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Full-Text Articles in Law
Law And Finance: The Case Of Stock Market Development In China, Zhong Zhang Dr
Law And Finance: The Case Of Stock Market Development In China, Zhong Zhang Dr
Zhong Zhang Dr
Having grown to one of the largest in the world in just over two decades, the stock market of China is cited as a counterexample to the significance of law for financial market development. A thorough examination of the development of China’s stock market however finds that law is actually critical to sustaining market growth and law did play a role in the growth of the market. On the other hand, the trajectory of development in China is growth first followed by law, and the improvement of law is caused by market growth. The experience of China hence suggests that …
Puzzles In Controlling Shareholder Regimes And China: Shareholder Primacy And (Quasi) Monopoly, Sang Yop Kang
Puzzles In Controlling Shareholder Regimes And China: Shareholder Primacy And (Quasi) Monopoly, Sang Yop Kang
Sang Yop Kang
Professor Mark Roe explained that the shareholder wealth maximization norm (“the norm”) is not fit for a country with a (quasi) monopoly, because the norm encourages managers to maximize monopoly rents, to the detriment of the national economy. This Article provides new findings and counter-intuitive arguments as to the tension created by the norm and (quasi) monopoly by exploring three key corporate governance concepts that Roe did not examine—(1) “controlling minority structure” (CMS), where dominant shareholders hold a fractional ownership in their controlled-corporations, (2) “tunneling” (i.e., illicit transfer of corporate wealth to controlling shareholders), and (3) Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). …
An Approach To The Regulation Of Spanish Banking Foundations, Miguel Martínez
An Approach To The Regulation Of Spanish Banking Foundations, Miguel Martínez
Miguel Martínez
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the legal framework governing banking foundations as they have been regulated by Spanish Act 26/2013, of December 27th, on savings banks and banking foundations. Title 2 of this regulation addresses a construct that is groundbreaking for the Spanish legal system, still of paramount importance for the entire financial system insofar as these foundations become the leading players behind certain banking institutions given the high interest that foundations hold in the share capital of such institutions.
Avenues To Foreign Investment In China’S Shipping Industry—Have Lease Financing Arrangements And The Free Trade Zones Opened Markets For Foreign Non-Bank Investment?, Rick Beaumont
Rick Beaumont
No abstract provided.
Optimized Theft: Why Some Controlling Shareholders “Generously” Expropriate From Minority Shareholders, Sang Yop Kang
Optimized Theft: Why Some Controlling Shareholders “Generously” Expropriate From Minority Shareholders, Sang Yop Kang
Sang Yop Kang
Although controlling shareholder agency problems have been well studied so far, many questions still remain unanswered. In particular, an important puzzle in a bad-law jurisdiction is: why some controlling shareholders (“roving controllers”) loot the entire corporate assets at once, and why others (“stationary controllers”) siphon a part of corporate assets on a continuous basis. To solve this conundrum, this Article provides analytical frameworks exploring the behaviors and motivations of controlling shareholders. To begin with, I reinterpret Olson’s political theory of “banditry” in the context of corporate governance in developing countries. Based on a new taxonomy of controlling shareholders (“roving controllers” …
Re-Envisioning Investors’ Anti-Director Rights Index: Theory, Criticism, And Implications, Sang Yop Kang
Re-Envisioning Investors’ Anti-Director Rights Index: Theory, Criticism, And Implications, Sang Yop Kang
Sang Yop Kang
‘Law and Finance’ theory – which offers analytical frameworks to measure the protection of public investors and the quality of corporate governance – has dominated the comparative corporate governance scholarship in the last decade. So far, many proponents and critics have had debates on the relevance of the theory and the implications of the theory’s empirical studies. Several important points in relation to shareholder protection, however, have been highly neglected in these debates. In particular, the significance of one-share-one-vote (OSOV) rule has been inappropriately underestimated. In response, this Article explores (1) why OSOV is an utmost critical component in corporate …
Bank Resolution In The European Banking Union: A Transatlantic Perspective On What It Would Take, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Bank Resolution In The European Banking Union: A Transatlantic Perspective On What It Would Take, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Jeffrey N Gordon
The project of creating a European Banking Union is designed to overcome the fatal link between sovereigns and their banks in the Eurozone. As part of this project, political agreement for a common supervision framework and a common resolution scheme has been reached with difficulty. However, the resolution framework is weak, underfunded and exhibits some serious flaws. Further, Member States’ disagreements appear to rule out a federalized deposit insurance scheme, commonly regarded as the necessary third pillar of a successful Banking Union. This paper argues for an organizational and capital structure substitute for these two shortcomings that can minimize the …
