matter? The Impact Of The Lead Plaintiff Provision Of The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch, A. C. Pritchard
All Faculty Scholarship
When Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995 (“PSLRA”), the Act’s “lead plaintiff” provision was the centerpiece of its efforts to increase investor control over securities fraud class actions. The lead plaintiff provision alters the balance of power between investors and class counsel by creating a presumption that the investor with the largest financial stake in the case will serve as lead plaintiff. The lead plaintiff then chooses class counsel and, at least in theory, negotiates the terms of counsel’s compensation.
Congress’s stated purpose in enacting the lead plaintiff provision was to encourage institutional investors—pension funds, mutual …
The New Dividend Puzzle, William W. Bratton
The New Dividend Puzzle, William W. Bratton
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.