Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Institution
- Keyword
-
- AGI (1)
- Advanced Artificial General Intelligence and Contract (1)
- Banking (1)
- Basel Committee (1)
- Boards of directors (1)
-
- Business (1)
- Capital Regulation (1)
- Cognitive abilities (1)
- Corporate Governance Reform (1)
- Corporate Law (1)
- Corporate governance (1)
- Corporate law (1)
- Corporations (1)
- Dodd-Frank Act (1)
- Financial Crisis (1)
- Financial Institutions (1)
- Independent Directors (1)
- John Linarelli (1)
- Risk Management (1)
- Shareholder-Centrism (1)
- Turing test (1)
Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Law
Do Conflicts Of Interest Require Outside Boards? Yes. Bsps? Maybe., Usha Rodrigues
Do Conflicts Of Interest Require Outside Boards? Yes. Bsps? Maybe., Usha Rodrigues
Scholarly Works
From the Symposium: Outsourcing the Board: How Board Service Providers Can Improve Corporate Governance
Boards of directors are curious creatures. The law generally requires corporations to have them—indeed, they are the focus of the corporate law we teach in Business Associations in U.S. law schools. The corporation is managed by directors or under their direction; directors hire and fire officers; directors are necessary for fundamental transactions.
But the reason why corporations have directors is not entirely clear. In the prototypical privately held corporation, the family firm, the same individuals serve both as directors and officers. The CEO (better known as …
Corporate Governance Reform In Post-Crisis Financial Firms: Two Fundamental Tensions, Christopher Bruner
Corporate Governance Reform In Post-Crisis Financial Firms: Two Fundamental Tensions, Christopher Bruner
Scholarly Works
The manner in which financial firms are governed directly impacts the stability and sustainability of both the financial sector and the "real" economy, as the financial crisis and associated regulatory reform efforts have tragically demonstrated. However, two fundamental tensions continue to complicate efforts to reform corporate governance in post-crisis financial firms. The first relates to reliance on increased equity capital as a buffer against shocks and a means of limiting leverage. The tension here arises from the fact that no corporate constituency desires risk more than equity does, and that risk preference only tends to be stronger in banks, and …
Advanced Artificial Intelligence And Contract, John Linarelli
Advanced Artificial Intelligence And Contract, John Linarelli
Scholarly Works
The aim of this article is to inquire whether contract law can operate in a state of affairs in which artificial general intelligence (AGI) exists and has the cognitive abilities to interact with humans to exchange promises or otherwise engage in the sorts of exchanges typically governed by contract law. AGI is a long way off but its emergence may be sudden and come in the lifetimes of some people alive today. How might contract law adapt to a situation in which at least one of the contract parties could, from the standpoint of capacity to engage in promising and …