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Articles 1 - 30 of 32
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Case For Preemptive Oligopoly Regulation, Jeffrey D. Manns
The Case For Preemptive Oligopoly Regulation, Jeffrey D. Manns
Indiana Law Journal
One of the few things former President Donald Trump and leading Democrats appear to agree on is the need to subject Big Technology (“Big Tech”) firms to antitrust scrutiny. But unsurprisingly they disagree about how to address the problem. Senator Elizabeth Warren and many other leading Democrats have called for breaking up large technology firms, such as Google, Amazon, and Facebook, in a revival of the trust-busting progressive era of the early twentieth century. In contrast, the Trump administration triggered more traditional antitrust monopoly review of potential anticompetitive activities of a number of leading technology firms, which is more likely …
Liberty And Antitrust In The Formative Era, Alan J. Meese
Liberty And Antitrust In The Formative Era, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
Don't Disintegrate Microsoft (Yet), Alan J. Meese
Debunking The Purchaser Welfare Account Of Section 2 Of The Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us A Total Welfare Standard And Why We Should Keep It, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
The last several years have seen a vigorous debate among antitrust scholars and practitionersa bout the appropriates tandardf or evaluating the conduct of monopolists under section 2 of the Sherman Act. While most of the debate over possible standards has focused on the empirical question of each standard's economic utility, this Article undertakes a somewhat different task: It examines the normative benchmark that courts have actually chosen when adjudicating section 2 cases. This Article explores three possible benchmarks-producer welfare, purchaser welfare, and total welfare-and concludes that courts have opted for a total welfare normative approach to section 2 since the …
Market Power And American Express, John B. Kirkwood
Market Power And American Express, John B. Kirkwood
University of Miami Business Law Review
The Second Circuit ruled that American Express did not have market power because it operated in a two-sided market and any leverage it exercised over merchants derived from its successful competition for cardholders. As a result, the relevant market had to include both sides of a credit card transaction, the company’s market share was modest, and it could not exploit both merchants and cardholders. In Market Power and Antitrust Enforcement (forthcoming in B.U. L. REV.), I propose a new approach that infers market power from the likely effects of the challenged conduct. This approach shows that American Express clearly exercised …
Applying The Rule Of Reason To Two–Sided Platform Businesses, David S. Evans, Richard Schmalensee
Applying The Rule Of Reason To Two–Sided Platform Businesses, David S. Evans, Richard Schmalensee
University of Miami Business Law Review
In recent years, the federal courts’ analysis of the competitive effects of conduct challenged under the Sherman Act’s rule of reason, which generally includes market definition as a critical step, has been properly guided by sensitivity to business reality and sound economic analysis of the conduct at issue. When it comes to two–sided platforms, the courts should adhere to that same flexible but principled approach and avoid rigid alternatives that would apply regardless of the platform, conduct, or fact–pattern.
In Ohio v. American Express Co., (Case No. 16–1454), now before the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Department of Justice …
Assessing The Competitive Effects Of Surcharging The Use Of Payment Mechanisms, Steven Semeraro
Assessing The Competitive Effects Of Surcharging The Use Of Payment Mechanisms, Steven Semeraro
University of Miami Business Law Review
The Department of Justice’s theory of liability in its case attacking the non–discrimination provisions in American Express’s merchant contracts contends that point–of–sale competition on the price of making a purchase with a credit card is an instrument creating economic efficiency. That is, the economy would run more efficiently, and consumers would be better off, if merchants were free to charge variable prices for different types of credit cards. After all, charging different prices for using different types of payment mechanisms appears to be just another form of presumptively positive price competition.
