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Full-Text Articles in Law
A Delaware Response To Delaware's Choice, Lawrence Hamermesh, Norman Monhait
A Delaware Response To Delaware's Choice, Lawrence Hamermesh, Norman Monhait
Lawrence A. Hamermesh
This article is an invited response to Professor Subramanian’s article “Delaware’s Choice.” The article expresses skepticism, for two primary reasons, about the need for the change to Delaware’s takeover statute that Professor Subramanian proposes. First, there is uncertainty that the constitutionality of that statute would be evaluated today under a test as demanding as the one that was applied when the statute was upheld in the late 1980s. Second, citing an earlier article by A. Gilchrist Sparks and Helen Bowers, we question whether a constitutional evaluation of the takeover statute should be limited to data on tender offers that are …
M&A Under Delaware's Public Benefit Corporation Statute: A Hypothetical Tour, Frederick Alexander, Lawrence Hamermesh, Frank Martin, Norman Monhait
M&A Under Delaware's Public Benefit Corporation Statute: A Hypothetical Tour, Frederick Alexander, Lawrence Hamermesh, Frank Martin, Norman Monhait
Lawrence A. Hamermesh
Noting the enthusiastic initial response to Delaware’s 2013 public benefit corporation statute, this Article presents a series of hypotheticals as vehicles for comment on issues that are likely to arise in the context of mergers and acquisitions of public benefit corporations. The Article first examines appraisal rights, concluding that such rights will be generally available to stockholders in public benefit corporations, and noting the potential for ambiguity in defining “fair value” where the corporation’s purposes extend to public purposes as well as private profit. Next, the Article examines whether and to what extent “Revlon” duties and limitations on deal protection …
Consent In Corporate Law, Lawrence Hamermesh
Consent In Corporate Law, Lawrence Hamermesh
Lawrence A. Hamermesh
Recent Delaware case law explores and extends what the author describes as the “doctrine of corporate consent,” under which a stockholder is deemed to consent to changes in the corporate relationship that are adopted pursuant to statutory authority (such as by directors adopting bylaws). This essay examines whether and to what extent there may be limits on the application of the doctrine of corporate consent, and whether fee-shifting bylaws exceed those limits.
Director Nominations, Lawrence Hamermesh
Director Nominations, Lawrence Hamermesh
Lawrence A. Hamermesh
“I don't care who does the electing, so long as I get to do the nominating.” William M. (“Boss”) Tweed. Shareholder election of directors is widely accepted as an important tool in corporate governance. As Boss Tweed’s aphorism demonstrates, the shareholder’s ability to nominate director candidates should therefore also be deemed important. With ever-increasing shareholder activism and increased sensitivity on the part of management to the prospect of director election contests, the scope of the right to nominate and the scope of permissible limitations of that right are likely to come under increasing scrutiny. Yet corporate statutes are largely silent …
An Introduction To The Federalist Society's Panelist Discussion Titled "Deregulating The Markets: The Jobs Act", Lawrence Hamermesh, Peter Tsoflias
An Introduction To The Federalist Society's Panelist Discussion Titled "Deregulating The Markets: The Jobs Act", Lawrence Hamermesh, Peter Tsoflias
Lawrence A. Hamermesh
At its 2012 National Lawyers Convention in Washington, D.C., the Corporations, Securities & Antitrust Practice Group of the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies hosted a panel discussion titled "Deregulating the Markets: The JOBS Act." The panel members were the Honorable Daniel M. Gallagher, Joseph H. Kaufman, Joanne T. Medero, Professor Robert T. Miller, and Professor Robert B. Thompson. The Honorable Frank H. Easterbrook moderated the discussion. This Article begins with a cursory overview of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (the "JOBS Act" or "Act") provisions discussed by the panelists. It then summarizes the positions expressed by …
Who Let You Into The House?, Lawrence Hamermesh
Who Let You Into The House?, Lawrence Hamermesh
Lawrence A. Hamermesh
Recent Congressional corporate governance initiatives have reallocated to independent directors the functions of hiring and supervising the work of certain “gatekeepers,” and some have proposed such a reallocation with respect to general counsel, as a means to address cognitive biases and capture by senior management that may prevent inside counsel from identifying and preventing corporate misconduct. That proposal, however, does not sufficiently account for the positive effect on corporate conduct arising from a close relationship of trust and confidence between general counsel and the CEO or other senior managers. Eliminating such a relationship is likely to undermine access to internal …
Delaware Corporate Law And The Model Business Corporation Act: A Study In Symbiosis, Jeffrey Gorris, Lawrence Hamermesh, Leo Strine
Delaware Corporate Law And The Model Business Corporation Act: A Study In Symbiosis, Jeffrey Gorris, Lawrence Hamermesh, Leo Strine
Lawrence A. Hamermesh
No abstract provided.
Silos, Corporate Law, And Bankruptcy Law, Lawrence Hamermesh
Silos, Corporate Law, And Bankruptcy Law, Lawrence Hamermesh
Lawrence A. Hamermesh
No abstract provided.
The Challenge To Delaware's Preeminence In Corporate Law, Lawrence Hamermesh
The Challenge To Delaware's Preeminence In Corporate Law, Lawrence Hamermesh
Lawrence A. Hamermesh
This short essay suggests that the focus on federal-state jurisdictional conflict over regulation of corporate governance in the U.S. is misplaced, and that declining levels of IPO's in the U.S. should be a concern shared by lawmakers at both state and federal levels. Those who reflexively advocate inflexible federal governance rules of wide application -- as opposed to regulatory reforms aimed carefully at unboundedly risky financial practices -- should prevail only upon a clear understanding that the potential benefits of such governance rules outweigh the risks associated with them.
Rationalizing Appraisal Standards In Compulsory Buyouts, Lawrence Hamermesh, Michael Wachter
Rationalizing Appraisal Standards In Compulsory Buyouts, Lawrence Hamermesh, Michael Wachter
Lawrence A. Hamermesh
This Article makes several contributions to the literature on Delaware appraisal law. We first argue that the "going concern value" standard adopted by the Delaware courts as the measure of "fair value" in share valuation proceedings is superior to its two main competitors, market value and third-party sale value, on grounds of both fairness and efficiency. Application of the going concern value standard has two important consequences. First, it is critical that going concern value be measured in a way that includes not only the present value of the existing assets of the corporation, but also the present value of …