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Full-Text Articles in Law
Adapting Global Standards To A Changing World, Serdar Çelik, Mats Isaksson
Adapting Global Standards To A Changing World, Serdar Çelik, Mats Isaksson
Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership
In 1996, Ira Millstein received a phone call from Paris. It came from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) asking him to head a small international group of distinguished businesspeople, including Sir Adrian Cadbury. Their assignment would be to provide economists and policy makers with advice for future work in the area of corporate governance. At the time, the topic was little understood among policy makers and its wider economic implications were rarely discussed. But OECD, already well known for its analysis of both macroeconomics and structural policies, wanted to change that. They looked at corporate governance as …
Codes Of Corporate Governance: A Review, Nolan Haskovec
Codes Of Corporate Governance: A Review, Nolan Haskovec
Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership
The U.S. was one of the first nations in the world to concern itself with the governance of its publicly-listed corporations. But it stopped well short of developing authoritative general standards of corporate governance. By contrast, many of the world’s other markets have by now agreed to some sort of ‘official’ principles for the governance of their quoted companies.
A key reason often cited for why the U.S. lacks a single, authoritative national code of corporate governance2 is the general resistance to centralized regulation of corporate law, which is subject to state rather than federal statutes. But several other major …
Are Institutional Investors Part Of The Problem Or Part Of The Solution?: Key Descriptive And Prescriptive Questions About Shareholders, Ben W. Heineman Jr., Stephen Davis
Are Institutional Investors Part Of The Problem Or Part Of The Solution?: Key Descriptive And Prescriptive Questions About Shareholders, Ben W. Heineman Jr., Stephen Davis
Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership
Over the last twenty years, institutional investors have owned an increasing share of public equity markets — more than 70 percent of the largest 1,000 companies in the United States in 2009, for example. Over the past two years, in response to failures of some boards of directors and business leaders, shareholders, including institutional investors, have been given increased powers to participate in — or have disclosures about — discrete spheres of governance in publicly held corporations. Moreover, during this same period, and in multiple jurisdictions, there have been increasing calls from both the public and private sectors for institutional …
Agenda For Private Sector Reform: Omnibus Policy Recommendations For A Post-Crisis Market, Millstein Center For Corporate Governance And Performance
Agenda For Private Sector Reform: Omnibus Policy Recommendations For A Post-Crisis Market, Millstein Center For Corporate Governance And Performance
Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership
The global financial crisis has exposed a raft of market weaknesses and failures The Center has concentrated on probing urgent, corporate governance-related issues where it identified apparent gaps in knowledge, insight and infrastructure. Policy Briefings have addressed the advisory vote on executive compensation; board-shareowner communications; proxy voting reform; independent board leadership; risk oversight; pay for performance; and shareowner stewardship. Using global perspectives, they address key concerns within the relevant subject areas and attempt to gather and present practical recommendations and ideas.
This report compiles summaries of the Center’s recommendations on these seven key areas from 2007 through mid-2009. The objective …
Pay, Risk And Stewardship: Private Sector Architecture For Future Capital Markets, Mariana Pargendler
Pay, Risk And Stewardship: Private Sector Architecture For Future Capital Markets, Mariana Pargendler
Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership
The recent financial crisis revealed a massive failure of institutions that populate the world’s capital markets. Banks, investors, ratings agencies, regulators and numerous other players demonstrated that confidence in market responses was misplaced. The loss of faith in capital market institutions has represented a significant hurdle to recovery as financial institutions continue to be wary of one another, and the public is wary of all of them.
Restoring trust in the system requires two distinct pillars of reform. The first pillar, reform of the financial regulatory system, both nationally and globally, has received most of the attention so far. Many …
Voting Integrity: Practices For Investors And The Global Proxy Advisory Industry, Meagan Thompson-Mann
Voting Integrity: Practices For Investors And The Global Proxy Advisory Industry, Meagan Thompson-Mann
Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership
Accountability of corporate boards to shareowners rests in large part on the integrity of the system by which investors vote their proxy ballots. Shareowners rely on the vote to affect the governance of a company; corporate directors see the vote as a barometer of investor confidence in board stewardship. Outcomes determine the fate of director tenure, mergers, acquisitions, capital raising, remuneration plans and other critical decisions with sometimes profound consequences for stakeholders and the marketplace.
However, this briefing finds that the proxy voting system in the US and other markets is chronically subject to criticism that it is short on …
Talking Governance: Board-Shareowner Communications On Executive Compensation, Stephen Davis, Stephen Alogna
Talking Governance: Board-Shareowner Communications On Executive Compensation, Stephen Davis, Stephen Alogna
Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership
Advantages stemming from board-shareowner communications on governance and executive pay outweigh the potential risks and costs of such dialogue. Regulation FD in the US should be seen as a caution rather than a barrier to such communication. Prompted by universal adoption of advisory ‘say on pay’ resolutions, UK companies have moved to integrate regular engagement with domestic investors into the annual process of framing corporate remuneration policies. Most US companies have not fully endeavored to engage their shareowners in the same manner, but some—motivated sometimes by crises—are experimenting with various models of dialogue. Companies can best manage effective engagement when …