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Articles 1 - 13 of 13
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Trustee’S Strong Arm Power Under The Bankruptcy Code, David G. Carlson
The Trustee’S Strong Arm Power Under The Bankruptcy Code, David G. Carlson
Faculty Articles
No abstract provided.
Aviation Law And Regulation, Robert M. Hardaway, Paul Stephen Dempsey, William E. Thoms
Aviation Law And Regulation, Robert M. Hardaway, Paul Stephen Dempsey, William E. Thoms
Sturm College of Law: Faculty Scholarship
We sought to write a comprehensive reference book for aviation lawyers and practitioners, and airline and aircraft manufactuing executives in need of vital information regarding law and government regulation in the field of commercial and general aviation. We envision this book as an aid for the neophyte and experienced practitioner alike.
Postpetition Lending Under Section 364: Issues Regarding The Gap Period And Financing For Prepackaged Plans, David G. Epstein
Postpetition Lending Under Section 364: Issues Regarding The Gap Period And Financing For Prepackaged Plans, David G. Epstein
Law Faculty Publications
If the priorities provided by section 364(c) are insufficient to entice potential lenders to provide sufficient :financing to a Chapter 11 debtor, the debtor may, with the court's approval, obtain credit by granting the lender a lien on property of the debtor that is senior to existing liens on such property (a "priming lien"). The granting of such a priming lien, however, is subject to several statutory conditions. First, as with section 364(c), the debtor must prove that it cannot obtain credit on any less intrusive basis (i.e., through the use of section 364(a), (b), or (c)). Second, the debtor …
Why Have Chapter 11 Bankruptcies Failed So Miserably? A Reappraisal Of Congressional Attempts To Protect A Corporation's Net Operating Losses After Bankruptcy, Michelle A. Cecil
Why Have Chapter 11 Bankruptcies Failed So Miserably? A Reappraisal Of Congressional Attempts To Protect A Corporation's Net Operating Losses After Bankruptcy, Michelle A. Cecil
Faculty Publications
This Article will first outline the history of judicial and statutory limitations on the free transferability of net operating losses, highlighting congressional attempts to afford more favorable treatment to troubled corporations reorganizing in Title 11 proceedings. It will then examine the operation of section 382 of the 1986 Code, again focusing on those provisions designed to assist in the successful reorganization of these corporations, and will demonstrate the wholesale inability of these provisions to preserve the net operating losses of troubled corporations. Finally, the Article will propose an amendment to section 382 that would increase the likelihood that corporations will …
The Flip Side Of Twist Cap: Letters Of Credit As Executory Contracts In Bankruptcy, Stephen M. Mcjohn
The Flip Side Of Twist Cap: Letters Of Credit As Executory Contracts In Bankruptcy, Stephen M. Mcjohn
Suffolk University Law School Faculty Works
This article analyzes the treatment of letters of credit as executory contracts in bankruptcy. Some courts had stated that the bankruptcy of the beneficiary terminates a letter of credit. This article concludes that decisions were incorrect in treating a letter of credit as an executory contract to provide financial accommodations to the beneficiary. A letter of credit is not a means to provide credit to the beneficiary: it is a means to provide credit to the applicant (and thereby allowing the applicant and beneficiary to avoid extending credit to each other). The issuer is not dependent on the credit risk …
Bankruptcy-Based Discrimination, Douglass G. Boshkoff
Bankruptcy-Based Discrimination, Douglass G. Boshkoff
Articles by Maurer Faculty
No abstract provided.
Bargaining And The Division Of Value In Corporate Reorganization, Howard F. Chang, Lucian A. Bebchuk
Bargaining And The Division Of Value In Corporate Reorganization, Howard F. Chang, Lucian A. Bebchuk
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Nature And Effect Of Corporate Voting In Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, David A. Skeel Jr.
The Nature And Effect Of Corporate Voting In Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, David A. Skeel Jr.
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Bankruptcy In The Seventh Circuit: 1991, Douglass Boshkoff
Bankruptcy In The Seventh Circuit: 1991, Douglass Boshkoff
Articles by Maurer Faculty
No abstract provided.
Running The Asylum: Governance Problems In Bankruptcy Reorganizations, Christopher W. Frost
Running The Asylum: Governance Problems In Bankruptcy Reorganizations, Christopher W. Frost
Law Faculty Scholarly Articles
Like much of life, the study of bankruptcy is the study of leverage. Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code may be appropriately described as providing a framework within which interested parties may negotiate solutions to the problems facing a troubled company. The allocation of leverage to the negotiating parties is critical to the ultimate outcome of the process. In any negotiation setting control over the bargaining process is a key item of leverage. This Article proposes a framework for analysis and suggests solutions to the problem of control over corporations during the pendency of a Chapter 11 reorganization …
"Reasonable Expectations" Define Board Power To Liquidate A Solvent Close Corporation In Bankruptcy, Shelby D. Green
"Reasonable Expectations" Define Board Power To Liquidate A Solvent Close Corporation In Bankruptcy, Shelby D. Green
Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications
This Article will argue that, in the absence of contrary provisions in the articles of incorporation, the power of the board of directors of a solvent close corporation to file a voluntary petition for liquidation in bankruptcy must be determined by the theory of “reasonable expectations.” This doctrine not only addresses wrongdoing by those in control, but also defines the power and rights of close corporation participants. Part II briefly considers the uses of bankruptcy in recent years and comments on the peculiar occasion of a solvent corporation deciding to liquidate in bankruptcy. Part III summarizes the facts and identifies …
Erisa: Anti-Alienation Superiority In Bankruptcy, George Lee Flint Jr
Erisa: Anti-Alienation Superiority In Bankruptcy, George Lee Flint Jr
Faculty Articles
Both ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code consider the issue of debtor-participant’s interest in certain pension trusts when an action has been undertaken against the bankrupt debtor participant’s estate. Many jurisdictions have offered conflicting views on the handling of the interest. These conflicts create litigious interpretation and choice of law problems and place plan administrators at risk for breach of fiduciary duty depending on jurisdictional interpretation. Paying-out a bankruptcy trustee’s turnover demand could affect the tax qualified status of the pension plan, thereby hurting all plan participants. ERISA’s preemption provision was drafted to create uniformity among the states in interpreting employee …
Airlines, Airports And Antitrust: A Proposed Strategy For Enhanced Competition, Robert M. Hardaway, Paul Stephen Dempsey
Airlines, Airports And Antitrust: A Proposed Strategy For Enhanced Competition, Robert M. Hardaway, Paul Stephen Dempsey
Sturm College of Law: Faculty Scholarship
Most of this country's major airports are monopolies or duopolies at which one or two dominant carriers control a high percentage of terminal facilities. Airlines have used this market power to raise fares on flights originating and terminating at such airports. Although this power has been gained in part through the process of buy-outs and mergers in the airline industry itself, it has also been gained through actions taken in concert with airport authorities, such as when agreements are entered into that effectively limit the availability of airport facilities to new entrants and other competitors. Airlines, by virtue of rights …