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Full-Text Articles in Law
How Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case Of The Golden Leash, Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven Davidoff Solomon
How Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case Of The Golden Leash, Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven Davidoff Solomon
Steven Davidoff Solomon
This Article presents a case study of a corporate governance innovation—the incentive compensation arrangement for activist-nominated director candidates colloquially known as the “golden leash.” Golden leash compensation arrangements are a potentially valuable tool for activist shareholders in election contests. In response to their use, several issuers adopted bylaw provisions banning incentive compensation arrangements. Investors, in turn, viewed director adoption of golden leash bylaws as problematic and successfully pressured issuers to repeal them. The study demonstrates how corporate governance provisions are developed and deployed, the sequential response of issuers and investors, and the central role played by governance intermediaries—activist investors, institutional …
Rethinking Chutes: Incentives, Investment, And Innovation, Simone M. Sepe, Charles K. Whitehead
Rethinking Chutes: Incentives, Investment, And Innovation, Simone M. Sepe, Charles K. Whitehead
Charles K Whitehead
Eighty-two percent of public firms have golden parachutes (or “chutes”) under which CEOs and senior officers may be paid tens of millions of dollars upon their employer’s change in control. What justifies such extraordinary payouts? Much of the conventional analysis views chutes as excessive compensation granted by captured boards, focusing on the payouts that occur following a takeover. Those explanations, if they ever were complete, miss the mark today. This Article demonstrates, theoretically and empirically, that chutes are less relevant to a firm during a takeover than they are before a takeover, particularly in relation to firms that invest in …
Addressing The Tension Between Directors' Duties And Shareholder Rights - A Tale Of Two Regimes, Sean Vanderpol, Edward J. Waitzer
Addressing The Tension Between Directors' Duties And Shareholder Rights - A Tale Of Two Regimes, Sean Vanderpol, Edward J. Waitzer
Edward J. Waitzer
There is a basic tension inherent in the regulation of corporations between the role to be played by boards and that to be played by shareholders. Boards have the statutory responsibility to manage the business and affairs of the corporation, and owe an express duty to act in the best interests of the corporation. Shareholders, however, are the ultimate ‘owners’ of the corporation, and have the ability to elect and remove directors. Canadian courts and securities regulators have long struggled with this tension in determining the roles to be played by each in transactions that pose the potential for conflicts …
Peoples, Bce, And The Good Corporate "Citizen", Edward J. Waitzer, Johnny Jaswal
Peoples, Bce, And The Good Corporate "Citizen", Edward J. Waitzer, Johnny Jaswal
Edward J. Waitzer
This article considers the use of various legal instruments to advance a more expansive but well-defined view of directors' duties and discretion--a view which focuses on the longer-term interests of the corporation. We begin with an attempt to clarify the nature of directors' statutory duties under Canadian corporate law. We then consider the recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise and BCE v. 1976 Debentureholders, in which the Court took a broad view of corporate purpose, but failed to provide clear logic or operational guidance as to consequential directorial responsibilities. …
Politics Of Knowledge Dissemination: Corporate Reporting, Shareholder Voice, And Human Rights, Aaron A. Dhir
Politics Of Knowledge Dissemination: Corporate Reporting, Shareholder Voice, And Human Rights, Aaron A. Dhir
Aaron A. Dhir
This article considers the relationship between social disclosure and corporate accountability in Canada. It focuses on the potential benefits social disclosure can provide in terms of the overall human rights project. I explore this issue with reference to the broader theoretical frameworks of new governance and reflexive law. White I ground my analysis in these analytical approaches. I distance myself slightly from particular arguments in the literature to date: specifically, the argument that the disclosure process will result in self-correcting behaviour on the part of corporate decision makers. Rather, I argue that the value of social disclosure may lie more …
The United States, Lawrence A. Hamermesh
The Tort Foundation Of Duty Of Care And Business Judgment, Robert J. Rhee
The Tort Foundation Of Duty Of Care And Business Judgment, Robert J. Rhee
Robert Rhee
This Article corrects a misconception in corporation law – the belief that principles of tort law do not apply to the liability scheme of fiduciary duty. A board’s duty of care implies exposure to liability, but the business judgment rule precludes it. Tort law finds fault; corporation law excuses it. The conventional wisdom says that the tort analogy fails. This dismissal of tort prinicples is wrong. Although shareholder derivative suits and ordinary tort cases properly yield systemically antipodal outcomes, they are bound by a common analytical framework. The principles of board liability are rooted in tort doctrines governing duty, customs, …
A U.S./Canadian Dialogue About The Current State Of Poison Pills, Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Pierre-Yves Leduc
A U.S./Canadian Dialogue About The Current State Of Poison Pills, Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Pierre-Yves Leduc
Lawrence A. Hamermesh
No abstract provided.
A Delaware Lawyer In Chairman Schapiro's 'Court', Lawrence A. Hamermesh
A Delaware Lawyer In Chairman Schapiro's 'Court', Lawrence A. Hamermesh
Lawrence A. Hamermesh
No abstract provided.
Irreconcilable Differences: Director, Manager And Shareholder Conflicts In Takeover Transactions, Steven M. Davidoff, Caroline M. Gentile, Paul L. Regan
Irreconcilable Differences: Director, Manager And Shareholder Conflicts In Takeover Transactions, Steven M. Davidoff, Caroline M. Gentile, Paul L. Regan
Paul L Regan
No abstract provided.