The Second Circuit rejected that conclusion, recognizing that in …
Sharing Economy Meets The Sherman Act: Is Uber A Firm, A Cartel, Or Something In Between?, Mark Anderson
Sharing Economy Meets The Sherman Act: Is Uber A Firm, A Cartel, Or Something In Between?, Mark Anderson
Articles
The sharing economy is a new industrial structure that is made possible by instantaneous internet communication and changes in the life, work, and purchasing habits of individual entrepreneurs and consumers. Antitrust law is an economic regulatory scheme dating back to 1890 in the United States that is designed to address centrally controlled concentrations of economic power and the threats that those concentrations pose to consumer interests and economic efficiency. In order to accommodate a modern enterprise structure in which thousands or millions of independent contractors join forces to provide a service by agreement among themselves, antitrust law requires re-envisioning and …
The New Road To Serfdom: The Curse Of Bigness And The Failure Of Antitrust, Carl T. Bogus
The New Road To Serfdom: The Curse Of Bigness And The Failure Of Antitrust, Carl T. Bogus
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
This Article argues for a paradigm shift in modern antitrust policy. Rather than being concerned exclusively with consumer welfare, antitrust law should also be concerned with consolidated corporate power. Regulators and courts should consider the social and political, as well as the economic, consequences of corporate mergers. The vision that antitrust must be a key tool for limiting consolidated corporate power has a venerable legacy, extending back to the origins of antitrust law in early seventeenth century England, running throughout American history, and influencing the enactment of U.S. antitrust laws. However, the Chicago School’s view that antitrust law should be …
International Implications Of The 1982 Merger Guidelines, Vincent Draa
International Implications Of The 1982 Merger Guidelines, Vincent Draa
Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law
No abstract provided.
Standard Oil And U.S. Steel: Predation And Collusion In The Law Of Monopolization And Mergers, William H. Page
Standard Oil And U.S. Steel: Predation And Collusion In The Law Of Monopolization And Mergers, William H. Page
William H. Page
The Supreme Court’s 1911 decision in Standard Oil gave us embryonic versions of two foundational standards of liability under the Sherman Act: the rule of reason under Section 1 and the monopoly power/exclusionary conduct test under Section 2. But a case filed later in 1911, United States v. United States Steel Corporation, shaped the understanding of Standard Oil’s standards of liability for decades. U.S. Steel, eventually decided by the Supreme Court in 1920, upheld the 1901 merger that created "the Corporation," as U.S. Steel was known. The majority found that the efforts of the Corporation and its rivals to control …
Predatory Hiring As Exclusionary Conduct: A New Perspective, Richard J. Braun, Michael A. Williams
Predatory Hiring As Exclusionary Conduct: A New Perspective, Richard J. Braun, Michael A. Williams
The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law
The showing of predatory or exclusionary conduct is a necessary element to prove an attempted monopolization claim under section 2 of the Sherman Act. Predatory hiring as a form of exclusionary conduct has not been extensively analyzed from legal or economic perspectives. Most litigated cases have followed Universal Analytics, Inc. v. MacNeal-Schwendler Corp., where the court held that unlawful predatory hiring occurs when talent is acquired not for purposes of using that talent, but for purposes of denying it to a competitor. An anticompetitive act by a single firm is an act that is not profit maximizing but for the …
Market Power In Power Markets: The Filed-Rate Doctrine And Competition In Electricity, Sandeep Vaheesan
Market Power In Power Markets: The Filed-Rate Doctrine And Competition In Electricity, Sandeep Vaheesan
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
State and federal initiatives have opened the American electric power industry to competition over the past four decades. Although the process has not occurred uniformly across the country, wholesale electricity markets exist everywhere today. Independent power producers can construct generation facilities and sell their output to utilities and industrial customers through bilateral contracts. In many regions, centralized power markets now facilitate the sale of billions of dollars in electricity annually through auctions. Although market forces have replaced direct price regulation in electricity, antitrust enforcement has not expanded its role commensurately. A lack of competition has been a serious problem in …
Standard Oil And U.S. Steel: Predation And Collusion In The Law Of Monopolization And Mergers, William H. Page
Standard Oil And U.S. Steel: Predation And Collusion In The Law Of Monopolization And Mergers, William H. Page
UF Law Faculty Publications
The Supreme Court’s 1911 decision in Standard Oil gave us embryonic versions of two foundational standards of liability under the Sherman Act: the rule of reason under Section 1 and the monopoly power/exclusionary conduct test under Section 2. But a case filed later in 1911, United States v. United States Steel Corporation, shaped the understanding of Standard Oil’s standards of liability for decades. U.S. Steel, eventually decided by the Supreme Court in 1920, upheld the 1901 merger that created "the Corporation," as U.S. Steel was known. The majority found that the efforts of the Corporation and its …
In The Wake Of Empagran – Lights Out On Foreign Activity Falling Under Sherman Act Jurisdiction? Courts Carve Out A Prevailing Standard, Kelly L. Tucker
In The Wake Of Empagran – Lights Out On Foreign Activity Falling Under Sherman Act Jurisdiction? Courts Carve Out A Prevailing Standard, Kelly L. Tucker
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
No abstract provided.
