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Rescuing Expedited Discovery From The Commodity Futures Trading Commission & Returning It To Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(D)(1): Using A Doctrine's Forgotten History To Achieve Legitimacy, Jesse N. Panoff, Esq.
Rescuing Expedited Discovery From The Commodity Futures Trading Commission & Returning It To Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(D)(1): Using A Doctrine's Forgotten History To Achieve Legitimacy, Jesse N. Panoff, Esq.
Golden Gate University Law Review
For over a decade, judicial decisions have “authorized” the CFTC to conduct expedited discovery irrespective of 26(d)(1)’s structure and text. Instead, courts typically allow discovery because either: (i) “good cause” exists, or (ii) for no articulated reason at all. Consider that the so-called Good-Cause Test merely proclaims, “[g]ood cause exists for the plaintiff [CFTC] to conduct expedited discovery . . . .” Hence, judicial decisions have developed the doctrine in ways that are attenuated from 26(d)(1). The overall result is if the Commission asks for accelerated discovery, then courts will grant such relief. This is somewhat unsurprising because the very …
Using Game Theory And Contractarianism To Reform Corporate Governance: Why Shareholders Should Seek Disincentive Schemes In Executive Compensation Plans, Elias Pete George
Using Game Theory And Contractarianism To Reform Corporate Governance: Why Shareholders Should Seek Disincentive Schemes In Executive Compensation Plans, Elias Pete George
Golden Gate University Law Review
Employing a model of game theory, this Article shows how current judge-made law in areas of the duty of loyalty does not adequately prevent corporate managers from violating their fiduciary duty. This Article presents a solution, advising shareholders to reform corporate governance through executive compensation contracts that would properly incentivize corporate managers to comport with their duty of loyalty. Part I examines the rise of contractarianism, the prominent legal academic view of a corporation that helps to guide judicial interpretation of corporate law pertaining to managers’ fiduciary duties. Part II examines agency costs, a subset of transaction costs, and the …