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Quantifying The Increase In “Effective Concentration” From Verticle Mergers That Raise Input Foreclosure Concerns: Comment On The Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines, Serge Moresi, Steven C. Salop
Quantifying The Increase In “Effective Concentration” From Verticle Mergers That Raise Input Foreclosure Concerns: Comment On The Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines, Serge Moresi, Steven C. Salop
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This comment responds to the request by the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division for public comment on the draft 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines. In this comment, we show that there is an inherent loss of an indirect competitor and competition when a vertical merger raises input foreclosure concerns. We also show that it then is possible to calculate an effective increase in the HHI measure of concentration for the downstream market. We refer to this “proxy” measure as the “dHHI.” We derive the dHHI measure by comparing the pricing incentives and associated upward …