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Full-Text Articles in Law

An Approach To The Regulation Of Spanish Banking Foundations, Miguel Martínez Jun 2015

An Approach To The Regulation Of Spanish Banking Foundations, Miguel Martínez

Miguel Martínez

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the legal framework governing banking foundations as they have been regulated by Spanish Act 26/2013, of December 27th, on savings banks and banking foundations. Title 2 of this regulation addresses a construct that is groundbreaking for the Spanish legal system, still of paramount importance for the entire financial system insofar as these foundations become the leading players behind certain banking institutions given the high interest that foundations hold in the share capital of such institutions.


Optimized Theft: Why Some Controlling Shareholders “Generously” Expropriate From Minority Shareholders, Sang Yop Kang Jan 2015

Optimized Theft: Why Some Controlling Shareholders “Generously” Expropriate From Minority Shareholders, Sang Yop Kang

Sang Yop Kang

Although controlling shareholder agency problems have been well studied so far, many questions still remain unanswered. In particular, an important puzzle in a bad-law jurisdiction is: why some controlling shareholders (“roving controllers”) loot the entire corporate assets at once, and why others (“stationary controllers”) siphon a part of corporate assets on a continuous basis. To solve this conundrum, this Article provides analytical frameworks exploring the behaviors and motivations of controlling shareholders. To begin with, I reinterpret Olson’s political theory of “banditry” in the context of corporate governance in developing countries. Based on a new taxonomy of controlling shareholders (“roving controllers” …


Re-Envisioning Investors’ Anti-Director Rights Index: Theory, Criticism, And Implications, Sang Yop Kang Jan 2015

Re-Envisioning Investors’ Anti-Director Rights Index: Theory, Criticism, And Implications, Sang Yop Kang

Sang Yop Kang

‘Law and Finance’ theory – which offers analytical frameworks to measure the protection of public investors and the quality of corporate governance – has dominated the comparative corporate governance scholarship in the last decade. So far, many proponents and critics have had debates on the relevance of the theory and the implications of the theory’s empirical studies. Several important points in relation to shareholder protection, however, have been highly neglected in these debates. In particular, the significance of one-share-one-vote (OSOV) rule has been inappropriately underestimated. In response, this Article explores (1) why OSOV is an utmost critical component in corporate …


The Failure Of Corporate Internal Controls And Internal Information Sharing: A Conceptual Framework For Taiwan, Chang-Hsien Tsai Dec 2014

The Failure Of Corporate Internal Controls And Internal Information Sharing: A Conceptual Framework For Taiwan, Chang-Hsien Tsai

Chang-hsien (Robert) TSAI

Although East Asian jurisdictions such as Taiwan have been adopting similar models of Anglo-American independent directors and audit committees in recent years, we can find that common issues are failure of internal controls, in general, and dysfunctional internal information-sharing mechanisms, in particular. To accommodate Taiwan’s reform trend towards furthering the adoption of independent directors and audit committees, this paper offers a roadmap for conceptual solutions which are harmonic with each other as prerequisites to enable monitors of management to have the incentives and means to exercise their oversight. First, the board’s duty to monitor should be reiterated while being transplanted …


The Cost Of Doing Business In Asia: A Comparative Legal Study Of Environmental Regulations In The Emerging Markets Of Thailand, Malaysia, And Indonesia, Brooke R. Padgett May 2014

The Cost Of Doing Business In Asia: A Comparative Legal Study Of Environmental Regulations In The Emerging Markets Of Thailand, Malaysia, And Indonesia, Brooke R. Padgett

Brooke R. Padgett

Abstract: This article explores whether voluntary standards, customary law, or more binding bilateral investment treaties are best for corporations, the emerging markets of Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia, and the environment itself. While corporations, markets, and the environment facially seem to have divergent priorities, environmental disasters are more costly after the fact than they are to prevent so in reality their priorities may not be so different after all. Some of the potential issues the paper will examine and address are big picture macro level such as fairness to future generations, intergenerational rights; the actual cost through questions of polluter pays, …


The Evolution Of The Digital Millennium Copyright Act; Changing Interpretations Of The Dmca And Future Implications For Copyright Holders, Hillary A. Henderson Jan 2014

The Evolution Of The Digital Millennium Copyright Act; Changing Interpretations Of The Dmca And Future Implications For Copyright Holders, Hillary A. Henderson

Hillary A Henderson

Copyright law rewards an artificial monopoly to individual authors for their creations. This reward is based on the belief that, by granting authors the exclusive right to reproduce their works, they receive an incentive and means to create, which in turn advances the welfare of the general public by “promoting the progress of science and useful arts.” Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or …


Controlling Shareholders: Benevolent “King” Or Ruthless “Pirate”, Sang Yop Kang Jan 2014