Debunking The Purchaser Welfare Account Of Section 2 Of The Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us A Total Welfare Standard And Why We Should Keep It, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
The last several years have seen a vigorous debate among antitrust scholars and practitionersa bout the appropriates tandardf or evaluating the conduct of monopolists under section 2 of the Sherman Act. While most of the debate over possible standards has focused on the empirical question of each standard's economic utility, this Article undertakes a somewhat different task: It examines the normative benchmark that courts have actually chosen when adjudicating section 2 cases. This Article explores three possible benchmarks-producer welfare, purchaser welfare, and total welfare-and concludes that courts have opted for a total welfare normative approach to section 2 since the …
Reflections On Section 5 Of The Ftc Act And The Ftc's Case Against Intel, Daniel A. Crane
Reflections On Section 5 Of The Ftc Act And The Ftc's Case Against Intel, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
The Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC’s”) unprecedented enforcement action against Intel raises profound issues concerning the scope of the FTC’s powers to give a construction to Section 5 of the FTC Act that goes beyond the substantive reach of the Sherman Act. While I have urged the FTC to assert such independence from the Sherman Act, this is the wrong case to make a break. Indeed, if anything, Intel poses a risk of seriously setting back the development of an independent Section 5 power by provoking a hostile appellate court to rebuke the FTC’s effort and cabin the FTC’s powers in …
Bank Merger Reform Takes An Extended Philadelphia National Bank Holiday, Edward Pekarek, Michela Huth
Bank Merger Reform Takes An Extended Philadelphia National Bank Holiday, Edward Pekarek, Michela Huth
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
No abstract provided.
The Antitrust Aspects Of Bank Mergers - Introduction, Carl Felsenfeld
The Antitrust Aspects Of Bank Mergers - Introduction, Carl Felsenfeld
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
No abstract provided.
State Action Antitrust Exemption Collides With Deregulation: Rehabilitating The Foreseeability Doctrine, Elizabeth Trujillo
State Action Antitrust Exemption Collides With Deregulation: Rehabilitating The Foreseeability Doctrine, Elizabeth Trujillo
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
No abstract provided.
