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Full-Text Articles in Law
Procuring "Justice"?: Citizens United, Caperton V. Massey, And Partisan Judicial Elections, André Douglas Pond Cummings
Procuring "Justice"?: Citizens United, Caperton V. Massey, And Partisan Judicial Elections, André Douglas Pond Cummings
andré douglas pond cummings
In recent years, two inextricably connected issues have received a great deal of attention in both United States political discourse and in the legal academic literature. One issue of intense legal debate and frustration has been that of judicial recusal, including an examination of the appropriate standards that should necessarily apply to judges that seem conflicted or biased in their role as neutral arbiter. A second issue that has spawned heated commentary and great dispute over the past decade is that of campaign finance law, including examination of the role that powerful and wealthy benefactors play in American electioneering. Both …
Ignoring The Writing On The Wall: The Role Of Enterprise Risk Management In The Economic Crisis, Michelle M. Harner
Ignoring The Writing On The Wall: The Role Of Enterprise Risk Management In The Economic Crisis, Michelle M. Harner
Michelle M. Harner
Enterprise risk management (ERM) targets overall corporate strategy and, when implemented correctly, can manage a corporation’s risk appetite and exposure. When ignored or underutilized, it can contribute to a corporation’s demise. In fact, many commentators point to ERM failures as contributing to the severity of the 2008 economic crisis. This essay examines the different approaches to ERM adopted by financial institutions affected by the 2008 economic crisis and how ERM contributed to the survival or failure of those firms. It then considers ERM in the broader context of corporate governance generally. This discussion reflects on ERM techniques for corporate boards …
The Search For An Unbiased Fiduciary In Corporate Reorganizations, Michelle M. Harner
The Search For An Unbiased Fiduciary In Corporate Reorganizations, Michelle M. Harner
Michelle M. Harner
When a company experiences financial distress, a control contest often follows. Management fights to remain in control of the company, and shareholders, creditors and others try to influence management’s exercise of that control—or wrest it away. This is not a new phenomenon. The degree of influence now exerted by corporate stakeholders in the distressed context, however, is strikingly different than in the past. Recent headlines highlight that stakeholder control issues are at the forefront of financially-distressed situations large and small. The U.S. government, as creditor, dictated the terms of Chrysler’s and General Motors’ bankruptcies. It also demanded and received preferred …
Choice, Progressive Values, And Corporate Law: A Reply To Greenfield, Harry G. Hutchison
Choice, Progressive Values, And Corporate Law: A Reply To Greenfield, Harry G. Hutchison
Harry G. Hutchison
In his recent book chapter, CORPORATE LAW AND THE RHETORIC OF CHOICE, Professor Kent Greenfield rejects contractarian justifications for existing corporate governance arrangements. Greenfield advances this critique on two grounds. First, relying on behavioralist scholars, he accepts the demise of the rational actor model and, accordingly, opposes the contemporary use of choice as a construct that legitimates current corporate governance approaches. Second, Greenfield refracts his analysis through the prism of Progressive thought and values.
Greenfield’s approach is disturbing for two reasons. First, he fails to notice that behavioralist scholars often rely on experimental data, while law and economics scholars rely …
The Credence Characteristics Of Corporate Reform, Omari S. Simmons
The Credence Characteristics Of Corporate Reform, Omari S. Simmons
Omari Scott Simmons
No abstract provided.
Shareholder Primacy And The Business Judgment Rule: Arguments For Expanded Corporate Democracy, Robert Sprague, Aaron Lyttle
Shareholder Primacy And The Business Judgment Rule: Arguments For Expanded Corporate Democracy, Robert Sprague, Aaron Lyttle
Robert Sprague
There is a fundamental flaw in the law’s approach to corporate governance. While shareholder primacy is a well-established norm within U.S. corporate law, the business judgment rule essentially holds directors blameless when they fail to maximize shareholder wealth. During the past century, control of the corporation has passed from shareholders to managers. As a result, shareholders have little practical say in who runs the corporation, even though they cannot usually hold managers legally liable when those managers destroy shareholder wealth through incompetence. Despite a number of arguments asserting that shareholders do not deserve any additional management powers, this article concludes …