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Full-Text Articles in Law
Looking Back, Looking Forward: Personal Reflections On A Scholarly Career, David K. Millon
Looking Back, Looking Forward: Personal Reflections On A Scholarly Career, David K. Millon
David K. Millon
No abstract provided.
Bad And Not-So-Bad Arguments For Shareholder Primacy, Lynn A. Stout
Bad And Not-So-Bad Arguments For Shareholder Primacy, Lynn A. Stout
Lynn A. Stout
In 1932, the Harvard Law Review published a debate between two preeminent corporate scholars on the subject of the proper purpose of the public corporation. On one side stood the renowned Adolph A. Berle, coauthor of the classic The Modern Corporation and Private Property. Berle argued for what is now called "shareholder primacy"—the view that the corporation exists only to make money for its shareholders. According to Berle, "all powers granted to a corporation or to the management of a corporation, or to any group within the corporation. . . [are] at all times exercisable only for the ratable …
Director Accountability And The Mediating Role Of The Corporate Board, Margaret M. Blair, Lynn A. Stout
Director Accountability And The Mediating Role Of The Corporate Board, Margaret M. Blair, Lynn A. Stout
Lynn A. Stout
One of the most pressing questions facing both corporate scholars and businesspeople today is how corporate directors can be made accountable. Before addressing this issue, however, it seems important to consider two antecedent questions: To whom should directors be accountable? And for what? Contemporary corporate scholarship often starts from a "shareholder primacy" perspective that holds that directors of public corporations ought to be accountable only to the shareholders, and ought to be accountable only for maximizing the value of the shareholders' shares. This perspective rests on the conventional contractarian assumption that the shareholders are the sole residual claimants and risk …
Shareholder Ownership And Primacy, Julian Velasco
Shareholder Ownership And Primacy, Julian Velasco
Julian Velasco
According to the traditional view, the shareholders own the corporation. Until relatively recently, this view enjoyed general acceptance. Today, however, there seems to be substantial agreement among legal scholars and others in the academy that shareholders do not own corporations. In fact, the claim that shareholders do own corporations often is dismissed as merely a “theory,” a “naked assertion,” or even a “myth.” And yet, outside of the academy, views on the corporation remain quite traditional. Most people - not just the public and the media, but also politicians, and even bureaucrats and the courts - seem to believe that …
Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously, Julian Velasco
Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously, Julian Velasco
Julian Velasco
The great corporate scandals of the recent past and the resulting push for legal reform have revived the role of the shareholder in the corporation as a subject of great debate. Those who favor an expanded role for shareholders in corporate governance tend to focus on developing new legal rights for shareholders, and their critics respond with reasons why such rights are unnecessary and inappropriate. While these issues certainly are worthy of consideration, issues concerning existing shareholder rights are more fundamental. If existing rights are adequate or could be improved, then new rights may not be necessary; but if existing …
The Fundamental Rights Of The Shareholder, Julian Velasco
The Fundamental Rights Of The Shareholder, Julian Velasco
Julian Velasco
Shareholders have many legal rights, but they are not all of equal significance. This article will argue that two rights — the right to elect directors and the right to sell shares — are more important than any others, that these rights should be considered the fundamental rights of the shareholder, and that, as such, they deserve a great deal of respect and protection by law. The history of corporate law has been one of increasing flexibility for directors and decreasing rights for shareholders. Although the law seems to have coalesced around the norm of shareholder primacy, this is not …
Shareholder Primacy In The Classroom After The Financial Crisis, David Millon
Shareholder Primacy In The Classroom After The Financial Crisis, David Millon
David K. Millon
No abstract provided.
The Law Of Corporate Purpose, David Yosifon
The Law Of Corporate Purpose, David Yosifon
David G. Yosifon
Delaware corporate law requires corporate directors to manage firms for the benefit of shareholders, and not for any other constituency. Delaware jurists have been clear about this in their case law, and they are not coy about it in extra-judicial settings, such as speeches directed at law students and practicing members of the corporate bar. Nevertheless, the reader of leading corporate law scholarship is continually exposed to the scholarly assertion that the law is ambiguous or ambivalent on this point, or even that case law affirmatively empowers directors to pursue non-shareholder interests. It is shocking, and troubling, for corporate law …
New Principles For Corporate Law, Kent Greenfield
New Principles For Corporate Law, Kent Greenfield
Kent Greenfield
The fundamental assumptions of corporate law have changed little in decades. Accepted as truth are the notions that corporations are voluntary, private, contractual entities, that they have broad powers to make money in whatever ways and in whatever locations they see fit. The primary obligation of management is to shareholders, and shareholders alone. Corporations have broad powers but only a limited role: they exist to make money. Those who maintain these principles – a group that includes most of the legal scholars who teach and write in the area – have derived the narrow role of corporations in one of …
Shareholder Primacy And The Business Judgment Rule: Arguments For Expanded Corporate Democracy, Robert Sprague, Aaron Lyttle
Shareholder Primacy And The Business Judgment Rule: Arguments For Expanded Corporate Democracy, Robert Sprague, Aaron Lyttle
Robert Sprague
There is a fundamental flaw in the law’s approach to corporate governance. While shareholder primacy is a well-established norm within U.S. corporate law, the business judgment rule essentially holds directors blameless when they fail to maximize shareholder wealth. During the past century, control of the corporation has passed from shareholders to managers. As a result, shareholders have little practical say in who runs the corporation, even though they cannot usually hold managers legally liable when those managers destroy shareholder wealth through incompetence. Despite a number of arguments asserting that shareholders do not deserve any additional management powers, this article concludes …