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Bankruptcy Law

Seattle University School of Law

Faculty Articles

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Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law

Grassroots Shareholder Activism In Large Commercial Bankruptcies, Diane Lourdes Dick Jan 2015

Grassroots Shareholder Activism In Large Commercial Bankruptcies, Diane Lourdes Dick

Faculty Articles

In early 2013, a group of similarly situated individuals gathered to discuss how they could defend themselves against a grave potential injustice. Time was of the essence, so they would need to act quickly to preserve their rights. Fortunately, their path to justice was already paved: the matter was pending in federal court, and each had standing to appear and be heard. But frustratingly, this seemingly well-paved path was barred to them. These individuals, who were technically parties to the proceeding, were virtually invisible to the court and largely disenfranchised in settlement negotiations. Striving to overcome these obstacles, they persisted …


Bankruptcy’S Corporate Tax Loophole, Diane Lourdes Dick Jan 2014

Bankruptcy’S Corporate Tax Loophole, Diane Lourdes Dick

Faculty Articles

Imagine you are a company with a failing business that is drowning in debt. On the bright side, you also possess a very valuable asset. This asset is unique because, unlike most assets, if you liquidate the business through a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, it will be extinguished and its value will not be realized by any shareholders or creditors. On the other hand, even if you substantially liquidate the business using Chapter 11, you can, thanks to an extraordinary ambiguity in the law, preserve this valuable asset. Even better, you can direct the value of this asset to your preferred …


The Chapter 11 Efficiency Fallacy, Diane Lourdes Dick Dec 2013

The Chapter 11 Efficiency Fallacy, Diane Lourdes Dick

Faculty Articles

This article challenges the persistent claim that Chapter 11's increasing utilization of market mechanisms will help facilitate economically efficient resolutions of corporate financial distress. Using two recent case studies, this article shows that, in fact, these mechanisms are used by stakeholders with existing market power to take control of the restructuring process and extract rents at the expense of other constituents: creditors, equity holders, and—in the case of companies that receive governmental bailouts—taxpayers. These distortionary effects are obscured by a dominant, neoclassical legal paradigm that ignores institutional and political dynamics. This article advances a new explanatory model that draws upon …