Law Commons^™

Volkswagen's Bad Decisions & Harmful Emissions: How Poor Process Corrupted Codetermination In Germany's Dual Board Structure, Nicola Faith Sharpe

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

This Article directly challenges the often argued proposition that Ger-many’s two-tier board of directors is superior to America’s single-tier board structure. It argues that regardless of structure, any decision-making body that lacks effective decision-making processes is at signifcant risk of failure, scandal, and ineffectiveness. Legal scholars and policymakers have largely ignored the connection between decision-making processes and the efficacy of corporate leadership. The Article is the first to examine this underexplored relationship in the context of the German dual-board.

Volkswagen’s 2015 emissions scandal provides a vehcicle to critcally assess the relationship between Germany’s two-tiered board and an effec-tive decision-making process. …

Creating A Plug-In Electric Vehicle Industry Cluster In Michigan: Prospects And Policy Options, Thomas P. Lyon, Russell A. Baruffi Jr.

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

This Article seeks to examine how policy can be used strategically to foster the development of a plug-in electric vehicle ("PEV") industry cluster in Michigan. The tendency for certain industries to localize in particular regions has captured the interest of much economic research and policy discussion in recent years. The trend toward the clustering of new industries has stayed strong despite the acceleration of globalization. Attention to clusters has proven to be an enduring theme in economic development circles for nearly thirty years. Clusters generate synergies that make industrial activity greater than the sum of contributions by individual players. In …

Boilerplate And Economic Power In Auto-Manufacturing Contracts, Omri Ben-Shahar, James J. White

Book Chapters

This chapter examines the boilerplate contracts used by auto makers to procure parts from suppliers. It identifies drafting and negotiation techniques that are used to secure advantageous terms. It also explores some prominent specific arrangements as evidence that firms with bargaining power are exploiting their position to dictate self-serving but inefficient terms. Finally, it shows how standard contractual clauses solve the problem of ex-post hold-up by suppliers.