Controlling Shareholders: Benevolent “King” Or Ruthless “Pirate”, Sang Yop Kang

Sang Yop Kang

Unfair self-dealing and expropriation of minority shareholders by a controlling shareholder are common business practices in developing countries (“bad-law countries”). Although controlling shareholder agency problems have been well studied so far, there are many questions unanswered in relation to behaviors and motivations of controlling shareholders. For example, a puzzle is that some controlling shareholders in bad-law countries voluntarily extract minority shareholders less than other controlling shareholders. Applying Mancur Olson’s framework of political theory of “banditry” to the context of corporate governance, this Article proposes that there are at least two categories of controlling shareholders. “Roving controllers” are dominant shareholders with …


Deja Vu All Over Again? The Internal Affairs Rule And Entity Law Convergence Patterns In Europe And The United States, Matthew G. Dore Jan 2014

Deja Vu All Over Again? The Internal Affairs Rule And Entity Law Convergence Patterns In Europe And The United States, Matthew G. Dore

Matthew G Dore

Many scholars embrace the view that corporate law convergence is an inevitable byproduct of the internal affairs rule and market competition by jurisdictions that seek to attract new entity formations by offering ever more efficient business association laws. Yet recent developments in Europe and the U.S. cast doubt on this proposition. As the article describes, the European Court of Justice embraced the internal affairs rule more than a decade ago, and European Union legislation now offers new opportunities for EU Member States to compete in the company law field. But Europe has experienced neither U.S.-style jurisdictional competition for business entity …


Directors’ Legal Duties And Csr: Prohibited, Permitted Or Prescribed In Contemporary Corporate Law?, Benedict Sheehy, Donald Feaver Dec 2013

Directors’ Legal Duties And Csr: Prohibited, Permitted Or Prescribed In Contemporary Corporate Law?, Benedict Sheehy, Donald Feaver

Benedict Sheehy

Abstract: The interaction between CSR obligations and directors’ legal duties is seriously under examined. This article addresses that lack by examining directors’ duties in case law and legislation across the major commonwealth countries and the USA. It provides an analysis of leading cases and examines how they deal with the issues of the shareholder primacy doctrine, corporate legal theory, CSR and directors’ duties. The article reviews fiduciary relations and duties, analyses the directors’ duties to exercise power in the best interests of the company as a whole and for proper purposes. As this area of law is highly contested there …


Re-Envisioning The Controlling Shareholder Regime: Why Controlling Shareholders And Minority Shareholders Embrace Each Other, Sang Yop Kang Jul 2013

Re-Envisioning The Controlling Shareholder Regime: Why Controlling Shareholders And Minority Shareholders Embrace Each Other, Sang Yop Kang

Sang Yop Kang

According to conventional corporate governance scholarship, controlling shareholder regimes exist in jurisdictions where minority shareholders are not well protected by controlling shareholders’ expropriation. However, Professor Ronald Gilson raises a critical point against the conventional view; if laws are inefficient and do not protect investors, as the conventional view explains, why do we observe any minority shareholders at all in such “bad-law” countries? One possible reason is that in response to controlling shareholders’ expropriation, minority shareholders discount severely shares that corporations issue. Then, a related question is: if it is true, why do some controlling shareholders in bad-law countries have many …


Exit, Voice And International Jurisdictional Competition: A Case Study Of The Evolution Of Taiwan’S Regulatory Regime For Outward Investment In Mainland China, 1997-2008, Chang-Hsien Tsai Dec 2011

Exit, Voice And International Jurisdictional Competition: A Case Study Of The Evolution Of Taiwan’S Regulatory Regime For Outward Investment In Mainland China, 1997-2008, Chang-Hsien Tsai

Chang-hsien (Robert) TSAI

This Article explores the interplay of demand and supply forces in the market for law through international jurisdictional competition led by offshore financial centers. To do so it uses the example of the evolution of a regulatory regime imposed by an onshore jurisdiction, Taiwan, to control outward investment into mainland China (“China-investment”). The argument is that jurisdictional competition brought about by capital mobility or exit will provoke legal changes to prevent the departure of capital when laws reduce the value of remaining within the jurisdiction. The case study is used to examine the extent to which jurisdictional competition fuelled by …


Demand And Supply Forces In The Market For Law Interplaying Through Jurisdictional Competition: Basic Theories And Cases, Chang-Hsien Tsai Aug 2010

Demand And Supply Forces In The Market For Law Interplaying Through Jurisdictional Competition: Basic Theories And Cases, Chang-Hsien Tsai

Chang-hsien (Robert) TSAI

Inspired by corporate charter competitions in the 19th-century U.S. and contemporary Europe as well as the negative impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on the U.S. cross-listing market, this article draws positive lessons from the above stories that demand and supply forces underlying jurisdictional competition constrains regulating jurisdictions from disregarding business demands and from imposing excessive regulation, and that jurisdictional competition brought about by mobility or exit would push for legal flexibility. Through the positive arguments developed in this article, regulatory jurisdictions in East Asia could, to an extent, understand the true costs and benefits of regulation in the …