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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Law
Thinking To Be Paid Versus Being Paid To Think, Merritt B. Fox
Thinking To Be Paid Versus Being Paid To Think, Merritt B. Fox
Faculty Scholarship
In the first chapter of The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel make an arresting statement:
... [P]eople who are backing their beliefs with cash are correct; they have every reason to avoid mistakes, while critics (be they academics or regulators) are rewarded for novel rather than accurate beliefs. Market professionals who estimate these things wrongly suffer directly; academics and regulators who estimate wrongly do not pay a similar penalty. Persons who wager with their own money may be wrong, but they are less likely to be wrong than are academics and regulators, who are wagering …
Insider Trading Deterrence Versus Managerial Incentives: A Unified Theory Of Section 16(B), Merritt B. Fox
Insider Trading Deterrence Versus Managerial Incentives: A Unified Theory Of Section 16(B), Merritt B. Fox
Faculty Scholarship
Part I of this article assesses the social costs of a crude rule of thumb. Because section 16(b) applies to a given class of paired transactions, it deters both transactions based on inside information and transactions not so based. Each time section 16(b) is stretched to include a class of paired transactions, it deters some additional innocent transactions. This side effect will take the form of officers' and directors' purchasing fewer shares in their own companies and refusing to accept as large a portion of their compensation in a form based on share price. There are strong theoretical and empirical …
The Sec And The Institutional Investor: A Half-Time Report, John C. Coffee Jr.
The Sec And The Institutional Investor: A Half-Time Report, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
Nothing that the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has done in recent years has been as controversial or significant as its efforts to reform the proxy rules to permit greater communication among shareholders. Nothing that it has undertaken recently has also been left as incompletely or equivocally realized as these same efforts. That the SEC's efforts at facilitating shareholder communication have been controversial and significant is by now a commonplace observation. That they are incomplete and equivocal requires more explanation. Although the discovery that an agency is behaving inconsistently is hardly a revelation, more than politics appears to be at …
Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, John C. Coffee Jr., Bernard S. Black
Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, John C. Coffee Jr., Bernard S. Black
Faculty Scholarship
A central puzzle in understanding the governance of large American public firms is why most institutional shareholders are passive. Why would they rather sell than fight? Until recently, the Berle-Means paradigm – the belief that separation of ownership and control naturally characterizes the modern corporation – reigned supreme. Shareholder passivity was seen as an inevitable result of the scale of modern industrial enterprise and of the collective action problems that face shareholders, each of whom owns only a small fraction of a large firm's shares.
A paradigm shift may be in the making, however. Rival hypotheses have recently been offered …
The Politics Of Article 9, Robert E. Scott
The Politics Of Article 9, Robert E. Scott
Faculty Scholarship
In the ongoing debate concerning the efficiency and social value of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, two points are beyond dispute. First, asset-based financing has undergone an enormous transformation since the enactment of Article 9. The most vivid illustration of this is the dramatic increase in the number and size of firms that rely on secured credit as their principal means of financing both ongoing operations and growth opportunities. Previously, with a few exceptions (such as factoring and trust receipts), secured financing principally had served second-class markets as the "poor man's" means of obtaining credit. Now, it has …
Decoupling Sales Law From The Acceptance-Rejection Fulcrum, Jody S. Kraus
Decoupling Sales Law From The Acceptance-Rejection Fulcrum, Jody S. Kraus
Faculty Scholarship
The determination of whether the buyer has accepted or rejected goods provides the sales law solution to the problems of allocating burden of proof, assigning duties to salvage goods in failed transactions, and reducing systematic undercompensation. But one doctrine is unlikely to provide the best solution to each of these distinct problems. Decoupling the rules addressing burden of proof, salvage, and undercompensation from the doctrines of acceptance and rejection, and thus from one another, would significantly improve sales law.
This strategy has a distinguished precedent in the history of sales law. Karl Llewellyn based his objection to the doctrine of …
Institutions As Relational Investors: A New Look At Cumulative Voting, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Institutions As Relational Investors: A New Look At Cumulative Voting, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Faculty Scholarship
The hostile takeover may have become a receding memory, but the problem that the market in corporate control purported to address nevertheless remains. In a world of imperfect competition, the product, capital, and managerial markets may temporarily indulge suboptimal performance by a firm's managers. As cases such as GM, Sears, American Express, and IBM illustrate, a firm with a substantial franchise and substantial financial reserves can sustain deteriorating economic performance over a significant period, resulting in a long slow slide of economic values. Shareholders and society generally will benefit from a mechanism that replaces the firm's incumbent managers well before …