Law Commons^™

Managers’ Fiduciary Duties In Financially Distressed Corporations: Chaos In Delaware (And Elsewhere), Rutheford B. Campbell Jr., Christopher W. Frost

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

The inherent conflict between creditors and shareholders has long occupied courts and commentators interested in corporate governance. Creditors holding fixed claims to the corporation's assets generally prefer corporate decision making that minimizes the risk of firm failure. Shareholders, in contrast, have a greater appetite for risk, because, as residual owners, they reap the rewards of firm success while sharing the risk of loss with creditors.

Traditionally, this conflict is mediated by a governance structure that imposes a fiduciary duty on the corporation's managers-its officers and directors-to maximize the value of the shareholders' interests in the firm. In this traditional view, …

The Past And Future Of Kentucky's Fraudulent Transfer And Preference Laws, Douglas C. Michael

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

An important part of the law of creditors' remedies is the ability of creditors to recover property formerly held by the debtor, but transferred to others under circumstances that are considered to be unfair or inequitable. There are two principal ways a creditor can seek to have a debtor's transfer characterized as unfair in order to recover it. First, a transfer to another creditor or a third party can be fraudulent as to one or all of the remaining creditors, or may be deemed to be fraudulent because of the circumstances surrounding the transfer, such as a transfer made by …