The Supreme Court And The Trusts: Antitrust And The Foundations Of Modern American Business Regulation From Knight To Swift, Donald J. Smythe
The Supreme Court And The Trusts: Antitrust And The Foundations Of Modern American Business Regulation From Knight To Swift, Donald J. Smythe
ExpressO
The period from 1870-1920 was a turning point in modern history. It was during this time that the contours of the modern industrial state were formed. A “Great Merger Movement” occurred right in the middle of this period across most of the industrialized nations of the world. The trend toward industrial concentration, which was known at the time as the “trust problem,” generated considerable public alarm. Some have argued that it was caused by antitrust policy and the Supreme Court’s early antitrust decisions. Indeed, the idea has become the conventional wisdom among some antitrust scholars, especially those connected with the …
Don't Disintegrate Microsoft (Yet), Alan J. Meese
Don't Disintegrate Microsoft (Yet), Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Liberty And Antitrust In The Formative Era, Alan J. Meese
Liberty And Antitrust In The Formative Era, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Quality Of Care And Market Failure Defenses In Antitrust Health Care Litigation, Thomas L. Greaney
Quality Of Care And Market Failure Defenses In Antitrust Health Care Litigation, Thomas L. Greaney
All Faculty Scholarship
This article considers quality-based justifications for antitrust challenges to collaboration among health care professionals. It first examines doctrinal developments resisting such justifications and, with a skeptical eye, analyzes attempts to interject quality of care and worthy motive defenses into antitrust appraisals of horizontal restraints of trade. Next the article assesses the economic basis and the risks and benefits of a market failure defense that would allow some quality-enhancing restraints of trade to escape antitrust challenge. Its principle recommendation is that courts recognize a narrow, market failure defense subject to several limiting principles to cabin its reach. The article concludes by …
Sherman Act Applications To Predation By Controlled Economy Enterprises Marketing In The United States: Departures From Mechanical Formulae, Deborah M. Levy
Sherman Act Applications To Predation By Controlled Economy Enterprises Marketing In The United States: Departures From Mechanical Formulae, Deborah M. Levy
Michigan Journal of International Law
In a reproachful dissent in United States v. Columbia Steel, the late Justice Douglas sought to remind his brethren what the antitrust laws of the United States are all about: [A]ll power tends to develop into a government in itself. Power that controls the economy should be in the hands of elected representatives of the people, not in the hands of an industrial oligarchy. Industrial power should be decentralized.... That is the philosophy and the command of the Sherman Act.
Interlocks In Corporate Management And The Antitrust Laws, Arthur H. Travers Jr.
Interlocks In Corporate Management And The Antitrust Laws, Arthur H. Travers Jr.
Publications
No abstract provided.
Anti Trust - Personal Liability Of Corporate Officers Participating In Sherman Act Violations, Paul Auster
Anti Trust - Personal Liability Of Corporate Officers Participating In Sherman Act Violations, Paul Auster
William & Mary Law Review
No abstract provided.
Corporations-Officers And Directors-Liability For Representative Acts Under The Sherman Act, Leon E. Irish
Corporations-Officers And Directors-Liability For Representative Acts Under The Sherman Act, Leon E. Irish
Michigan Law Review
An indictment brought under section 1 of the Sherman Act charged appellee and the corporation that employed him with conspiracy to eliminate price competition in the greater Kansas City milk market. Appellee was charged solely, in his capacity as officer, director or agent of the corporation. The district court dismissed the indictment on the ground that natural persons are indictable under section 1 of the Sherman Act only for acts done on their own account. On direct appeal to the Supreme Court, held, reversed and remanded. A corporate officer is liable under section 1 of the Sherman Act whether …
Continuing Corporate Liability For Federal Crime After State Dissolution Of Corporation - Melrose Distillers, Inc. V. United States, Alan M. Wilner
Continuing Corporate Liability For Federal Crime After State Dissolution Of Corporation - Melrose Distillers, Inc. V. United States, Alan M. Wilner
Maryland Law Review
No abstract provided.
Suits Against Unincorporated Associations Under The Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure, John Kaplan
Suits Against Unincorporated Associations Under The Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure, John Kaplan
Michigan Law Review
Concepts, Benjamin Cardozo has said, "are useful, indeed indispensable, if kept within their place. We will press them quite a distance. . . . A time comes, however, when the concepts carry us too far, or farther than we are ready to go with them, and behold, some other concept, with capacity to serve our needs is waiting at the gate. 'It is a peculiar virtue of our system of law that the process of inclusion and exclusion, so often employed in developing a rule, is not allowed to end with its enunciation, and that an expression in an opinion …