Law Commons^™

Crowdsourcing (Bankruptcy) Fee Control, Matthew Bruckner

Matthew Adam Bruckner

In this article, I explore how crowdsourcing can help reduce the cost of professional representation in corporate bankruptcy cases. The cost of professional representation in bankruptcy cases is currently a hot topic, with oral argument haven taken place before the U.S. Supreme Court in Baker Botts L.L.P. v. Asarco, L.L.C. in February 2015, which case addressed various issues raised in my article. In brief, the fees of lawyers, investment bankers, and other bankruptcy professionals has been spiraling out of control because chapter 11’s existing fee control system is broken. That system can neither identify nor control professional overcharging, which empirical …

Flexible Finality In Bankruptcy: The Right To Appeal A Denial Of Plan Confirmation, Joseph L. Nepowada

Joseph L Nepowada

This Article examines the current state of the law interpreting what “finality” means in context of a bankruptcy proceeding and what effect that interpretation has on the appealability of certain orders, such as the denial of plan confirmation under a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding. The article highlights nine courts of appeals and their decisions concerning the appealability of a denial of a plan confirmation and it is apparent that the courts are split with three courts of appeal allowing a debtor to appeal a denial of plan confirmation as a matter of right, while six courts of appeal will deny …

Against Regulatory Displacement: An Institutional Analysis Of Financial Crises, Jonathan C. Lipson

Jonathan C. Lipson

This paper uses “institutional analysis”—the study of the relative capacities of markets, courts, and regulators—to make three claims about financial crises.

First, financial crises are increasingly a problem of “regulatory displacement.” Through the ad hoc rescues of 2008 and the Dodd-Frank reforms of 2010, regulators displace market and judicial processes that ordinarily prevent financial distress from becoming financial crises. Because regulators are vulnerable to capture by large financial services firms, however, they cannot address the pathologies that create crises: market concentration and complexity. Indeed, regulators may inadvertently aggravate these conditions through resolution tactics that consolidate firms, and the volume and …