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Expanding Mfw: Delaware Law Should Offer A Business Judgment Rule Safe Harbor For All Conflicted Controller Transactions, Alex Lindsey
Expanding Mfw: Delaware Law Should Offer A Business Judgment Rule Safe Harbor For All Conflicted Controller Transactions, Alex Lindsey
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
While courts usually defer to a board’s business decisions under the business judgment rule, courts will apply a much less deferential standard of review due to loyalty concerns if a conflicted controller is involved in a business decision such as a merger. However, in Kahn v. M & F Worldwide (“MFW”) when a squeeze out merger was challenged by a minority stockholder, the Delaware Supreme Court reviewed the transaction under the deferential business judgment rule standard because the Court found that the structure of the transaction neutralized the controller loyalty concerns. Building on this reasoning, the Court developed a checklist …
The Problem With The “Non-Class” Class: An Urgent Call For Improved Gatekeepers In Merger Objection Litigation, Josh Molder
The Problem With The “Non-Class” Class: An Urgent Call For Improved Gatekeepers In Merger Objection Litigation, Josh Molder
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
Until recently, class actions dominated merger objection litigation. However, plaintiff’s lawyers have constructed a “non-class” class where an individual suit can benefit from the leverage of a certified class without ever meeting the stringent class certification requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23. This new development has initiated a shift in merger objection litigation where plaintiffs are increasingly filing individual suits instead of class actions. However, this shift has left shareholders vulnerable to collusive settlements because plaintiff’s attorneys have significant control over these suits and a strong incentive to settle quickly for a substantial fee. Additionally, corporate defendants are …
A New Standard For Governance: Reflections On Worker Representation In The United States, Julian Constain
A New Standard For Governance: Reflections On Worker Representation In The United States, Julian Constain
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
The contemporary state of corporate law in the United States is one that is skewed toward the archaic principle of shareholder primacy. This narrow conception of corporate purpose has resulted in governance mechanisms that tend to overlook the many stakeholders that are affected by, and, in turn, affect the bottom line of modern corporations. In the wake of the recently proposed Accountable Capitalism Act, this Note investigates the viability of adopting a system of mandated worker board representation—codetermination—in the United States. The Note employs a comparative analysis of the German and Swedish experiences with codetermination, and then evaluates the policy, …