Law And Finance: The Case Of Stock Market Development In China, Zhong Zhang Dr
Law And Finance: The Case Of Stock Market Development In China, Zhong Zhang Dr
Zhong Zhang Dr
In just over 2 decades China has developed a stock market that is now one of the biggest in the world. This is puzzling, considering that law in general and investor protection in particular in China is widely regarded as weak. However, a thorough examination reveals that, far from being a counterexample, the case of China lends strong support to the “law matters”’ thesis. Granted, investor protection counted for little during the rapid growth of the market before mid-2001. But by the early 2000s, outrageous securities frauds had become endemic, bringing the market to a serious crisis. Faced with a …
The Evolution Of The Digital Millennium Copyright Act; Changing Interpretations Of The Dmca And Future Implications For Copyright Holders, Hillary A. Henderson
The Evolution Of The Digital Millennium Copyright Act; Changing Interpretations Of The Dmca And Future Implications For Copyright Holders, Hillary A. Henderson
Hillary A Henderson
Copyright law rewards an artificial monopoly to individual authors for their creations. This reward is based on the belief that, by granting authors the exclusive right to reproduce their works, they receive an incentive and means to create, which in turn advances the welfare of the general public by “promoting the progress of science and useful arts.” Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or …
Controlling Shareholders: Benevolent “King” Or Ruthless “Pirate”, Sang Yop Kang
Controlling Shareholders: Benevolent “King” Or Ruthless “Pirate”, Sang Yop Kang
Sang Yop Kang
Unfair self-dealing and expropriation of minority shareholders by a controlling shareholder are common business practices in developing countries (“bad-law countries”). Although controlling shareholder agency problems have been well studied so far, there are many questions unanswered in relation to behaviors and motivations of controlling shareholders. For example, a puzzle is that some controlling shareholders in bad-law countries voluntarily extract minority shareholders less than other controlling shareholders. Applying Mancur Olson’s framework of political theory of “banditry” to the context of corporate governance, this Article proposes that there are at least two categories of controlling shareholders. “Roving controllers” are dominant shareholders with …
Deja Vu All Over Again? The Internal Affairs Rule And Entity Law Convergence Patterns In Europe And The United States, Matthew G. Dore
Deja Vu All Over Again? The Internal Affairs Rule And Entity Law Convergence Patterns In Europe And The United States, Matthew G. Dore
Matthew G Dore
Many scholars embrace the view that corporate law convergence is an inevitable byproduct of the internal affairs rule and market competition by jurisdictions that seek to attract new entity formations by offering ever more efficient business association laws. Yet recent developments in Europe and the U.S. cast doubt on this proposition. As the article describes, the European Court of Justice embraced the internal affairs rule more than a decade ago, and European Union legislation now offers new opportunities for EU Member States to compete in the company law field. But Europe has experienced neither U.S.-style jurisdictional competition for business entity …
Re-Envisioning The Controlling Shareholder Regime: Why Controlling Shareholders And Minority Shareholders Embrace Each Other, Sang Yop Kang
Re-Envisioning The Controlling Shareholder Regime: Why Controlling Shareholders And Minority Shareholders Embrace Each Other, Sang Yop Kang
Sang Yop Kang
According to conventional corporate governance scholarship, controlling shareholder regimes exist in jurisdictions where minority shareholders are not well protected by controlling shareholders’ expropriation. However, Professor Ronald Gilson raises a critical point against the conventional view; if laws are inefficient and do not protect investors, as the conventional view explains, why do we observe any minority shareholders at all in such “bad-law” countries? One possible reason is that in response to controlling shareholders’ expropriation, minority shareholders discount severely shares that corporations issue. Then, a related question is: if it is true, why do some controlling shareholders in bad-law countries have many …
Investment Dispute Resolution Under The Transpacific Partnership Agreement: Prelude To A Slippery Slope?, Leon E. Trakman Professor
Investment Dispute Resolution Under The Transpacific Partnership Agreement: Prelude To A Slippery Slope?, Leon E. Trakman Professor
Leon E Trakman Dean
Intense debate is currently brewing over the multistate negotiation of the Transpacific Partnership Agreement [TPPA], led by the United States. The TPPA will be the largest trade and investment agreement after the European Union, with trillions of investment dollars at stake. However, there is little understanding of the complex issues involved in regulating inbound and outbound investment. The negotiating of the TPPA is shrouded in both mystery and dissension among negotiating countries. NGOs, investor and legal interest groups heatedly debate how the TPPA ought to regulate international investment. However this dissension is resolved, it will have enormous economic, political and …