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Business Organizations Law

SelectedWorks

2012

Corporations

Articles 1 - 5 of 5

Full-Text Articles in Law

Threats Escalate: Corporate Information Technology Governance Under Fire, Lawrence J. Trautman Jan 2012

Threats Escalate: Corporate Information Technology Governance Under Fire, Lawrence J. Trautman

Lawrence J. Trautman Sr.

In a previous publication The Board’s Responsibility for Information Technology Governance, (with Kara Altenbaumer-Price) we examined: The IT Governance Institute’s Executive Summary and Framework for Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology 4.1 (COBIT®); reviewed the Weill and Ross Corporate and Key Asset Governance Framework; and observed “that in a survey of audit executives and board members, 58 percent believed that their corporate employees had little to no understanding of how to assess risk.” We further described the new SEC rules on risk management; Congressional action on cyber security; legal basis for director’s duties and responsibilities relative to IT governance; …


Where Did Mill Go Wrong? Why The Capital-Managed Rather Than The Labor-Managed Enterprise Is The Predominant Organizational Form In Market Economies, 73 Ohio State L.J. 219 (2012, Justin Schwartz Jan 2012

Where Did Mill Go Wrong? Why The Capital-Managed Rather Than The Labor-Managed Enterprise Is The Predominant Organizational Form In Market Economies, 73 Ohio State L.J. 219 (2012, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

In this Article, I propose a novel law and economics explanation of a deeply puzzling aspect of business organization in market economies. Why are virtually all firms organized as capital-managed and -owned (capitalist) enterprises rather than as labor-managed and -owned cooperatives? Over 150 years ago, J.S. Mill predicted that efficiency and other advantages would eventually make worker cooperatives predominant over capitalist firms. Mill was right about the advantages but wrong about the results. The standard explanation is that capitalist enterprise is more efficient. Empirical research, however, overwhelmingly contradicts this. But employees almost never even attempt to organize worker cooperatives. I …


Post-Citizens United: Using Shareholder Derivative Claims Of Corporate Waste To Challenge Corporate Independent Political Expenditures, William Alan Nelson Ii Jan 2012

Post-Citizens United: Using Shareholder Derivative Claims Of Corporate Waste To Challenge Corporate Independent Political Expenditures, William Alan Nelson Ii

William Alan Nelson II

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Citizens United v. FEC allows companies to spend unlimited sums from their treasuries on advertisements that promote or oppose political candidates. This issue has taken the main stage in American politics, especially with the current Republican primary race and the Presidential election in November. This article discusses how shareholders may use derivative claims of corporate waste to challenge independent political expenditures that they believe are detrimental to the corporation. The article begins by discussing the history of the corporate waste doctrine and looks at the standard for pleading a claim of corporate waste. The …


Ending The Silence: Shareholder Derivative Suits And Amending The Dodd-Frank Act So “Say On Pay” Votes May Be Heard In The Boardroom, William Alan Nelson Ii Jan 2012

Ending The Silence: Shareholder Derivative Suits And Amending The Dodd-Frank Act So “Say On Pay” Votes May Be Heard In The Boardroom, William Alan Nelson Ii

William Alan Nelson II

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) has broad and deep implications that will touch every corner of the financial services industry, as well as multiple other industries. This article is the first to fully examine shareholder derivative lawsuits filed after a negative “say on pay” vote on executive compensation under the Dodd-Frank Act. The article begins by providing a history of “say on pay” votes and examining the “say on pay” provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act. The article transitions into a discussion of how the Dodd-Frank “say on pay” provisions are currently being utilized by …


Regulation Not Prohibition: The Comparative Case Against The Insurable Interest Doctrine, Sharo Michael Atmeh Jan 2012

Regulation Not Prohibition: The Comparative Case Against The Insurable Interest Doctrine, Sharo Michael Atmeh

Sharo M Atmeh

American law requires an insurable interest—a pecuniary or affective stake in the subject of an insurance policy—as a predi-cate to properly obtaining insurance. In theory, the rule prevents both wagering on individual lives and moral hazard. In practice, the doctrine is avoided by complex insurance transaction structuring to effectuate both origination and transfers of insurance by individuals without an insurable interest. This paper argues that it is time to ab-andon the insurable interest doctrine. As both the English and Aus-tralian experiences indicate, elimination of the insurable interest doctrine will have little detrimental pecuniary effect on the insurance industry, while freeing …