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Business Organizations Law

University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law

Faculty Scholarship

Fiduciary duty

Publication Year

Articles 1 - 5 of 5

Full-Text Articles in Law

The Tort Foundation Of Duty Of Care And Business Judgment, Robert J. Rhee Jan 2013

The Tort Foundation Of Duty Of Care And Business Judgment, Robert J. Rhee

Faculty Scholarship

This Article corrects a misconception in corporation law – the belief that principles of tort law do not apply to the liability scheme of fiduciary duty. A board’s duty of care implies exposure to liability, but the business judgment rule precludes it. Tort law finds fault; corporation law excuses it. The conventional wisdom says that the tort analogy fails. This dismissal of tort prinicples is wrong. Although shareholder derivative suits and ordinary tort cases properly yield systemically antipodal outcomes, they are bound by a common analytical framework. The principles of board liability are rooted in tort doctrines governing duty, customs, …


Corporate Control And The Need For Meaningful Board Accountability, Michelle M. Harner Jan 2010

Corporate Control And The Need For Meaningful Board Accountability, Michelle M. Harner

Faculty Scholarship

Corporations are vulnerable to the greed, self-dealing and conflicts of those in control of the corporation. Courts historically have regulated this potential abuse by designating the board of directors and senior management as fiduciaries. In some instances, however, shareholders, creditors or others outside of corporate management may influence corporate decisions and, in the process, extract corporate value. Courts generally address this type of corporate damage in one of two ways: they designate controlling shareholders as corporate fiduciaries and they characterize creditors, customers and others as contract parties with no fiduciary duties. The traditional roles of corporate shareholders and creditors may …


Twilight In The Zone Of Insolvency: Fiduciary Duty And Creditors In Troubled Companies, Royce De R. Barondes, Lisa M. Fairfax, Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Robert Lawless, Jonathan C. Lipson, Russell C. Silberglied Jan 2007

Twilight In The Zone Of Insolvency: Fiduciary Duty And Creditors In Troubled Companies, Royce De R. Barondes, Lisa M. Fairfax, Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Robert Lawless, Jonathan C. Lipson, Russell C. Silberglied

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


The Duty To Creditors Reconsidered - Filling A Much Needed Gap In Corporation Law, Richard A. Booth Jan 2007

The Duty To Creditors Reconsidered - Filling A Much Needed Gap In Corporation Law, Richard A. Booth

Faculty Scholarship

The most fundamental question of corporation law is to whom does the board of directors of a corporation owe its fiduciary duty. Recently, the question has tended to be whether and under what circumstances the board of directors has the duty to maximize stockholder wealth. But if a corporation is insolvent (or close to it), business decisions designed to maximize stockholder wealth may result in a reduction of creditor wealth. Although the conventional wisdom is that creditors must protect themselves by contractual means, there is a substantial body of case law that says that creditors can assert claims sounding in …


Fiduciary Duty, Contract, And Waiver In Partnerships And Limited Liability Companies, Richard A. Booth Marbury Research Professor Of Law Jan 1997

Fiduciary Duty, Contract, And Waiver In Partnerships And Limited Liability Companies, Richard A. Booth Marbury Research Professor Of Law

Faculty Scholarship

Among the controversies swirling around the promulgations of new uniform statutes governing partnerships and LLCs is the question whether and to what extend fiduciary duties should be made mandatory or waivable. Although courts and commentators have not traditionally focused on the costs of fiduciary duties, the costs are significant in that such duties may preclude agents from engaging in other legitimate ventures. Indeed, fiduciary duty may be used by those to whom it is owed to prevent competition or extort side benefits form participants. Mandatory duties effectively require participants who may identify multiple business opportunities to overinvest their human capital …