Law Commons^™

Who Benefits From Corporate Tax Cuts?: Evidence From Banks And Credit Unions Around The Tcja, Edward Fox, Benjamin David Pyle

Faculty Scholarship

The TCJA of 2017 made large changes to the taxation of corporate and pass-through businesses in the U.S. Understanding the effects of these changes is complicated by the difficulty of finding control firms whose taxation was not altered by the Act. We study the effect of the TCJA on small and medium size banks using credit unions—which compete with these banks for deposits and in making loans—as a novel control group. Credit unions were not taxed both before and after the Act. Using a difference-in-difference framework, we find that an important fraction of the incidence of the tax cut goes …

The Tailors Of Wall Street, Graham S. Steele

University of Colorado Law Review

The narrative that emerged in the aftermath of the COVID-19 financial crisis has focused on nonbank financial intermediation as the primary vulnerability that plagued financial markets starting in March of 2020 and the exogenous nature of a public health crisis as a unique precipitating event. As a result, the crisis has largely been viewed as vindication for financial regulation as it applies to banks, with the Federal Reserve playing the role of heroic rescuer of the financial system.

This Article offers an alternative-and critical-analysis of the performance of banks during the COVID-19 financial crisis and the Fed's role as a …

The Role Of Rival Litigation In Wilmarth's New Glass-Steagall, Heidi Mandanis Schooner

University of Colorado Law Review

No abstract provided.

Who's Looking Out For The Banks?, Jeremy C. Kress

University of Colorado Law Review

When the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act authorized financial conglomeration in 1999, Professor Arthur Wilmarth, Jr. presciently predicted that diversified financial holding companies would try to exploit their bank subsidiaries by transferring government subsidies to their nonbank affiliates. To prevent financial conglomerates from taking advantage of their insured depository subsidiaries in this way, policymakers instructed a bank's board of directors to act in the best interests of the bank, rather than the bank's holding company. This symposium Article, written in honor of Professor Wilmarth's retirement, contends that this legal safeguard ignores a critical conflict of interest: the vast majority of large-bank directors also …

Afterword: Why "Taming The Megabanks" Should Remain A Top Priority For Financial Regulators And Policymakers, Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr.

University of Colorado Law Review

No abstract provided.