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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Case For A Market In Debt Governance, Yesha Yadav
The Case For A Market In Debt Governance, Yesha Yadav
Vanderbilt Law Review
Scholars have long lamented that the growth of modern finance has given way to a decline in debt governance. According to current theory, the expansive use of derivatives that enable lenders to trade away the default risk of their loans has made these lenders uninterested, even reckless, when it comes to exercising creditor discipline. In contrast to current theory, this Article argues that such derivatives can prove a positive and powerful influence in debt governance. Theory has overlooked those who sell credit protection to lenders and assume default risk on the borrower. These protection sellers are left holding the economic …
The Supercharged Ipo, Victor Fleischer, Nancy Staudt
The Supercharged Ipo, Victor Fleischer, Nancy Staudt
Vanderbilt Law Review
A new innovation on the IPO landscape has emerged in the last two decades, allowing owner-founders to extract billions of dollars from newly public companies. These IPOs-labeled supercharged IPOs-have been the subject of widespread debate and controversy: lawyers, financial experts, journalists, and members of Congress have all weighed in on the topic. Some have argued that supercharged IPOs are "brilliant, just brilliant," while others have labeled them "underhanded" and "bizarre."
In this Article, we explore the supercharged IPO and explain how and why this new deal structure differs from the more traditional IPO. We then outline various theories of financial …
Business, Human Rights, And The Promise Of Polycentricity, Jamie D. Prenkert, Scott J. Shackelford
Business, Human Rights, And The Promise Of Polycentricity, Jamie D. Prenkert, Scott J. Shackelford
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (SRSG) John Ruggie referred to the "Protect, Respect, and Remedy" Framework (PRR Framework) and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (Guiding Principles) as a polycentric governance system. However, the exact meaning of this phrase has not been very carefully elucidated. This Article analyzes that description in the context of the deep and varied body of literature on polycentric governance and evaluates the PRR Framework in that light. In particular, this Article uses a case-study approach, analyzing the emerging polycentric …
Managing Systemic Risk In Legal Systems, J.B. Ruhl
Managing Systemic Risk In Legal Systems, J.B. Ruhl
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
The American legal system has proven remarkably robust even in the face vast and often tumultuous political, social, economic, and technological change. Yet our system of law is not unlike other complex social, biological, and physical systems in exhibiting local fragility in the midst of its global robustness. Understanding how this “robust yet fragile (RYF) dilemma operates in legal systems is important to the extent law is expected to assist in managing systemic risk, the risk of large local or even system-wide failures in other social systems. Indeed, legal system failures have been blamed as partly responsible for disasters such …
Shareholder Voting In An Age Of Intermediary Capitalism, Paul H. Edelman, Randall S. Thomas, Robert B. Thompson
Shareholder Voting In An Age Of Intermediary Capitalism, Paul H. Edelman, Randall S. Thomas, Robert B. Thompson
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Shareholder voting is a key part of contemporary American corporate governance. As numerous contemporary battles between corporate management and shareholders illustrate, voting has never been more important. Yet, traditional theory about shareholder voting, rooted in concepts of residual ownership and a principal/agent relationship, does not reflect recent fundamental changes as to who shareholders are and their incentives to vote (or not vote). In the first section of the article, we address this deficiency directly by developing a new theory of corporate voting that offers three strong and complementary reasons for shareholder voting. In the middle section, we apply our theory …