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Articles 1 - 13 of 13
Full-Text Articles in Law
Shifting Influences On Corporate Governance: Capital Market Completeness And Policy Channeling, Ronald J. Gilson, Curtis J. Milhaupt
Shifting Influences On Corporate Governance: Capital Market Completeness And Policy Channeling, Ronald J. Gilson, Curtis J. Milhaupt
Faculty Scholarship
Corporate governance scholarship is typically portrayed as driven by single factor models, for example, shareholder value maximization, director primacy or team production. These governance models are Copernican; one factor is or should be the center of the corporate governance solar system. In this essay, we argue that, as with binary stars, the shape of the governance system is at any time the result of the interaction of two central influences, which we refer to as capital market completeness and policy channeling. In contrast to single factor models, which reflect a stable normative statement of what should drive corporate governance, in …
The Rejected Threat Of Corporate Vote Suppression: The Rise And Fall Of The Anti-Activist Pill, Jeffrey N. Gordon
The Rejected Threat Of Corporate Vote Suppression: The Rise And Fall Of The Anti-Activist Pill, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Faculty Scholarship
As disciplinary takeovers are replaced by activist shareholder campaigns, managements may well want to turn to the “anti-activist pill” as shelter from the storm. The economic shock from the widespread shutdown to combat the Covid-19 pandemic produced dozens of so-called “crisis pills.” The defense of these pills as avoiding “disruption” and “distraction” of managements can be seen as a test run for broader use of poison pills to fend off shareholder activism. The Delaware courts, first Chancery and then the Supreme Court, rejected this managerial defense tactic in a way that clarifies the role of the poison pill in corporate …
Crime And The Corporation: Making The Punishment Fit The Corporation, John C. Coffee Jr.
Crime And The Corporation: Making The Punishment Fit The Corporation, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
The debate over corporate criminal liability has long involved a fight between proponents who argue that corporate liability is necessary for effective deterrence and opponents who claim that it “punishes the innocent.” This Article agrees and disagrees with both sides. Corporate criminal liability could play a critical role in establishing an effective deterrent to organizational misconduct, but today it largely fails. Currently, we have a system that combines Deferred Prosecution Agreements, Non-Prosecution Agreements, and extraordinarily generous sentencing credits for compliance plans that have failed, and the result is a system that is more carrots than sticks. The evidence seems clear …
In Search Of Good Corporate Governance, Dorothy S. Lund
In Search Of Good Corporate Governance, Dorothy S. Lund
Faculty Scholarship
In this Forum Response, Dorothy Lund considers whether the “corporate governance gap” between large and small public companies is the product of harmful or beneficial forces, and in so doing, rejects the idea that there is a single governance framework that is optimal for all public companies.
Credit, Crises And Infrastructure: The Differing Fates Of Large And Small Businesses, Todd Baker, Kathryn Judge, Aaron Klein
Credit, Crises And Infrastructure: The Differing Fates Of Large And Small Businesses, Todd Baker, Kathryn Judge, Aaron Klein
Faculty Scholarship
This Essay sheds new light on the importance of credit creation infrastructure in determining who actually receives government support during periods of distress, and who continues to benefit after the acute phase of a crisis and the government’s formal support programs come to an end. The pandemic revealed, and the government’s response accentuated, meaningful asymmetries in the capacities of small and large businesses to access needed funding.
At first glance, it would seem that small businesses benefitted more than large ones from the government’s pandemic-support programs, as more government funds flowed into small businesses. Yet closer inspection of the range …
Systemic Stewardship, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Systemic Stewardship, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Faculty Scholarship
This Article frames a normative theory of stewardship engagement by large institutional investors and asset managers that is congruent with their theory of investment management — “Modern Portfolio Theory” — which describes investors as attentive to both systematic risk as well as expected returns. Because investors want to maximize risk-adjusted returns, it will serve their interests for asset managers to support and sometimes advance shareholder initiatives that will reduce systematic risk. “Systematic stewardship” provides an approach to “ESG” matters that serves both investor welfare and social welfare and fits the business model of large, diversified funds, especially index funds. The …
Agents Of Inequality: Common Ownership And The Decline Of The American Worker, Zohar Goshen, Doron Levit
Agents Of Inequality: Common Ownership And The Decline Of The American Worker, Zohar Goshen, Doron Levit
Faculty Scholarship
The last forty years have seen two major economic trends: wages have stalled despite rising productivity, and institutional investors have replaced retail shareholders as the predominant owners of the U.S. equity markets. A few powerful institutional investors — dubbed common owners — now hold large stakes in most U.S. corporations. And in no coincidence, when U.S. workers acquired this new set of bosses, their wages stopped growing while shareholder returns increased. This Article explains how common owners shift wealth from labor to capital, thereby exacerbating income inequality.
