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Business Decisions By The New Board: Behavioral Science And Corporate Law, Robert J. Haft
Business Decisions By The New Board: Behavioral Science And Corporate Law, Robert J. Haft
Michigan Law Review
This Article's thesis is that, by reason of its recently secured independence from management domination, the boards of directors of large American corporations are now in a unique position to make business decisions of the highest quality, and that corporate law should respond to this potential appropriately. On the basis of findings in the behavioral sciences, this Article urges a limited rethinking of the role of the chief executive and the board of directors before the model of directors as "monitors" of the chief executive's performance is frozen in place. Already armed with information supposedly received as monitors, the independent …
"No Soul To Damn: No Body To Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry Into The Problem Of Corporate Punishment, John C. Coffee Jr.
"No Soul To Damn: No Body To Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry Into The Problem Of Corporate Punishment, John C. Coffee Jr.
Michigan Law Review
Because this Article's arguments are interwoven, a preliminary roadmap seems advisable. First, Section I will examine three perspectives on corporate punishment and will develop several concepts in terms of which corporate penalties should be evaluated. Although this analysis will suggest several barriers to effective corporate deterrence, Section II will explain why a sensible approach to corporate misbehavior still must punish the firm as well as the individual decision- maker. Section III will then evaluate three proposed approaches: (1) the "equity fine,'' (2) the use of adverse publicity, and (3) the fuller integration of public and private enforcement. In addition, it …
Corporate Governance--A Moving Target, Robert L. Knauss
Corporate Governance--A Moving Target, Robert L. Knauss
Michigan Law Review
This Essay elaborates on Professor Conard's sensible suggestion with the hope that others will take it to heart. First, the Essay discusses the unique governance problems raised by what I call quasipublicly traded corporations. These smaller corporations, whose shares are not actively traded, have been largely neglected in most discussions of corporate governance. The neglect is ironic since most state corporation statutes were originally designed with the quasipublicly traded corporation in mind. Second, the Essay turns to a problem of corporate governance common to all corporations - the proper role of directors - and shows that appropriate standards may vary …