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Full-Text Articles in Law
Vertical Control, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Vertical Control, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Antitrust litigation often requires courts to consider challenges to vertical “control.” How does a firm injure competition by limiting the behavior of vertically related firms? Competitive injury includes harm to consumers, labor, or other suppliers from reduced output and higher margins.
Historically antitrust considers this issue by attempting to identify a market that is vertically related to the defendant, and then consider what portion of it is “foreclosed” by the vertical practice. There are better mechanisms for identifying competitive harm, including a more individualized look at how the practice injures the best placed firms or bears directly on a firm’s …
Law School News: Staff Person Of The Year 2021: Ann Marie Thompson 05/18/2021, Michael M. Bowden
Law School News: Staff Person Of The Year 2021: Ann Marie Thompson 05/18/2021, Michael M. Bowden
Life of the Law School (1993- )
No abstract provided.
A Suggested Revision Of The 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines (July 2021), Steven C. Salop
A Suggested Revision Of The 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines (July 2021), Steven C. Salop
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
The DOJ/ FTC Vertical Merger Guidelines (VMGs) were adopted by the FTC in June 2020 by a party-line 3-2 party line over the dissent of the Acting Chair. One might expect that the VMGs will be withdrawn and/or revised, now that there is a Democratic majority. Revision is appropriate because the VMGs are both incomplete and overly permissible. This Suggested Revision can aid that process.
Potential Competition And Antitrust Analysis: Monopoly Profits Exceed Duopoly Profits, Steven C. Salop
Potential Competition And Antitrust Analysis: Monopoly Profits Exceed Duopoly Profits, Steven C. Salop
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This short note prepared for an OECD meeting in June 2021 examines several antitrust issues involving analysis of potential competition. While the analysis is not new, it is still useful to collect them together in a unified fashion to show how they are related. In this regard, all the analysis and conclusions flow from the overarching (and obvious) points that exclusionary conduct and agreements that maintain monopoly power very often harm consumers, and that monopoly profits typically exceed the combined duopoly profits earned by the dominant firm and the entrant, if there is successful entry. While this is not inevitably …