Powerful institutional investors pushing public corporations en masse to adopt strong corporate governance …
Barbarians Inside The Gates: Raiders, Activists, And The Risk Of Mistargeting, Zohar Goshen, Reilly S. Steel
Barbarians Inside The Gates: Raiders, Activists, And The Risk Of Mistargeting, Zohar Goshen, Reilly S. Steel
Faculty Scholarship
This Article argues that the conventional wisdom about corporate raiders and activist hedge funds — raiders break things and activists fix them — is wrong. Because activists have a higher risk of mistargeting — mistakenly shaking things up at firms that only appear to be underperforming — they are much more likely than raiders to destroy value and, ultimately, social wealth.
As corporate outsiders who challenge the incompetence or disloyalty of incumbent management, raiders and activists play similar roles in reducing “agency costs” at target firms. The difference between them comes down to a simple observation about their business models: …
Twitter V. Musk: The "Trial Of The Century" That Wasn't, Ann M. Lipton, Eric L. Talley
Twitter V. Musk: The "Trial Of The Century" That Wasn't, Ann M. Lipton, Eric L. Talley
Faculty Scholarship
The months-long saga over Elon Musk's on-again, off-again acquisition of Twitter provided considerable entertainment for lawyers and laypeople alike. But for those of us who teach business law, it also provided a unique (and in certain ways, vexing) opportunity to show real-time examples of the legal principles that are the grist for courses in contracts, corporations, corporate finance, and mergers and acquisitions.
Both of us found ourselves incorporating the saga into our classroom discussions, which in turn informed our own thinking about how the dynamic played out. Although we were both relatively active on social media (indeed on Twitter itself) …
The Future Of Board Time And Priorities, Janet Foutty, Eric L. Talley, Carey Oven, Erica Mitnick Klein, Maureen Bujno, Katherine Waldock, Molly Calkins, Lyssa Bantleon Little, Caroline Schoenecker
The Future Of Board Time And Priorities, Janet Foutty, Eric L. Talley, Carey Oven, Erica Mitnick Klein, Maureen Bujno, Katherine Waldock, Molly Calkins, Lyssa Bantleon Little, Caroline Schoenecker
Faculty Scholarship
“Houston, we’ve had a problem.”
Popularized by the 1995 film Apollo 13, this one line signals a dramatic turning point in the story of the 1970 mission to land three people on the surface of the moon.
It recounts the pivotal moment when carefully laid plans for a 33-hour stay on the moon are about to go awry. The very purpose of the mission — two space walks, a series of geological surveys, and the placement of scientific instruments that would send data back to Earth for long after — is in jeopardy.
It is the moment when the playbook …
Asset Managers As Regulators, Dorothy S. Lund
Asset Managers As Regulators, Dorothy S. Lund
Faculty Scholarship
The conventional view of regulation is that it exists to constrain corporate activity that harms the public. But amid perceptions of government failure, many now call on corporations to tackle social problems themselves. And in this moment of dissatisfaction with government, powerful asset managers have stepped in to serve as regulators of last resort, adopting rules that bind corporate America on issues of great social importance, including climate change and workplace diversity. This Article describes this dynamic — where shareholders have become regulators — which has been made possible by the rise of institutional shareholding (and index investing in particular) …
Toward A Fair And Sustainable Corporate Governance System: Reflections On Leo Strine, Jr.'S Writing On Institutional Investors, Dorothy S. Lund
Toward A Fair And Sustainable Corporate Governance System: Reflections On Leo Strine, Jr.'S Writing On Institutional Investors, Dorothy S. Lund
Faculty Scholarship
It is a privilege to contribute to this Festschrift for my friend, mentor, and co-author, Leo Strine, Jr. It is also a pleasure to revisit his vast body of work and to re-experience the breadth and depth of his scholarship, as well as reflect on his unparalleled influence on the development of corporate law that he brought about while presiding over its most influential courts for twenty-one years.
In thinking about this essay, I recalled a conversation that I had with “CJS” when I was serving as his law clerk. In this conversation, he decried (with James Taylor blasting in …
Contractual Evolution, Matthew Jennejohn, Julian Nyarko, Eric L. Talley
Contractual Evolution, Matthew Jennejohn, Julian Nyarko, Eric L. Talley
Faculty Scholarship
Conventional wisdom portrays contracts as static distillations of parties’ shared intent at some discrete point in time. In reality, however, contract terms evolve in response to their environments, including new laws, legal interpretations, and economic shocks. While several legal scholars have offered stylized accounts of this evolutionary process, we still lack a coherent, general theory that broadly captures the dynamics of real-world contracting practice. This paper advances such a theory, in which the evolution of contract terms is a byproduct of several key features, including efficiency concerns, information, and sequential learning by attorneys who negotiate several deals over time. Each …