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Full-Text Articles in Law
Irredeemably Inefficient Acts: A Threat To Markets, Firms, And The Fisc, Alex Raskolnikov
Irredeemably Inefficient Acts: A Threat To Markets, Firms, And The Fisc, Alex Raskolnikov
Faculty Scholarship
This Article defines and explores irredeemably inefficient acts – a conceptually distinct and empirically important category of socially undesirable conduct. Though inefficient behavior is, no doubt, pervasive, the standard view holds that inefficient conduct may be converted into efficient behavior by forcing actors to internalize the external harms of their decisions. For some acts, however such conversion is impossible. These acts are not just inefficient forms of otherwise socially beneficial activities – they are not just contingently inefficient. Rather, they are inefficient at their core; they reduce social welfare no matter what the regulator does. These irredeemably inefficient (or just …
The Role Of Secured Credit In Small-Business Lending, Ronald J. Mann
The Role Of Secured Credit In Small-Business Lending, Ronald J. Mann
Faculty Scholarship
The traditional perspective holds that large firms in our economy use unsecured credit and small firms use secured credit. Existing scholarship, however, has provided little explanation of that pattern. In a recent article, I attributed the use of unsecured credit by large firms to the limited capacity of secured credit to lower the lending costs of creditworthy companies. This article uses data from a dozen interviews with small-business bankers to explain the small-business half of that lending pattern. To the extent smallbusiness lenders require secured credit, they do so largely for one significant benefit: secured credit allows small-business lenders to …
Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance As A Multi-Player Game, John C. Coffee Jr.
Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance As A Multi-Player Game, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
This is an article written in honor of Professor Donald Schwartz, a leading figure in academic corporate law for over two decades, but also a man nearly unique in his willingness to move beyond corporate law to the general study of corporate behavior. In this light, this article will not explore the latest wrinkle in the law – the most recent case, latest SEC ruling, or newest takeover defense tactic – but will instead ask if there are new ways in which we should try to talk about corporate law and corporate behavior. These were questions that Don Schwartz repeatedly …