Law Commons^™

Corporate Restructuring Under Relative And Absolute Priority Default Rules: A Comparative Assessment, Jonathan M. Seymour, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

The European Union recently adopted a Restructuring Directive intended to facilitate the reorganization of insolvent and other financially troubled firms. Although the central goal of the Directive parallels that of chapter 11 of U.S. bankruptcy law—to protect and maximize the value of financially distressed but economically viable enterprises by consensually reorganizing their capital structure—the Directive introduces an innovative but controversial option: that EU Member States can decree that reorganization negotiations should be subject to a relative priority default rule, in contrast to the type of absolute priority default rule used by chapter 11. EU officials argue that relative priority is …

The Limited Lifespan Of The Bankruptcy Estate: Managing Consumer And Small Business Reorganizations, Jonathan M. Seymour

Faculty Scholarship

Congress has a great affinity for debt adjustment bankruptcies. These are bankruptcies in which a debtor keeps rather than liquidates her assets and instead repays creditors out of future income. Chapter 13, which allows individual consumer debtors to reorganize in this way, was supplemented in 1986 by chapter 12 for farm bankruptcies. In 2019, in the largest expansion of debt adjustment bankruptcies since the Bankruptcy Code was enacted, Congress made debt adjustment bankruptcy available to small businesses.

The reality is, however, that most debt adjustment bankruptcies fail. For that reason, the relative rights of debtors and creditors when tensions arise …

Cracking The Code: An Empirical Analysis Of Consumer Bankruptcy Outcomes, Sara Sternberg Greene, Parina Patel, Katherine M. Porter

Faculty Scholarship

Chapter 13 is a cornerstone of the bankruptcy system. Its legal requirements strike a balance between the rehabilitation of debtors through keeping assets and reducing debt, and the repayment of creditors over a period of years. Despite the accolades from policymakers, the hard truth is that the majority of the half-million families each year that seek refuge in chapter 13 bankruptcy will not achieve the debt relief of a discharge. Prior research found that those who drop out of bankruptcy quickly endure the serious financial struggles that they had before bankruptcy—now even worse off for having spent thousands of dollars …

Puerto Rico And The Netherworld Of Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Mitu Gulati, Robert K. Rasmussen

Faculty Scholarship

Puerto Rico has incurred debt well beyond its ability to repay. It attempted to address its fiscal woes through legislation allowing the restructuring of some its debt. The Supreme Court put a stop to this effort, holding that Congress in the Bankruptcy Code barred the Commonwealth from enacting its own restructuring regime. Yet all agreed that the Bankruptcy Code did not provide anything in its place. While Congress quickly enacted PROMESA in an attempt to address the Puerto Rico’s fiscal ills, we explore in this paper whether Congress has the power to bar Puerto Rico from enacting a restructuring mechanism …

Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Model-Law Approach, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

The existing contractual framework for sovereign debt restructuring is sorely inadequate. Whether or not their fault, nations sometimes take on debt burdens that become unsustainable. Until resolved, the resulting sovereign debt problem hurts not only those nations (such as Greece) but also their citizens, their creditors, and—by posing serious systemic risks to the international financial system—the wider economic community. The existing contractual framework functions poorly to resolve the problem because it often leaves little alternative between a sovereign debt bailout, which is costly and creates moral hazard, and a default, which raises the specter of systemic financial contagion.

Most observers …

Targeted Subordination Of Official Sector Debt, Lee C. Buchheit, Mitu Gulati

Faculty Scholarship

If Greece’s debt is unsustainable, and most observers (including the IMF) seem to think it is, the country’s only source of funding will continue to be official sector bailout loans. Languishing for a decade or more as a ward of the official sector is undesirable from all perspectives. The Greeks bridle under what they see as foreign imposed austerity; the taxpayers who fund the official sector loans to Greece balk at the prospect of shoveling good money after bad. The question then is how to facilitate Greece’s ability to tap the private capital markets at tolerable interest rates. The IMF’s …

A Model-Law Approach To Restructuring Unsustainable Sovereign Debt, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Unresolved sovereign debt problems are hurting debtor nations, their citizens and their creditors, and also can pose serious systemic threats to the international financial system. The existing contractual restructuring approach is insufficient to make sovereign debt sustainable. Although a more systematic legal resolution framework is needed, a formal multilateral approach, such as a treaty, is not currently politically viable. An informal model-law approach should be legally, politically and economically feasible. This informal approach would not require multilateral acceptance. Because most sovereign debt contracts are governed by either New York or English law, it would be sufficient if one or both …

Towards A “Rule Of Law” Approach To Restructuring Sovereign Debt, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Role Of The Imf In Future Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Report Of The Annenberg House Expert Group, Douglas G. Baird, Nicole Bollen, Lee C. Buchheit, Mitu Gulati, Anne O. Krueger, Fridrik Mar Balursson, Robert K. Rasmussen, David A. Skeel Jr., Sergei Storchak, Jeromin Settelmeyer

Faculty Scholarship

A meeting of international finance and insolvency experts was held on November 2, 2013 at the Annenberg House in Santa Monica, California. The meeting was co-hosted by the USC Law School and the Annenberg Retreat at Sunnylands. The goal was to solicit the views of experts on the implications of the IMF’s April 26, 2013 paper captioned “Sovereign Debt Restructuring -- Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund’s Legal and Policy Framework”. The April 26 paper may signal a shift in IMF policies in the area of sovereign debt workouts. Although the Expert Group discussed a number of the ideas …

Revisiting Sovereign Bankruptcy, Lee C. Buchheit, Anna Gelpern, Mitu Gulati, Ugo Panizza, Beatrice Weder Di Mauro, Jeromin Zettelmeyer

Faculty Scholarship

Sovereign debt crises occur regularly and often violently. Yet there is no legally and politically recognized procedure for restructuring the debt of bankrupt sovereigns. Procedures of this type have been periodically debated, but so far been rejected, for two main reasons. First, countries have been reluctant to give up power to supranational rules or institutions, and creditors and debtors have felt that there were sufficient instruments for addressing debt crises at hoc. Second, fears that making debt easier to restructure would raise the costs and reduce the amounts of sovereign borrowing in many countries. This was perceived to be against …

A Minimalist Approach To State ‘Bankruptcy’, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Increasingly finding themselves in financial straitjackets, states have been turning to austerity measures, tax increases, privatization of services, and renegotiation of collective bargaining agreements. Absent a federal government bailout, however, states will also need debt relief if their debt burden becomes so crushing that reasonable efforts at fiscal reform will fail to avoid default. Some advocate providing this relief by, effectively, extending municipal bankruptcy law to states. That approach brings in excess baggage, however, engendering political opposition and constitutional concerns. There is a simpler solution: Enable states to work out their debt problems with their creditors. Although the main obstacle …

Sovereign Debt Reform And The Best Interest Of Creditors, William W. Bratton, G. Mitu Gulati

Faculty Scholarship

In April 2002 the International Monetary Fund introduced a sovereign bankruptcy proposal only to be rebuffed by the United States Treasury. Where the IMF wanted a mandatory bankruptcy regime, the Treasury wanted to solve distress problems with contractual devices. Sovereign bondholders and sovereign issuers themselves flatly rejected both proposals, even though they were nominally the beneficiaries of both proponents. This Article addresses and explains this bondholder reaction. In so doing, it takes a highly skeptical view of the IMF's proposal even as it shows that the incentive structure surrounding sovereign lending renders untenable the Treasury's contractarian proposal. The Article's analysis …