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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Law
Selling Art: An Empirical Assessment Of Advertising On Fertility Clinics' Websites, Jim Hawkins
Selling Art: An Empirical Assessment Of Advertising On Fertility Clinics' Websites, Jim Hawkins
Indiana Law Journal
Scholarship on assisted reproductive technologies (ART) has emphasized the commercial nature of the interaction between fertility patients and their physicians, but little attention has been paid to precisely how clinics persuade patients to choose their clinics over their competitors’. This Article offers evidence about how clinics sell ART based on clinics’ advertising on their websites. To assess clinics’ marketing efforts, I coded advertising information on 372 fertility clinics’ websites. The results from the study confirm some suspicions of prior ART scholarship while contradicting others. For instance, in line with scholars who are concerned that racial minorities face barriers to accessing …
Selling Art Or Selling Out?: A Response To Selling Art: An Empirical Assessment Of Advertising On Fertility Clinics' Websites, Jody L. Madeira
Selling Art Or Selling Out?: A Response To Selling Art: An Empirical Assessment Of Advertising On Fertility Clinics' Websites, Jody L. Madeira
Indiana Law Journal
Roundtable on Regulating Assisted Reproductive Technology 2012
A Potential Game Changer In E-Commerce Taxation, David Gamage, Andrew J. Haile, Darien Shanske
A Potential Game Changer In E-Commerce Taxation, David Gamage, Andrew J. Haile, Darien Shanske
Articles by Maurer Faculty
In this essay, we evaluate recent legislative proposals for Congress to authorize state taxation of e-commerce. We argue that these proposals contain a potential game-changing innovation — the requirement that states provide remote sellers with “adequate software” for calculating use tax due within the state. Properly implemented, we explain how this innovation could force states to internalize the compliance costs of levying tax collection obligations on remote sellers, thereby incentivizing the states to simplify their sales and use tax statutes and resolving concerns about states overburdening interstate commerce.
Carrots And Sticks: How Vcs Induce Entrepreneurial Teams To Sell Startups, Brian J. Broughman, Jesse M. Fried
Carrots And Sticks: How Vcs Induce Entrepreneurial Teams To Sell Startups, Brian J. Broughman, Jesse M. Fried
Articles by Maurer Faculty
Venture capitalists (VCs) usually exit their investments in a startup via a trade sale. But the entrepreneurial team – the startup’s founder, other executives, and common shareholders – may resist a trade sale. Such resistance is likely to be particularly intense when the sale price is low relative to VCs’ liquidation preferences. Using a hand-collected dataset of Silicon Valley firms, we investigate how VCs overcome such resistance. We find, in our sample, that VCs give bribes (carrots) to the entrepreneurial team in 45% of trade sales; in these sales, carrots total an average of 9% of deal value. The overt …
Independent Directors And Shared Board Control In Venture Finance, Brian J. Broughman
Independent Directors And Shared Board Control In Venture Finance, Brian J. Broughman
Articles by Maurer Faculty
In most VC-backed firms neither the entrepreneurs nor the VC investors control the board. Instead control is typically shared with a mutually appointed independent director holding the tie-breaking seat. Contract theory, which treats control as an indivisible right held by one party, does not have a good explanation for this practice. Using a bargaining game similar to final offer arbitration, I show that an independent director as tie-breaker can reduce holdup by moderating each party’s ex post threat position, potentially expanding the range of firms which receive external financing. This project contributes to the literature on incomplete contracting and holdup, …