Law Commons^™

The Banker Removal Power, Da Lin

Law Faculty Publications

The Federal Reserve (“the Fed”) can remove bankers from office if they violate the law, engage in unsafe or unsound practices, or breach their fiduciary duties. The Fed, however, has used this power so rarely that few even realize it exists. Although major U.S. banks have admitted to repeated and flagrant lawbreaking in recent years, the Fed has never removed a senior executive from one of these institutions.

This Article offers the first comprehensive account of the banker removal power. It makes four contributions. First, drawing on a range of primary sources, it recovers the power’s statutory foundations, showing that …

Introduction: The Rise Of Fintech, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

This foreword introduces "The Rise of Fintech," a series of essays published in a symposium issue of the Washington University Journal of Law & Policy. The contributions examine the structure of firms and markets, considering fintech activities occurring within existing firms and regulatory perimeters and activities that spill over the boundaries we currently take for granted. The contributors examine the emerging regulatory responses to fintech, taxonomizing them. They consider which regulatory approaches, or ecosystems, will best help fintech to develop. They examine how fintech applies to fundraising, examining initial coin offerings (ICOs) and equity crowdfunding, techniques that attract attention for …

Financial Regulation In The Bitcoin Era, William Magnuson

Faculty Scholarship

The recent decade has witnessed an extraordinary degree of innovation in the financial sector. Developments in financial technology, computing power, and networking theory have allowed decentralized online platforms such as Bitcoin to fundamentally change the way that financial services are provided. While these innovations have been applauded by many as bringing a welcome degree of competition to a sector long dominated by powerful incumbents, they also create a set of challenges for current financial regulation. How do fiduciary standards apply to algorithms? How does online finance affect the behavior of investors? And more generally, how can regulators monitor and constrain …

Too Big To Supervise: The Rise Of Financial Conglomerates And The Decline Of Discretionary Oversight In Banking, Lev Menand

Faculty Scholarship

The authority of government officials to define and elimi­nate “unsafe and unsound” banking practices is one of the oldest and broadest powers in U.S. banking law. But this authority has been neglected in the recent literature, in part because of a movement in the 1990s to convert many supervi­sory judgments about “safety and soundness” into bright-line rules. This movement did not entirely do away with discre­tionary oversight, but it refocused supervisors on compliance, risk management, and governance – in other words, on inter­nal bank processes.

Drawing on the rules versus standards debate, this Arti­cle develops a taxonomy for parsing the …

Notes From The Border: Writing Across The Administrative Law/Financial Regulation Divide, Robert B. Ahdieh

Faculty Scholarship

A central feature – if not the central feature – of legal scholarship today is analysis across divides.

It is surprising, then, how little has been written across the divide that separates administrative law and financial regulation. That is perhaps especially so, given the modest nature of the relevant divide: one that is intra- rather than interdisciplinary, one that operates within rather than across geographic boundaries, and one that involves no temporal dimension but operates entirely within current-day law.

For all the proximity in their interests, targets of study, and even analytical tools, however, scholars of administrative law and of …

“Private” Means To “Public” Ends: Governments As Market Actors, Robert C. Hockett, Saule T. Omarova

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Many people recognize that governments can play salutary roles in relation to markets by (a) “overseeing” market behavior from “above,” or (b) supplying foundational “rules of the game” from “below.” It is probably no accident that these widely recognized roles also sit comfortably with traditional conceptions of government and market, pursuant to which people tend categorically to distinguish between “public” and “private” spheres of activity.

There is a third form of government action that receives less attention than forms (a) and (b), however, possibly owing in part to its straddling the traditional public/private divide. We call it the “government as …

Hazardous Hedging: The (Unacknowledged) Risks Of Hedging With Credit Derivatives, Gina-Gail S. Fletcher

Articles by Maurer Faculty

Is hedging with credit derivatives always beneficial? The benefit of hedging with credit derivatives, such as credit default swaps, is presumed by the Dodd-Frank Act, which excludes hedge transactions from much of the new financial regulation. Yet, new, significant risks can arise when credit derivatives are used to manage risks. Hedging, therefore, should be defined not only in relation to whether a transaction offsets risks, but also whether, on balance, the risks that are mitigated, as well as any new risks that arise, are outweighed by the potential benefits.

Firms using credit derivatives to hedge often fail to account for …

Towards A Legal Theory Of Finance, Katharina Pistor

Faculty Scholarship

This paper develops the building blocks for a legal theory of finance. LTF holds that financial markets are legally constructed and as such occupy an essentially hybrid place between state and market, public and private. At the same time, financial markets exhibit dynamics that frequently put them in direct tension with commitments enshrined in law or contracts. This is the case especially in times of financial crises when the full enforcement of legal commitments would result in the self-destruction of the financial system. This law-finance paradox tends to be resolved by suspending the full force of law where the survival …

Conflicted Gatekeepers: The Volcker Rule And Goldman Sachs, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

In many areas of regulation, rules require one person to act with loyalty to another person, or at least constrain one person’s pursuit of self-interest by restricting the extent to which that person may act in conflict with the interests of another person. These rules are typically justified on the basis of reducing (economic) agency costs. However, recently-adopted provisions in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which include the so-called Volcker Rule, impose such conflict of interest rules on underwriters selling securities to investors, including sophisticated investors - a context in which agency costs do not arise. …

Is The Bankruptcy Code An Adequate Mechanism For Resolving The Distress Of Systemically Important Institutions?, Edward R. Morrison

Faculty Scholarship

The President and members of Congress are considering proposals that would give the government broad authority to rescue financial institutions whose failure might threaten market stability. These systemically important institutions include bank and insurance holding companies, investment banks, and other "large, highly leveraged, and interconnected" entities that are not currently subject to federal resolution authority. Interest in these proposals stems from the credit crisis, particularly the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. That bankruptcy, according to some observers, caused massive destabilization in credit markets for two reasons. First, market participants were surprised that the government would permit a massive market player to …