Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Law

Corporate Sociability: Analysing Motivations For Collaborative Regulation, Mark Findlay May 2014

Corporate Sociability: Analysing Motivations For Collaborative Regulation, Mark Findlay

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

The article explores the features and charts the principle theorizing of regulatory sociability from collaboration rather than intervention, whatever the interest-based motivation behind transforming crisis, toward orderliness. A key theme is the role played by corporations in facilitating and benefiting from sociability. A particular explanatory focus on the way in which corporate culture can change from predatory jurisdiction shopping to embracing mutuality of interests in the context of environmental sustainability is employed. The article concludes with a discussion of how, as compulsory discipline increases, it may produce compliance but at costs for regulatory sociability. The alternative regulatory paradigm is one …


Joint Product Improvement By Client And Customer Support Center: The Role Of Gain-Share Contracts In Coordination, Shantanu Bhattacharya, Alok Gupta, Sameer Hasija Mar 2014

Joint Product Improvement By Client And Customer Support Center: The Role Of Gain-Share Contracts In Coordination, Shantanu Bhattacharya, Alok Gupta, Sameer Hasija

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

We study the role of different contract types in coordinating the joint product improvement effort of a client and a customer support center. The customer support center's costly efforts at joint product improvement include transcribing and analyzing customer feedback, analyzing market trends, and investing in product design. Yet this cooperative role must be adequately incentivized by the client, since it could lead to fewer service requests and hence lower revenues for the customer support center. We model this problem as a sequential game with double-sided moral hazard in a principal-agent framework (in which the client is the principal). We follow …