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Articles 1 - 8 of 8
Full-Text Articles in Law
Downstream Securities Regulation, Anita Krug
Downstream Securities Regulation, Anita Krug
All Faculty Scholarship
Securities regulation wears two hats. Its “upstream” side governs firms in connection with their obtaining financing in the securities markets. That is, it regulates firms’ and issuers’ offers and sales of securities, whether in public offerings to retail investors or in private offerings to institutional investors. Its “downstream” side, by contrast, governs financial services providers, who assist with investors’ activities in those markets. Their services include providing advice regarding securities investments, as investment advisers do; aggregating investors’ assets for purposes of enabling those investors to invest their assets collectively, as mutual funds do; and acting as “middlemen” between buyers and …
A Comparative Study Of Monitoring Of Management In German And U.S. Corporations After Sarbanes-Oxley: Where Are The German Enrons, Worldcoms, And Tycos?, Florian Stamm
Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law
No abstract provided.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Of 2002: Are Stricter Internal Controls Constricting International Companies?, Jennifer K. Coalson
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Of 2002: Are Stricter Internal Controls Constricting International Companies?, Jennifer K. Coalson
Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law
No abstract provided.
Present At The Creation: Reflections On The Early Years Of The National Association Of Corporate Directors, Lawrence J. Trautman
Present At The Creation: Reflections On The Early Years Of The National Association Of Corporate Directors, Lawrence J. Trautman
Lawrence J. Trautman Sr.
Effective corporate governance is critical to the productive operation of the global economy and preservation of our way of life. Excellent governance execution is also required to achieve economic growth and robust job creation in any country. In the United States, the premier director membership organization is the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD). Since 1978, NACD plays a major role in fostering excellence in corporate governance in the United States and beyond. The NACD has grown from a mere realization of the importance of corporate governance to become the only national membership organization created by and for corporate directors. …
Corporate Governance Theory And Review Of Board Decisions, Christopher M. Bruner
Corporate Governance Theory And Review Of Board Decisions, Christopher M. Bruner
Scholarly Works
No abstract provided.
Improving Hedge Fund Governance, Houman B. Shadab
Improving Hedge Fund Governance, Houman B. Shadab
Articles & Chapters
This Article provides the first comprehensive scholarly analysis of the internal governance of hedge funds. Hedge fund governance consists of the funds’ underlying legal regime and the practices they adopt in response to lacking permanent capital and to reduce agency costs. Hedge fund governance is important because better governance can improve investor returns and help managers raise and retain capital. I argue that hedge fund governance is best understood as a type of responsive managerialism. It is a type of managerialism because applicable law and contracting structures give managers uniquely wide-ranging control over the fund and its operations. Hedge fund …
The Governance Structure Of Shadow Banking, Steven L. Schwarcz
The Governance Structure Of Shadow Banking, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Governance Structure Of Shadow Banking: Rethinking Assumptions About Limited Liability, Steven L. Schwarcz
The Governance Structure Of Shadow Banking: Rethinking Assumptions About Limited Liability, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
In an earlier article, I argued that shadow banking — the provision of financial services and products outside of the traditional banking system, and thus without the need for bank intermediation between capital markets and the users of funds — is so radically transforming finance that regulatory scholars need to rethink their basic assumptions. This article attempts to rethink the corporate governance assumption that owners of firms should always have their liability limited to the capital they have invested. In the relatively small and decentralized firms that dominate shadow banking, equity investors tend to be active managers. Limited liability gives …