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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Importance Of "Money", Kathryn Judge
The Importance Of "Money", Kathryn Judge
Faculty Scholarship
In a provocative new book, The Money Problem: Rethinking Financial Regulation, Professor Morgan Ricks argues that the government should reclaim control over money creation. Money, Ricks argues, is not just the cash in your pocket or the balance in your checking account. Instead, at least for purposes of financial stability policy, money is best equated with short-term debt. For most of the twentieth century, such debt was issued primarily by regulated commercial banks and insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), resulting in a fairly stable financial system. As a result of financial innovation, however, much of today's short-term …
Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Robert J. Jackson Jr.
Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Robert J. Jackson Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
The Supreme Court spoke clearly this Term on the issue of corporate political speech, concluding in Citizens United v. FEC' that the First Amendment protects corporations' freedom to spend corporate funds on indirect support of political candidates. 2 Constitutional law scholars will long debate the wisdom of that holding, as do the authors of the two other Comments in this issue.3 In contrast, this Comment accepts as given that corporations may not be limited from spending money on politics should they decide to speak. We focus instead on an important question left unanswered by Citizens United: who should have the …
Controlling Shareholders And Corporate Governance: Complicating The Comparative Taxonomy, Ronald J. Gilson
Controlling Shareholders And Corporate Governance: Complicating The Comparative Taxonomy, Ronald J. Gilson
Faculty Scholarship
Corporate governance scholarship has shifted focus in recent years from hostile takeovers, which occur primarily in the widely held shareholder systems of the United States and the United Kingdom, to the comparative merits of the "controlling shareholder" systems that are the norm most everywhere else in the world. In this emerging debate, the simple dichotomy between controlling shareholder systems and widely held shareholder systems that has largely dominated the discourse is too coarse to allow a deeper understanding of the diversity of ownership structures in different national capital markets and their policy implications. In this Article, Professor Ronald Gilson seeks …